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FOREWORD
Philosophy is the quest for wisdom and hence it may
share a common end with religion.

Not all philosoph ies are,

however, concerned with this end, nor, again 1 are all religions involved with a quest for· wisdom.

There may be differ-

ent techniques and tools em ployed in the accomplishment of
wisdom_, but this dissertat.ion is concerned only with the
study of the nature and use of reason.

In the philosophy of

Plato reason is employed in diverse fields· including mathematics, myths, and elaborate analogies, but when he turns to
reason itself, then it becomes important to this analysis.
Reason may be utilized in other systems of thought, say in
Aristotelian, but when it is functioning as the sole or paramount vehicle to the Good--then it is the subject for this
paper and its contents will be examined.

In the works of

Plato, the use of reason in this· sense is tenn·ed dialectic.
The terms "philosophy" and "dialectic" are, of course,
derived from the Greek.

It is equally clear that a rad"ical

change has· occurred in the meanings of these terms from the
original formulation in the Hellenic Age to the present day.
The primary and original meanings of these terms have been
nearly eclipsed by modern usages and there is a confusion as
to the basic ·meanings and content of these terms.
lem is further complicated by the tacit

J

agree~ent

This probthat

l

I
I

v

whatever is modern, or of late origin, must be better than
what preceded it.
to

exa~ine

·Hence there is today a general reluctance

basic origins and classic sources.

Contrary to

this belief is the concept that every real advance is a
result of returning to the basic origins· and sources and
redefining problems from this perspective.
base itself on the latter concept.

This work will

The final object will be

to re-examine the grounds and the extent to which philosophy
can be termed dialectical.

It is a request to reconsider

philosophy in the terms of dialectic.
A return to origins, in this case, is a return to the
Greeks and the terms philosophy and dialectic will be defined
with reference to the classic philosopher and dialectician-Plato.

The Platonic concept

o~

dialectic is to be utilized

as a s-t andard and basis of judging other systems that have
been termed dialectical.

Further, the work intends to reply

to the criticism that philosophy, including philosophy as
dialectic, has been superseded by .religion since religion
rather than philosophy can better insure the object of philosophy--wisdom.

Such a rejection of philosophy and dialec-

tic must of course presuppose a familiarity with the process
of the Platonic dialectic as well as its scope.

Thus, a

rejection, to be considered, must d-e monstrat·e a knowledge of
Plato and an understanding of the dialectic.

A decline of

philosophy and dialectic based upon a valid criticism would

j
vi
be justified.

On the other hand, it is important to discern

the mechanism implicit in a denial of philosophy, as well as
dialectic, in order to discern the consequences that follow
from such a d-enial.

Different systems of thought have been

termed dialectic and those chosen for analysis will be examined to determine whether they advance the concept of dialectic as defined in the thesis, and if they do not, to see if
it is possible to assign a cause.

The deficiencies and

inadequacies of the Platonic concept of philosophy as dialectic will also be shown and an attempt to correct this will be
made by recourse to other traditions of thought.
In the succeedine chapters, the analysis will include
Augustine, Vico, Kant, Hegel, and Jung, as well as Gaudapada,
Sankara, Nagarjuna, Confucius, and Lao

Tzu~

These authors

have been chosen because of their use of dialectic and/or
because they can contribute to the concept of dialectic as a
philosophy as noted in this thesis.

There ·i s no intention to

review or appraise any part of their work, except as regards
their use of dialectic in selected instances.

The philoso-

phers are chosen to support and to illustrate the thesis of
this dissertation.
Therefore the task will be to define dialectic within
the philosophy of Plato, to account for its decline or rejection, analyze some- private definitions of dialectic, and to
correct any shortcomings or inadequacies of dialectic.

CHAPTER I

THE. ANATOMY OF DIALECTIC
I.

PLATO

To understand the works of :Plato, it is first important to fix clearly the role of Socrates, the questioner, and
to determine the scope of his activities.

The dialogues are

records of conversations, come actuall some ideal, and they
present many excellent examples of the Socratic method.

The

Socratic method--the quest.ion and answer t .echnique--is the
dialectical method in the original and primary meaning of
that word.

In the dialogue the Theaetetus, there is a cl.ear

and definitive statement of Socrates as a dialectician functioning in his twin role as
of the new-born.

matchm~~er

and judge, or

examine~

He is presented as a ttmidwife" because he

attends the labors of men pregnant with ideas and examines
the result to see if it is a genuine birth or if it must be
aborted.

It is in the function of examiner that he calls

"the triumph of my- art"l for he must see if the ttthought
which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false ·idol
or a noble and true birth.n2

In this lies his paramount

ln. Jmfett (trans.), The Dialo~ues
House,
1937), "Theaetetus," 15 b.
Random
2Ibid .• , l50c •

.J

2f. Plato (New York:.

2

intere-st.

If others come who are not "pregnant,_, if they are

"empty," then he functions in the o th er capacity of midwifery
---a matchmaker.

He "matches" them to other teachers.

~here

ar: ot~ers, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently
noth1ng 1n them; as I know they have _no need of my
art, I coax them into marrying someone, and by the erace
of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them some
good. Many have I given to Prodicus, and many to other
inspired sages .3

_hav~ne

A-s a midwife, he himself must be barren, past gi vine
birth to concepts of his own design, "but /JSo{J does not
allow me to bring forth."4

Thus in the Socratic method,

there is a questioner who is compelled not to add
during the birth process.

anythin~

Within the dialectic the ques-

tianer, Socrates, must be active in the delivery but passive
before the activity.

This is the role of the midwife;

barren,, he remains silent, spinning no theories himself,. "nor
have I anything to show which is the invention of my soul."5
It might be argued that the "midwife" is only a literary
symbol, a poetic metaphor, which is not therefore a valid
object from which to draw logical deductions, yet the symbol
embodies the precise laws and rules of operation for dialectic.

Further, in the dialogue the Theaetetus, he clearly

states again, without ambiguity or tie to the metaphor:
But you do not see that in the reality none of ·these
theories come from me; they come from him who talks with

3rbid., l5la-b.

1

4Ibid., 150d.

J

me. I only know just enough ~o extract them from. tl:ewisdom of_.another and to rece1 ve them in a sp.;r 1· t
fairness.6
~
of
The procedure is to elicit the birth of an idea from another
and then to examine its character.
The acting out of the role of questioner has often
been considered and criticized as being merely dLsf:uised
rhetori-c or empty disputes having little effec.t upon man,
i.e., eristic; the a-sstnnption being that th-e difference
between the dialectician and the disputer is one in which
there is no real distinction.

But Plato d-efines the differ-

enc-e by accepting the account of the dialectical procedure as
presented in the speech of Protagoras and vindicated in the
dialogue·:
The disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he
likes, and may make fun; but the dialectician may be in
earnest, and only correct his adversary when neces-sary,
telling him the errors into which he has fallen throu~h
his own fault., or the company which he has ·previously
kept. If you do so your adversary will lay the blame
and .c onfusion and perplexity on himself, and will escape
from himself into philosophy, in order that he may. become
different than he was. But the other mode of argu~ng,
which is practiced by the many, will have just the oppo·s ite effect upon him; as he grows older, i~stead of turning to philosophy, he will come to hate ph~losophy.7
The dialectic-ian pursues one end--the G-ood--and he believes

that the use of reason is an avenue to that ultimate end.e

6rbid., 16lb; cf. 157d.

7rbid., l67e-l68b.

~rancis MacDonald Cornford (trans.), The Republic)of
Plato (New York and London: Oxford University~ess, 1945 '
VII. 532, cf. p. 32.

4

The immediate end is the elucidation of £alse beliefs and the
provision of a fruitful condition for the further purs-uit of
philosophy.
This procedure of Plato is not often clear to many
commentators since they often fail to recognize that Socrates
weaves a philosophy without content, that in the Theaetetus
there is no solution to the problem- of the definition of
knowledge (apart from the nature of knowledge),9 that all
views are found contradictory, that none is adequate.

The

result of the midwifery is that no view is accepted.
Socrates states that, "I must try by my art of midwifery to
deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge."lO
At the conclusion of the dialogue all the concepts of knowledge are displayed fraught with contradictionsll and
Thea-etetus is brought to realize and agree "that the offspring
of your brain is not worth bringing up.nl2

Yet, he does learn

something in the process; he learns to be soberer, humbler,
and "too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know.nl3
Consequently, this implies the answer to a few questions.

Primarily, does the failure of Theaetetus to uphold

and defend his argument preclude that someone else might have

9Jowett, £2• c_i t., "Theaetetus,n l47a.
12 Ibid., 210c.
lOrbid., 1S4a-b.
11~., 210a.
13Ibid., 210c-d.
!

I

J

5
succeeded~

Certainly Theaetetus was a youth, hence he pro-

vided only a weak argument, a straw-man for Socrates 1 rhetorical play.

What then can be the value of such activity!

Again, does the lack of any conclusion to the dialogue demonstrate that either knowledge is not possible or that knowledge
is not definable?

Still, it might be argued that Socrates is

merely correcting a false .idea or notion, and :that in .some
other dialogue he states either his own theory or agrees with
that of another.

Or can there be anything significant in the

silence that marks the end of the Platonic dialogues?
is the cognitive quality in silence, in no-thesis?

What

It might

even ·be argued that this dialogue, the Theaetetus, is a complex dialogue, and that in his better known works, the dramatic dialogues, he does in fact turn from the so-called
silence and advance many theories.

Hence, no valid deduction

c-an be drawn from this one example.
What these questions involve, then, is an analysis of
a dialogue and, seeing that most of the questions have arisen
from the Theaetetus., it is fitting that the defense should
come, for the most part, from that dialogue.

To meet the·

other objections, the other dialogues will be drawn on for
confirmation and validation.

The choice of the ·rheaetetus at

this point is obvious, since it provides an excellent account
of the process of dialectic without being -encumbered by other
considerations, i.e., its ultimate end or purpose.

J

6
The Straw-Man
Theodorus informs Socrates that his pupil, Theaetetus 1
is moving "surely and smoothly and successfully in the path
of knowledgenl4 and this becomes an invitat·ion for Socrates
to begin the dialectic.

These opening remarks set the stage

for the drama of dialectic.

Theaetetus begins by agreeing

that .knowledge and wisdom are one,l5 hence extends the problem while at the same time it becomes quite obvious that he
does not understand the consequences of this identity.

Wis-

dom, for Plato, is the intuitive grasp of the Good, the
Ultimate Good, while knowledge does not have this referent
when it is understood as relational.l6

Hence a typical

alternative is open to Socrates and he treats it with his
characteristic method of approach.

He offers no alternative

yiew of his own; neither does he correct by attempting to
exchange his ideas for someone else's.

He resists what would

be an excellent pontificating opportunity.

No lecture. is

offered, for a lecture is a poorly disguised attempt at
dogmatism.

Rather than make· such a retreat from understanding,

he starts at the level of the student's comprehension and
permits ·him to see the consequences of \vhat he thinks.

He

offers Theaetetus a mirror to see the contents of his own

l4Ibid., 144b •

16cornford, QE• cit., VII. 534·

7
mind.

He refrains from offering any alternative which he

might understand even less than his own concepts.

The

student, Theaetetus, has one set of ideas that he believes he
knows--his own--and that is his fixed center of interest and
reference.

Therefore, to offer an alternati·ve at this time

would only complicate the process by making a twin project
necessary, i.e., to try to understand an alternative doctrine
when actually· one's own thoughts are arrested, or ·the other
possibility of attempting some synthesis that w.ould either
exc-lude or include the new idea with one's private "truth."
For a teacher, this is always seen as the tragedy of the
lecture method.

The student's own ideas confuse the under-

standing, and thus it is always more basic to start at the
particular level of the student's understanding.
Socrates is fully cognizant that this youth, Theaetetus,
"is no real match for the task that he too ·f reely accepts for
himself.

Socrates encourages him to continue the examinati·on

even after he· ("Theaetetus) .finds himself at the wrong end of
several reductio ad absurdum arguments, and when the latter
wants to give up the inquiry, Socrates says:
Well, but if someone were to praise you for running,
and to say that he never met your equal among boys, and

afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grovmup man,
who was a greater runner--would the praise be any less
true'?l7

17Jowett, 2£• cit., "Theaetetus,n 14Sb-c.

The argument shifts after it is apparent that Socrates' distinction is beyond Theaetetus' understanding.

He says, "How

can a man understand the name of anything when he does not
kno11'r the naturE. of it?" 18
course of inquiry.

This question assmnes a different

He returns later to this same point,

admonishing Theaetetus again and again, to no avail, nHe
ought not to speak of the na."!le, but of the thing which is
contemplated under that name.ttl9
It is a request not to delineate definitions, the
names of things, but to discuss how one can know the nature
of a thing.

Socrates makes clear the serious nature of the

quest, "And is the discovery of knowledge so small a matter,
as I

have said?

Is it not one which would task the po\'ters of

men perfect in every way?tt20

Theaet-etus recovers his courage

and defines kno"Tledge as perception.21

Socrates is careful

to demonstrate that this really assumes Protagoras' doctrine2 2
and Socrates draws a set of acirnissions from Theaetetus which

renders the thes-is of Protagoras bankrupt and void of content .23

He has extended the arguments sho\'rine the complexi-

ties of the doctrine.

Theaetetus acclaims that he is so

confused that at this point he is not sure if the statements
and opinions are indeed Socrates'

l8rbid., 147a.

--,

2lrbid.

J

15le.

O\'m

or if he is only dravling

l9rbid., l77e.

20rbid., 14Sc.

22rnid ., 152a .._

23Ibid., 156a.

9
them out from himself.24

To this Socrates replies, restating

his favorite thesis:
You .forget, my fri -end, that I neither knovr, nor pro.fess to know anythin~ -o f these matters; you are the
person who is in labour, I am the barren midwife; and
this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing
after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that
r may at last help to bring your own opinion into the
light of day; when this has been accomplished then we
vzill determine whether what you have brought forth is
only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth~ Therefore,
keep up your spirits and answer like a man what you
think.25

As a result of this drawing-out process, the thesis (Prota-goras'} is reduced to an absurdity.

But the argum-ent has

been conducted by a boy, a youth unskilled in dialectic and
incapable of defending Protagoras' thesis.

Socrates, as the

dialectician, aware of this, answers,
And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result
would have been different if Protagoras, who was the
father of the first of t~,;o brats, had been aliv-e; he
would have had a _ great deal to say on his- behalf. But
he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and
even the guardian whom he left, and of whom our Friend
Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and
therefore, I suppose that I m~~t take up his cause
myself, and see j-ustice done.
The argume-n t is taken up again, but this tim-e by Socrates, and meets the same unhappy fate; the argument is still
found to be untenable.
logue.

However, this does not end the dia-

Socrates invokes Protagoras and restates an argument in

the strongest and ·most forceful t -erms as if it came from .Protagoras himself.

Again, the thesis is rejected and they quote

24rbid., 157c.

_,

from his '\'Jritings 2 7 in an ~ttempt to force the \\eak
into its more pristine form.

Hence tr-ree tr::rws are done to

remove the "straw-mann and. the first is

~;hen

Tr.eaetetus is

Then 'fheodorus , a friend of Frota.roras, 2f i~ c.J.lled

refuted.

on to defend him, and Socrates tries "to do Justicen2S: to the
argument by restating Protaf-;oras ' argume·nt and constrllctir.c:
it as tight and as logically coherent as
too fails.

pos~·ible.

Jut this

It might a pne.::.r that this -vro ul.C. conclude the arru-

ment but Socrates re p eats that,

rert~aps,

U :e truth lies in

the s.piri.t as ap:ainst the mere word: · , t hat one should see tbe
extension of the idea and there in the spirit find the tn:.e
proposition .
cient.

Hence a logical analysis is d~cmed not suffi-

The seriousness with t'lhich Socrates works in this

task of reassessing the fau.lt)r positi cm and b•..lt·tres~o· in ~ its
weak points can be judged by his estimate of the dialectician's obligations:

the dialectician must use the optimum of

his pm·t ers in creating the most form·idable ~osition rri c r to
any final rejection.

Protagoras is not present to defend his

position and Theodorus, his student, Nill not meet the challenge.
But as he ffrotar:,orai/ is not. >'r~ t~in call~ , ... ; ::1~s~
make the best use of our o-vm fac~l~t- ~es, sue._ a~, tr.e)
are~ and sneak out what appears to be true •. And no one
\vill deny th2..t there are great differcr:ces 1.n tte

2Bibid.,. 16Sd .

ll

understanding of men.30
Therefore, to meet the challenge of the stravs-man thesis, the
follmdng can be- noted.

After Theaetetus' understandine of

the thesis is demonstrated to be weak, 31 t -h e a rgill:lEnt

l. ~
_

rebuilt,3 2 first by reference to Protagoras' worksJ 33 then by

a logical examination of the idea.

It is then extended to

its limits to make explicit the contradictions.34

Apain a

restatene-nt is made in ter:::1s of •·;hat Prota,eoras must have
meant : 3 5

a shift in emphasis from the words to tl::e ideas or

spirit behind them.

Once a ga in the

~)rocesf>

continues as Soc-

rates turns to the thesis and attempts to revive it by addine
to it so that it now goes beyond Protagoras 1 oririnal thesis.36
This last stage takes the form of a new argument on three
separate occas-ions ) -7
defense.JB

They are found to be \·:ithout an adequate

One thing should be noted aeain: if Theaetetus

had understood that Socrates was askinr.; one ouestion and that
he was attempting to anE:wer another, the dialo~ue vrouJ d have
taken an entirely different course.

Socrate:.> \·;a s as kin:""

about the nature of knovTledge,. and \'/hen that was deter.nined
then to attempt to define it.

But since Theaetetus was intent

30Ibid., 17le .•

Jlibid .. , 165e.

32rbid., 154d .

33Ibid., lWe.

34Ibid., l64b.

35Ibid., l67a-b.

J6rbid.,- 17ld-e-.
JSibid., 210a-b .

3-7Ibid., 179b; 184b;

1E7b; 20lc {cf.2J 6c).

12
upon answering v.•hat he did not knm·J, Socrates could resort to
his t•.,.rin alternat.i ves.

He could eitl':.er force a point of vievi

upon Theaetetus, or merely sit by and let Theaetetus see if
he could define something he did not knm•?.

'l'l:e dialor;ue' s

conclusion establishes tte pretext for the inouiry to return

to the original prob 1 em •

Theaet et us is n m-r open to the -pro o-

lem that he thourht he had solved and understood.

At this

point he can return to the object of philoso-phy--t o kno"'l: the
nature of knov-rledr;e.
Value of Dialectic
Turning now to the other question that was raised,
ttVJhat is the value of this activity--of dialectic ;u ·v1e find
it rests upon the Platonic ccncept of the soul.
analo~ous with the body,

disease and deformity .3 9
disease.

The soul,.

can be af~licted by the t~o evils of
The discord of the body is called

In the soul, it is terr.1ed vice , cowardice, intem-

perance, and injustice.40

Again , deformity of the bo d y is

likened to ignorance because, like the body, deformity is a

1
lack of symmetry, as the soul becomes deformed by ignorance .4
Two arts are reauired to cu~e the soul, for zs the body needs
medicine and therapy· for the cure of disease and deformity,

39Jo-,.lett, .22.• cit., "Sophist ," 22Sa-b.

40Ib1·d

I

J

.'

2~c~
... ' d

.

41 Ibid__.,

228d-e •

13

so does the soul need cha_stise:nent &nd educ.ation.l:-2

P.m·:ever,

a difficulty e.rnerres rep;ardin ~r, education because two kinds of

education are knm·m--one being completely ineffectual, i.e.,
admonition techni~'.les, lectures, e.nd ~e::rmons.
c alled "rough."

This ldr~d is

In contrast , there is the "smooth»43 type of

education and, as can be expected, it is dialectic.

Plato

orovides a clear sta'te:-~ ent of this as \',rell as a ps~rcholor:ical

matrix for its episte.:1 olory.
to eradicate i r:; nora nce and

He says

c~mceit

th~t

dic.lectic attc:-::,..:ts

by use of the nsmooth"

education:
They [ciialectician.£.7 cros5-examine a r.ian ' s ':~ords , v:iien
he thinks that b.e is s a ying something and is really sr,yint~
nothinr.;, -and ea.s ily convict him o-r inconsistencies in }:is
opinions; these they then collect by the dialectical process, and placing th c!"'l side by r.ide , shm! that. they contra_dict one another about the same t hings , in relatior: to the
sn.P.'le thinps and in the sa'"'le re~ ~ ect. He , seeinr, this, is
angry v:ith himself and r~ rm·;s ' ;entle tiith o~hcrs, a.nd t L~s_,
is entirely deli v·e:;rcd fran r;reat prejudices and harsL
notions, in a way Vlhich is most a.'n.using to the h earer,
and produces the most lasting eood eff ect on t h e person
i·:ho is t l:e suoject o.f the operation. For as the physieian
c :m si C'~ ers t :·at t t:e body l':ill receive no benefit fror.-1 taking food until the internal obstacles have bEen recoved,
so the P'..lrifier o.[ the soul is cor;scious that hiE patient
1ilill receive no benefit from tl: e application of knm-:lede;e
until he is refuted , and from refutation learns modesty;
he must be pureed of ~1is prejudices first and made to
think that he knows only v~hat r_e knov.rs, and no more . 4h
A ~ ain

he

state~

the thesis of dialectic as a purifier and as

non-respecter of a person's rank or !)osition:

- --- --- --42rbid., 22S':b.

I

43rbid., 230a.

44Ibid., 230b-d.
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For all these reasons, Theaetetus, vle must adm.it that
refutation i~ the greatest and chiefest of purifications,
a~d he ~mo has not been refuted, though he be the Great
K1ng himself, is in an aw.ful state of impurity; he is
uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who
would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest.45
Hence, in the

philoso~hy

of Plato, dialectic functions as a

curative force--a purification of the soul in removing prejudice--and is thought to have a lastine effect upon man's
psyche.

Behavior has it.s roots in the understanding; its con-

tents can either be contradictory, confused, and chaotic, .or
the converse.

The irony is that if the basic ideas lie hid-

den, then it is never clear that they are themselves the
source of the difficulties that reflect the underlying contradictions and obscurity of the mind itself.

The goal deter-

mines behavior and consequently the ignorance of one's

o~m

goals has an adverse effect upon the behavioral patterns.
11

Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they

do not think they are because they do not know it.n46
case is:

The

One can make explicit the grounds of understanding

or remain ignorant of them.

One can be ignorant of the kind

of mental activity one is enmeshed in and not realize that it
is subject to blind. determinism.

Then, in ignorance, the world

b·e comes a mirror of our confusion; it is even a major task of

45rbid., 230e.
46Jowett, .2£• cit., "Theaetetus," l76e.
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insight to even suggest that the cause of the trouble may lie
within the mind.

The contents- of the mind are hidden unless

transfonned into speech,_ articulated and then examined.
can be the
premises or

unconsci~us
th~

They

forces of motivation with undiscovered

converse.

In either case, our motivation of

behavior can spring from this- sourc-e.

The choice is -either

to cooperate as a rational being with the pattern of true
understanding

o~

continue the folly of a disordered mind.

There are twin possibilities, either to gro'VT towards wisdom,
or towards folly,
• • • the one blessed and divine, the other godless
and wretched~ but they do not see them, or perceive that
in their utter folly and infatuation, they are grm'ling
like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their
evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life
answering to the pattern -which they are growing like.47
Therefore the unexamined mind or life is fraugh_t with contradictions which become the source of evil and ignorance in
lif-e .

On the other hand, the alternative course in the

conscious use of reason supplies a positive direction in
society and in the quest of philosophy.
The Structure of Dialectic
The art of dialectic is the distinguishing mark of the
true philosopher and his nature can be further defined by a

47rbid., 177a.
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study of general features of dialectic itself.48
has a structure and a
lect's mode

o~

~ormal

Dialectic

character exhibiting the intel-

operation; hence, at the same time it provides

an opportunity to become aware of the philosopher's process
of understanding.

Analysis of Plato's more complex and dia-

lectical dialogues (Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Parmenides, and Philebus) makes apparent a pattern of his
dialectic m·erging with certain recurrent features capable of
being woven into the dialectical structure.

Plato in these

dialogues recapitulates the process, thereby affording an
excellent occasion to compare the .methodology with .his final
summary.
Dialectic assumes the ability to perceive relationships, divisions, patterns, and unities within any field of
discourse.

The dual abilities of seeing unities and distinc-

tions are the key factors presupposed in the successful operation of dialectic.

Perception of unity can be rurther

ass-is.t ed by formal studies, 49 that stress the perceiving and
recording of distinctions.

These distinctions disclosed by

the dialectic are not arbitrary but reflect as much as possible natural models or orders.

The

emplo)~ent

of models

provides the origin and ground of the analogical method so

4Bcornfordt 2£· cit., VII. 533; cf. VII~ 518-519b.
49rbid., VII. 52e.

j
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typical of Plato.

It becomes the basis for making distinc-

tions and the training for the art of discrimination.

It is

as if in each dialectical encounter the first obligation i ·s
to discover a set of natural models to base distinctions upon
and then set these apart in isolation.

The ability to find

these connections in things, concepts, and then within discourse, is the pre-requisite for the dialectician.50

The

movement between the model or analogy and discourse is an
invitation to use insight, to sharpen intuition within the
dialectical encounter.

The bes-t example is the analogy of

State to individual in order to find Justice.51

This is not

only an -artistic device but a request for understanding to
discover relations through di.scourse... Certainly, it also is
a factor in furthering clarity and in translatine concepts
into a simpler matrix which can then provide the conditions
for intuition.

The reverse process (that of working back-

wards from the initial intuition) is also valuable because
the presence of a simple matrix or model will provide not
only the means to communicate it but also remove difficulties
and obscurities and extend the connections between concepts
(on the one side} and natural familiar events and distinctions
(.on the other).

The use of models as analogies is one basic

factor for the test of understanding since it is the medium

50Ibid., VII. 537.

l
I
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!

to translate insights into

co~~on

terms and thereby discover

and even deepen the intuition.
This seems to suggest a natural order of structural
similarity between analogies and reality.
Consider the previous analys-is of the psychology of
understanding in its relation to purification.52

It {the

analysis) can be diagrammed to illustrate this process and.
provide a matrix to .note the movements in the dialectic:
l.

Collecting

There are Arts of dividing home crafts,
or arts of dividing, i.e., carding,
spinning.

2.

Und.erlying idea:

implies division, separating the better
from the worse, hence the art of discrimination, and purification.
Objects
animate

inanimate
furbishing

fulling

body
disease
Analogy of doctory of body
to "doctor" of soul, henc.e:

1-ledicine

.•

Gymnastic

as

Doctor of the soul, the
purifier of- the soul, hence:

52Jowett,

-•

2£~

other animals

man

soul/intellect
vice

deformity

ignorance

medicine will cure disease as
gymnastics wilr-GOrrect deformity or
Disease

••

Deformity

arguing from analogy with
step 3 he likens disease to

cit., "Sophist," 228a-230e.
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Chastisement

.

vice "discord and disease
are same" and deformity is
a "want of measure as
ignorance" hence:
Education

as

Vice

.•

Ignorance

Yet, says Socrates, education seems to be a subject to further
divide and so, as we found previously, the arts of admoni-shine;
and dialectic must have their place.

Thus, starting with a

simple idea of the arts of division, the dialectician found
in a collection of examples, a single concept or idea from
which he legitimately proceeded to show the natural character
of--his di vi.s ions or distinctions •

Then he arrived at a point

from which it was necessary to invoke a series of analogies
to justify any further d-istinctions in order to clear the
ground for a more basic or general intuition to be recognized;
i.e., as the body suffers from disease and deformity, so, too,
the soul or intellect suffers from vice and ignorance.

This

return to natural order, familiar objects and events and homecrafts is typical of the Platonic style of writing.

By this

device of purposeful analogy he sought to communicate and
demonstrate the interrelatedness of things and events and
reveal the fundamental unity· underlying- their various structures.

The idea thus examined is concerned in a natural

unity throughout many different divisions, or concepts, and
precise enough to be capable of supporting differences and
distinctions.

This is the art of discrimination.

The

20

necessity of passing from the one idea to the particular
number (as specific case or cases) is decisive in the dialectic for without this they would be dogmatic assertions.
Showing the grounds for belief, exhibiting the particular number of examples and attempting to exhaust them without ignoring the more obvious particulars, this is the role of reason.
What it accomplishes is to demonstrate the evidence for and
also to

g~ve

inclusive.

support to the contention that it is meant to be

And attempting- to -be inc-lusive is to be vulnerable

and open to criticism because it is an invitation for the pro-

I

tagonist to determine if" there -are any factors that have been

I.

ignored or treated lightly..

Plato t -hus spells out his use of

dialectic and demonstrates by both examples and a concise summary exactly what he means by the dialectical method.

In the

Sophist and the Philebus he provides a very condensed statement of his di-alectic:
Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see
clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many
different forms contained under one higher form; and
again, one form knit tog-e ther into a _ sin~le. whole pe:vading many such wholes, and many forms, ex1st1ng only 1n
separation and ·isolation. This is the knowledge of.
classes which determines where they can have commun1on
with one another and where not.53
Again, in the Philebus:

53Ib-id., "Sophist," 253e; cf. Jowett's "Parmenides,"
n
19lc, 13 6b, "Phaedo," 75-79, !Ole, "Statesman," 2B6e, "Phaedres
265e, 266a, 277.
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A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods
tossed among men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and
there with a blaze of light; and the ancients, who were
our betters and nearer to the gods than we are, handed
down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be
composed of one and many, and have the finite or infinite implanted in them; seeing then that such is the order
of the world, we ought in every enquiry to begin laying
do·wn one idea of that which is the subject of inquiry;
this unity we shall find in everything. Having found it,
we may next proceed to look for two, or, if not, then for
thre-e or some number., subdividing each of these units,
until at last the unity with which we began is seen not
only to be one and many and infinite, but also a definite
number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the
many until the entire number of the species intermediate
between unity and infinity have been discovered--then,
and not until then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as
I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and
teaching one another, which the gods hav-e handed down to
us. But the wise men of our time are either too quick or
slow in. conceiving pl,.urality in unity. Having no method,
they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass·
at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur
to them. And this, I repeat, is- what makes the differeuc e
between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.) 4
This adds to the concept of dialectic, but it might be argued
that the above process has only a minimum function.

The issue

is still,what has this argumentative procedure to do with the
Ultimate Good that Plato considers to be the highest object of
knowledgei

Or, stated another way, what has dialectic to do

with the Platonic quest for wisdom?

Stated simply, the

objection could be raised that dialectic has nothing to do
with wisdom, and the discourses of dialectic can only report

54Jowett, 2£· cit., "Philebus," 16c.

i
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"views" and not disclose the object.
includes more than the verbal.

However, dialectic

In the Symposium, Plato out-

lines a method of contemplation which joins contemplation to
dialectic.

Contemplation, in Plato, is the inner dialectic

of the soul or intellect and, conversely, dialectic is ·the
outward movement in speech of the inner movement of contemplation.

In each system, the stress is on "seeing."

In

dialectic, it is the rational intuition tied to concepts.;
while in contemplation, it is intuition of "realities, since
he {the contemplatoi7 touches realities.n55

The end is the

vision of the Good, and the trainine ground is both dialectic
and contemplation.56

Dialectic promotes the recovery of

insight and intuition by the removal of ignorance and egoidentification.

On the other hand, contemplation has the

final task of seeing dir€ctly the Good.

In the Symposium,

the art of contemplation can be seen to have the following
structure: 5·7

55w. H. D. Rouse (trans.), The Great Dialogues- of
-P lato (New Y-ork: The New American Library, 1956), n-symposium,"
2lld.
56c-ornford, .Q.E• cit., VII. 53 2; cf. pp. J 5-3 7 of thesis •
57Rouse, .Q..E.-• cit., 209c-213d.
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PRACTICE
Physical:

Effect:

Particular:

"Love one body"

?•lany-:

"Notice that beauty of one body
is akin to the beauty of another
-body·"

relax the intense passion for one body.

Then, he "must believe beauty in souls to be more
precious than in the body."
Ideational: Particular:

Many:

"contemplate the beauty in laws_,
institutions, customs, and "in
families state"
"to see that all beauty is oi
one and the same kind"
KNOWLEDGE

I.ntuition:

Whole:

"directing his gaze from nm~T on
towards beauty as a whole"

One:

Again this Beauty now will be
"by itself with itself always
in simplicity."

Recapitulation:

"For let me tell you, the right way to
approach the things of love, or to be
led there by another is this: beginning
from these beautiful things to mount
for that b-eauty 1 s sake ever upwards,
as by a flight of steps, from one to
two, and from two to all beautiful pursuits and practices, and from practices
to beautiful learnings, so that from
learnings he may come at la-st to that
perfect learning ~~ich is the learning
solely of that beauty itself and may
know at last that which is the perfection of beauty. Therein life and there
alone, my dear s·o crates, is life worth
living for man, while he contemplates
beauty itself •" 58

5Bibid., 2llc.
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This last stage is neither the physical beauty, ideational,
nor intuitional (in the sense of relational), for he says,
Do you not reflect that there only it will be possible
for him, when he sees the beautiful v1ith the mind, which
alone can see it, to give to birth not to likenesses of
virtue, since he touches no likeness, but to realities,
since he touches realities; and when he has given birth
to real virtue and brought it up will it not be granted
him to be the friend of God, and immortal if any man
ever is?59
In the Symposium, the movement of the art of contem-

plation f.oll ows. the struct·ure of dialectic::

STRUCTURE
object

THEAETETUS
purification

SYMPOSIUM
one beautiful body

collecting similar home crafts
objects

many beautiful bodies

an underlying idea separating better
from worse

beauty itself

finding examples in body-disease and
natural ·models
def·o rmity

laws., institutions,
customs, families, etc.

analogical "leap"
to clear idea

"see" all beauty
as one

nas" the soul has
ignorance and v.ice

examoles as inclu- intemperance, stusi ve as possible
pidi ty, etc.
final statement

directing "gaze"
from the one to
beauty as a. whole

education, two kinds beauty not, "likehence the one over
nesses but to realithe other, or, dia- ities,n "By itself
lectic and not the
with itself in simadmonishing disciplicity."
plines.

59Ibid., 2lld-e.

25
Therefore, the movement of the dialectic can either
foll01i'J the v-erbal or the contemplat.ive.

The training of the

verbal is a technique to train the mind in the ability to
handle the idea of unity and this is translated into the art
of c-ontemplation.
dialec-tic.

This is the cro\'ming art and the end of

Further, the object is neither an idea of beauty

nor Beauty itself; it is the Good.

"Is not the Good also the Beautiful?"
"Yes • "(:1.)
The pursuit of the Good can be followed in many dialogues,
but in the Symposium it takes the form, or _natural model, of
Beauty, while in the Phaedo it outlines another technique of
contemplation and purification through the mysteries; whereas
in the Republic it has the form of the quest of Justice.
Summary of Types in Dialectic
Plato introduced ideas that were ne\"J and strange to
the Greeks as well as his innovating dialectic.61

Certainly

there were dialecticians prior to Plato, but they neither
used his structure nor linked it with th-e Good.

There is a

large gap between the Greeks' love of conversation with its

6oibid., 2<alc.
6lcr-. EnTin F?..hode, Psyche (New York: Human~ties Press,
1954), Chap. XIII; and William Ralph Inge, The Phllosophy of
Plotinus (London: Longrnans _, Green & Goa, l9ffi, I, 71-74.
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free play of speculation, and the dialectic of Plato.
the dialogue .form was not new.

Again.,

Ac-tually,. in the dialogues of

Zen.ophone, Socrates is portrayed as a cracker-barrel, or
homespun, philosoph-er concerned almost exclusively with
domestic problems.
As for the dialogues of Plato thems·elves, it is ouite
apparent that the participants function differently according

I
r

I

to their role;. hence, there are four modes, or typical
reactions.
1.

The lecturers who may or may not be cognizant of the role
of dialectic but ~no only state their ·thesis by long
monologues.

2.

The unskilled in dialectic.

3.

The companions to Socrates who are familiar with the
formal aspect of dialectic but are unable to present
or attack an existing thesis.

4.

The skilled uialecticians.

!

II

'

The men can be considered -as represented by:
~•

2.

3.
4.

T:ilna eus
Cephal as
Glaucon
Pannenides

Dialectic-, then, functions according to the ability and type
of participator in the dialogues.

The second class, the

unskilled in dialectic., quickly leave after the discussion
takes a :s -erious- tur_n; thus, Cephalos leaves. 62

62cornford, ££• cit., I. 331.

Again, his
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type m-ay be the dogmatist who only waits :for an opening in a
discussion and can hardly contain himself until his opinion
is presented.

If he does enter into the dialectic, it is

quite clear that he thinks the ouestioning· activity is- super:fluous.

He comes quickly to his point, often using poor

examples and poor analogies per se.

To engage in dialectic

after this truth is "given" is redundant since- one should be
spell-bound by the delivery and readily acquiesce in the
"truth.n63

Any insistence on remaining to examine or- question

is tantamount to doubting the validity of his thesis.

The

unskilled dialectician is usually insulted by any subjection
to dialectic and, like his counterpart, Cephalos, would rather
leave.64

Dialectic can only demolish his thesis by question-

ing and perhaps, as in the case of Thrasymachus, bring this

type to humility by the destruction of his dogmatism--but
only if he consents to stay after his presentation.
The fourth figure, Parmenides, is skilled in dialectic
and hence is on equal footing with Socrate-s, the dialectician.

Therefore -his role .is to examine not just t -he first category,
but his peers· and equals.

In the example of The Parmenides,

Socrates must be capable of seeing his
absurdities.

o~m

concept reduced to

But this is not the better part of dialectic,

63rbid., I. 344: Speech of Thrasymachus.

-

64Ibid., I. 331; cf.

r.

336b-d; I. 343-344e.
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for Parmenides must push on to the art of contemplation, the
end of dialectic.
Glaucon~

the third type, is very common in the dia-

logues and affords ample material for tracing the intellectual
climate nec·essary for dialectic to flourish.

Primarily, he

takes the role of the "sounding board,n or of the "mirror"
for the ideas of the examiner.

In order to funct·ion in this

capacity, he is usually a youth., or a companion of Socrates
who has become aware of this proc·edure.

He does not suspend

his critical faculties, but only assents if he sees the
rationale for same thesis resting upon a sound or riEorous
analysis, a valid distinction or a natural analogy.

It is

indifferent to him whether he really agrees with the thesis
or not.

What does matter, however, is ·whether he can pursue

the discuss-ion and assent to the logic of the dialogue.65
Dialectic in this case is not used to convince another
disputer but to demonstrate that the thesis is sound, given
these premises-.

It is interesting that the role of "Glaucon"

is often misunders·tood by read·ers o.f Plato unfamiliar with
his dialectic.

They often assert that some arguments need

not have taken this direction but might just as well have had
another course of tra.vel.

This is a misunderstanding of the

use of reason within Plato an.d betrays a lack of confidence

65Jowett, ££• cit., "Phaedo," 107bo
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in the Socratic method.

With this type or class only t\'to

clear alternatives are available.

Either it elaborates or

extends an .idea ·to provide the general -content of the thesis
in quest ion ( this is what I·:od erns might call the workinp; out
of definitions), or it uses a participator as a Judge to see

that the idea has a logical coherence with the thesis in
general.

It is usually the case that "Glaucon" cannot make

the final judgement as to the truth of the thesis in g.eneral,
but only in the particular ordering of propositions.

His

tongue is often convin~ed by the display of dialectic,66 but
his understanding cannot assimilate what his type of reasoning

is blind to.
The first category is that of Timaeus.

He is not

pregnant with wisdom or knowledge but has a "likely story" to
weave.

Theories accounting for natural phenomena scientifi-

cally are not open to dialectic and, hence, are not subject
to the dialectic.

The cosmology of Timaeus, often attributed

to Socrates in spite of his categorizing it as only a "likely
story," is based more upon an aesthetic judgement than upon
reason.

It is not a set of metaphysical stat-ements; it does

not pr€scribe to or for reality, and may even be considered a
convenient fiction to handle facts--the- laws of scienc-e understood as only the shorthand expression of a complex of past

. 66rbid., "Theaetetus," l54e.
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observations.

Making no claim to anything but a "likely

story," it is in the realm of opinion.

In the Symposium, there is a suggestion of still
another class of dialectic skill--a fifth.

In the descrip-

tion of the stages of contemplation, it seems that he mentions the dialectical process by only a tangental reference
when he says, "•

~

• then, to beget beautiful speech; then

he should take notice that the beauty in one body is akin to

the beauty in another body.n67

He advances to another stage

where Plato again refers to the same idea,_ but the speech
becomes more and more lik-e philosophy when:
Next he must believe beauty in souls to be more
precious than beauty in the body; so that if anyone is
decent in soul, even if it has little bloom, it should
be enough for him to love and care for, and to beget arrg8
seek such talks as will make young people better; • • •
and as the process approaches that stage where the student
"will behold a _Beauty marvelous in its Nature," he says,69
He should turn to the great ocean of beauty. and
in contemplation of it give birth to many beautiful
and magnificent speeches and thoughts in the abundance
of philosophy .. 70
It is interesting that he reverts- to his favorite metaphor,

"beget," and if this can be asserted it would seem that one
sign of soul-pregnancy is the love of beauty.
67Rouse ,

6 9Ibid., 210a-b.

-

In the

68rbid., 210a.

Jl
Symposium, as different from th-e Republic_, contemplati_o n does
not follow dialectic; rather, dialectic follows contemplation.
In this class of "the lover of Beauty," the quest of philosophy -has as its prerequisite tbe art of contemplation.
Plato has not written a dialogue presenting this fifth
class.

In ·the Symposium there are many beautifully composed

speeches, but little or no dialectic is in evidence except
for the supposed conversation between Socrates and Diotima
and this can hardly be termed a dialectic.

The lack of any

dialogue demonstratine this higher dialectic is a weakness
within his work.

It is as if his works wer-e written for the

public at large and lacked this important element.
numerous references to the existence of a dialoeue

There are
~The

Philosopher,n71 but this apparently was never completed.
the Statesman he refers to three dialogues:
Statesman, and

The Philosopher.

In

The Sophist,

The first two were completed

but The Philosopher is not now extant nor is it referred to
by other contemporary authors of Plato.
The dial-ectic clearly functions differ-ently in each
dialogue: serious and playful, ironic and comic, analytical
and synthetical.
differ again.

Hence, we could expect The Philosopher to

\'w'ithout this element it is diffi.c ult to ade-

quately judge Platonic diale-ctic.

The dialogues therefore

71Jowett, .2.E• cit., "Statesman," 257a.
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suggest this schema:

1.

Timaeus - "likely stories," products of art and science.

2.

Cephalos - afraid to ent-er into dialectic, either inner
or outer~ and remains ignorant •

.3.

Glaucon - capable of following another-'s thought but
unable- to pursue or comprehend the conclusion.

4.

Parmenides - highly d-eveloped intellect,_ but there
remains a question whether he can grasp the
Good.

5.

"Lover of Beauty" - Learning dialectic through beauty,
he knows the Good.
In the Republic, the philosopher's training and the

stages of his development are outlined, but it is unfortunate
that there is no verbal or positive dialectic within the dialogue that sustains the hieh level

of its other aspects.

The dialectic is performed within on-ly two classes, the
second and the third, and hence there is no evidence of a
dialectic functioning in the last stage, as in the Parmenides.
I·1ost of the dialogue is the systematic analysis of the training necessary to bring a sick or corrupt soul to health, from
ignorance to wisdom; yet, the dialect-ical encounter that
parallels this development is only with Glaucon.

This lack

of any clear evidenc-e of dialectic functioning at the highest
capacity is a definite shortcoming.

In the Republic, Plato

includes a course of contemplation of many years within the
general discipline of the dialectic.

It is clear that to

Plato dialectic includes (a) contemplation, (b) a positive
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dialectic in the Tteaetetus 'V':i th tb e "midv.' ife."

11

matcr4'T:ak cr"

and "exarJ.iner,n and (c) a neEative dialectic th<1t is critical
throu.rrhout and uses the ma.ior form of the rerluctio ad
absurdum.

Indeed, vdthin the dialor:ues, di2lectic is never

Sllllli";1arized "lith all of its component parts, ~nd Plato even
mentions the difficulty of defininr; dialectic7.2 r::o it is no
"\·mnder the:r·e is sOI:'le difficulty concerninp- tl1is rroblC?m .
Thus , the tra.inint· in tr:e Renublic rr:ay have different stresses
than the Symposium, but both cdalor':ue~ need more definitive
exa'TIDles of the dialectical skill.

Hence they shall both be

treated as belonp;inp. to tbe last class, the fifth .

But sir,ce

there is not .sufficient evidence to ,iudge tf,cir differences,

or whether their differences are sir;nificant, no new cla s s
will he invoked.
The Dialectic of the Ren~blic

In the Republic, one of the central themes of ]"hilasorbic merit is the role of reason as the int u :tive fc.culty
for the insi f:.h t

ir:to the essential nature of the Good.

doeE not argue for a special or new intuitive faculty .
holds th a t man already bns all the facultie s . 73
is~ue,

th·erefore,

is the proper

E?..mployment

PJ ato
He

The only

o :' reason .for the

72cornford, ..2.E• cit., VII. 533; cf. :·cause , on . cit .,

2l0a.

vision of the Good.
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He {Plato) speaks of the necessity of a

conversion--a turn-about--in order to insure that vision, and
states that the soul, which already has the power of sight, 7-4
could be turned so as to "bear to contemplate reality and
that supreme splendor which we have called the Good;n75 then
its journey would be complete.

The Platonic concept of con-

version has little to do with a reliF,ious conversion, for:
Any study, as we have said, will have that tendency,
if it forces the soul to turn towards the ree;ion of that
beatific reality, which it must by all means behold. So
geometry will be suitable or not, according as ~t makes
us contemplate reality or the world of change.7b
The study of unityJ be it in geometry or dialectic,
sets in motion the Platonic conversion.

The multitude of

everyday interests s€em to dissipate the power of seeinf the
Good, while the study of unity can "rekindle the sacred fire."
True, it is quite hard to realize that every soul
possesses an organ better worth saving than a thousand
eyes, because it is our only means of seeing the truth;
and that when its lieht is dimmed or extinguished by
other interests, these studies \·dll purify the hearth
and rekindle the sacred fire.77
It is for this reason that Plato stresses the study of
unity, since it converts the soul and"leads to the contemplation of reality.n7B

The course of studies in the Republic is

based on that one simple measure--the effect it has on reason--

74Ibid.

75rbid.

77Ibid., VII a -528_.

76Ibid., VII. 527.
7Bibid., VII. 527.

r
!

i
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since it can direct it either to the changing- world or
"towards the contemplation of the highest of all realities.tt79
It is through the study of dialectic that one discerns
the difference between a senblance of the Good and the Good
itself.

Plato says,

If he cannot do this, he will know neithe-r Goodness
itself nor any good thing; if he does lay hold upon some
semblance of good, it will only be a matter of belief,
not of knovrledge, and he v.,rill drea.'Tl away his life here in
a sleep 1·.rhich has no awakening on this side of that world
of death 'll.rhere he will sleep at last forever. BO
The Platonic Good is the ultimate--it is the basis, or

ground , of the objects of knowledge., as well as their source
and power, as in the case of Beauty, Justice, Virtue, and
Truth.

The Good is said to be beyond both being and becoming,

and Plato expresses this very movingly when he 'iritest
This, then, which gives to the objects of kno-vlledee
their truth and to him who knows them his power of
knowing, is the form or essential nature of Goodness.
It is the cause of knowledge and truth; and so, while
you may think of it as an. object of knowledge, you will
do \"lell to regard it as something beyond truth and knowled~e and, precious as these both are, of still higher
wo~th. • • • The Good must hold a yet higher place of
honor.
• • • and so ,..,rith the objects of knowledge; these
derive from the Good not only their power of being

kno\Am but t "heir very being and reality; and Goodness is
not the same thing as being, but ev~n beyond being,
surpassing it in di~nity and power.8l

79Ibid.y VII. 533, cf. 527.
81Ibid., VI. 508-509.

80Ibid_., VII. 5J4.
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The ability to pursue this end, as well as the. course that
has led to it, Plato says, is only possible to tte dialectician.

"And also that it can be reveal-ed only to one

'rJi-10

is

trained in the studies we have discussed, and to him only by
the power of dialectic."$2
Reason, as rational d-iscourse, is stripped of all
reference to the senses, reaching out alone by pure intelligence to the nature of the Good itself.

Havine reached that

lofty realm, it continues until it has grasped "by pure
intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself.
ney is what we call dialectic.n83

This jour-

All of the disciplines of

the student are for the purpose of awakening the noblest
faculty of the soul--reason--to the contemplation of the
ultimate Good.

It is important to note that it is not

through thought that this profound insi-ght is achi-e ved.

The

elaborate models of both the divided line and allegory of the
cave demonstrate the different levels of operation of the
faculties of reason.

Thought functions on the second level,

not the highest, for thought is contrasted with knowledge and
kno\'Il-e dge belonr,s to the highest (the first), 84 which is
related to intuition or -n ous.

Dialectic trains the eye of

the soul--intuition--for that ultimate vision of the Good,

__

82rbid. , VII. 533.
B4rbid., VL. 5lld.

83Ibid., VII. 532.
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and what reason refines by discrimination, contemplation
secures; yet both are under dialect·ic.
II.

PLOTINUS

The spirit of Hellenic philosophy that took its root
in the .Socratic and Platonic fonn reasserted itself in the
temporary abode of Plotinus' soul before it was finally
eclipsed from the Mediterranean area.

Regretfully, after

Plotinus, it soon perished and it has not found another
fertile soul in the history of all European thought.

The

great difficulty of European thought lies here (and in this
it is so vastly different from Asian thought), that something as noble as Platonic thought germinated but could not
be kept alive through the ages; no tradition of Platonic or
nee-Platonic thought was transmitted to future ages.

It died.

The European countries are fond of speaking of freedom, but
the measure of freedom is reflected in the continuity of rich
traditions and in this sense it can be seen to have not been
free.

It lost what the non-Christian nations retained--t-he

additional insights of men returning to the source of lofty
thoughts and ideals and purifying those very thoughts until
the tradition became a fusion of many individuals.

It there-

fore lost a real heritage for present and future ages.
With Plotinus, we find the last return to that particular vision known as Platonic thought.

Last though he was,

I
JS
he left a mark that has not yet been felt in European thou~ht.
The first European translation of his work was Ficine's of the
sixteenth century, which was ignored by nearly all scholars~
perhaps because a large part was hardly readable as well as
through lack of interest.

When NacKenna began his translation

there were ·no critical texts to guide him; previous translations were incomplete, while Muller's was obscure in meanine;
and nearly illegible.

The first trustworthy Greek text _has

only recently been made available, being the joint effort of
Henry and Schwyzer.
complete an English

1-IJacKenna, who was the first scholar to
translati~:m

of Plotinus based on this

accurate Greek text, finished his last volum-e in 1930.

In

E. R. Dodd's foreword to MacKenna's translation, he says,
The leading German authority on Plotinus was pro-bably
notfar out in his estimate when he observed in 1930 that
there are today perhaps only twent_y or thirty men alive
who can read this author after a fashion._l:55
The assumption of a continuity of tradition from the Gre-eks
to the present time is just a myth; and this myth \'!ill be
·taken up at a later point in this

paper.

The work of Plotinus is vast and profound, but this
paper can only deal with but one aspect--dialectic.
-Plotinus begins his section on dialectic with the

B5stephen MacKenna (trans.} _Plotinus: The Enneads
'
}
··
The refer(London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1927-30 , Po X11 • th r·1 t
e
rs
-ence here i _s to Richard Harder,- in the preface to
-volume of his German translation.

39
assertion that the method and discipline necessary for the
vision of the Good is dialectic.

There are two stages in the

dialectic: "as they· are making upwards," and those that "have
already gained that upper sphere.n86

Th e latter stage must

complete the proces-s and "advance \'Tithin that realm, n vrhi le
the first must be led through a conversion from the lower
life.

Of this first

cate~ory

are the musician and "natural

lover"; the technique outlined for this ascent is an exact
statement of the c-ontemplation of Plato's Symposium, which
has been mentioned_ previously. 87

The seco.nd stage belongs

to the metaphysician and he, after perfecting virtue, is
trained in mathematics and "put through a course in dialectics
and made an adept in the science."gg

The three parts of the dialectic are set forth by
Plotinus when he answers the question, "What, in sum, is it?"
He says it is a method and discipline that has the power to
pronounce the truth upon the nature and relation of things,
• • • what each is, how it differs from others, what.
quality all have, to what Kind each bel?ngs a~d ~n
what rank each stands in its Kind and whether ~ts Be~ng
is Real-Being, and how many Beings there ar~~ and how many
non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings.
co~~on

T.he second -s tate of the dialectic occurs when it takes leave

87Rouse, QE• cit., 2l0a-d.
cit.,
r.

BBMacKenna,
89rbid.,

OP •

1.3.3.

[

of the previous activity that is characterized as "the realm
of sense," and can now proceed into dialectic's own special
act·:
It employs the Platonic division to the discernment of
the .Id-eal-Forms, of the Authentic--Existence and of the
First:-Kinds (or Categories of Being): it establis·hes,. in
the l1ght of Intellection, the affiliations of all that
issues from ·these Firsts, until it has traversed the
entire Intellectual Rea.lm: then, by means of analysis
it takes the opposite path and returns once more to the
First Principle.90
'Vhen the student has been instructed and "satisfied as to the
b-eing of that realm" he is no longer concerned with the multiplicity and .h as "arrived at Unity, and it contemplates."
From this stage, Plotinus adds:
It Ldialecti£7 leaves to another science all that coil
of premises and conclusions called the art of rea.soning,
much as it leaves the art of writing: some of the matter
of logic, no doubt, it considers necessary--to clear the
ground--but it makes itself the judge, here as in everything else; where it sees use, it uses; anythi·n g it finds
superfluous, it leaves to whatever department of learning
or practice may turn that matter to account.91
Dialectic has often been considered as an arbitrary
use of reason, critical with no standards and, often, inhuman
in its rapier-like hunt for contradictions.

This has nothing

to do with dialectic, however, for in the Platonic dialectic,
the standards are furnished, Plotinus states, by IntellectualPrinciple and
• • • what else is necessary Dialectic puts together

90rbid.

L.

r
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for itself, combining and dividing, until it has reached
perfect intellection. "For," we read, nit is the purest
perfection of Intellection a!ld Contemplati ve-\'lisdom. n92.
Plotinus considers dialectic to be the "precious part
of philosophy" and it is neither the mere tool of the metaphysician nor does it "consist of bare theories or rules."
It r -ecognizes falsity and ignorance by virtue of its own
truth; it does not know sophism or untruth except as something foreign to it as "it perceives a clash with its own
canon of truth.n93

The knowledge of other schools of thought

becomes unimportant because all that is required here is the
vision of truth whereby the converse is reco?,nized by its
lack.

On the other hand, what it really claims knowledee of,

• • • above all Lf~ the operation of the Soul, and by
virtue of this knowing, it knows, too, what is affirmed
and what is denied, whether the denial is of what was
asserted or of something else, and whether ·propositions
agree or differ; all that is submitted to it, it attacks
with the directness of sense perception and it leaves
petty precisions of process to what other science may
care for such exercises.94
The alliance between philosophy and dialectic is very
close, as can be s·een in its relation to morality.

Philosophy,

for Plotinus, uses dialectic, for by it philosophy comes to
contemplation,. "though it LCfialecti£7' originates· of itself
the moral state or rather the discipline from which the moral

92Ibid., I. 3. 5.
"Phaedrus ~4Sd •.
93ill£., I. 3. 5.

Reference here is to Plato's
94Ibid_., I. 3. 5·
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state develops.n95- Virtue turns reason upon particular
experience as well as acts, but the virtue peculiarly induced
by the dialectic is, for Plotinus, " a certain super-reasoning
much closer to the Universal.n96

The reasoning in dialectic

is centered upon morality by its concern with the moment, in
:

its focus upon the propitious occasion for acts, and in its

I

I

desire to fulfill the highest ideal in the moment..

Plotinus

c ont.inues :• • • for it {the reasoning in dialecti£7 deals with
LSuch abstract ideas ai] correspondence and _s -equence, the
choice of time for action and inaction, the adoption of
this course, the rejection of that other:. \'lisdom and
Dialect~c -have the task of presenting all things as
Universals and ~tripped of matter for treatment by the
Understand~ng. 9·1
Yet the question could still be asked Plotinus, whether a
Master of dialectic could achieve this proficiency without
the lower virtues?

I
r

He answers,_

It would not happen: the lowe-r will spring either
before or toyether with the higher. And it is likely
that everyon~ normally possesses the natural virt~es
from which, when Wisdom steps in, the perfected_ v1rtue
develops. After the- natural virtues, then, Wisdom, and
so the perfecting of the moral nature. Once the ~atural
virtues exist,_ both orders, the natural and the h1gher
ripen side by side to their final excellence: or as the
one advance~ it carries forward the other tm'lards
perfection.'i8

He ends hi.s third tractate with the very acute, and one could
almost say, poignant observation of whether it is natural

95rbid., r. 3. 6.
97rbid •

.L
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virtue or the virtue through \'oTisdom:
• • • to both orders of virtue the essential matter
is from what principles we derive th~~.9 9
The absence of any actual example of Plotinus' dialectic is a serious lack, though on t h e other side he does p.:ive

a detailed analysis of contemplation.

Hm'lever, since there

are many features in common with Plato, it will not be
examined in any detail.

The lack of examples of the actual

dialectical encounter precludes any definitive statement as
to the question of the role of the mid\v.ife, or to catharsis
and the movement of the dialectic.

The reference he does

give in his section on the dialectic sugg ests nunerous inferences to the Platonic dialectic, but since there are no
explicit references, any such eclectic speculat i on must be
curtailed.

The issue he does insist upon is the distinction

between the disputer and the dialectician, the close tie of
dialectic and contemplation,. and the goal of dialectic bei ng
the ultimate good.
III.

RECAPITULATION AND EXTENSION

The style of the dialogue used by Plato and .his ch0ice
of this literary form as the vehicle to demonstrate the dialectic, is no chance choice.

99Ibid.

L

If the end of dialectic were
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merely to demonstrate the inconsistencies and contradictions
in an opponent •s thesis, then the form of the dialogue '\'lould
have been ill-chosen since a concise and not an expos-itory
style would be indicated.

It would have th.e brevity and eco-

nomical model_ of the la. .;y·e r' s :b rief.

Digression and tangents

would be censored and no point_, however seeminely trivial,
would be overlooked as a possible source of contradictions.
The unfoldment o_f a personality behi.nd the argument would
also be superfluous and redundant to the merely logical pursuit of the disputer.

The individual would .necessarily be

anonymous and the thesis would gain importance far beyond the
originator or expositor.

The desired result would be to

quickly achieve the conclusion.

Devices such as analogies,

appeals to myth and examples ·would be sifted away as superfluous, prior to any critical examination.

The object would

be consistency and logical presentability; consequences from
the conclusions would be secondary to the exhibition of economical analysis and rapid reductio ad absurdum techniques.
Further, the disputer would prefer not to deal directly with
an opponent, but rather deal with the thesis in isolation.
Clearly, the object of the disputer is the arr;urnent, r.ot the
individual's goals or the reasons for maintaining the argument.

It is sufficient for the disputer to be capable o.f

destroying

~n

argument and anything else would be deemed an

unnec-essary indulgence.

The sole goal of the disputer is to

45
maintain his

0\1TI

status, whether it is a formal identifica-

tion with a thesis or system, or a claim to disputation
itself; his art is incapable of bringing· to birth the concepts of another; incapable of rendering explicit the
implicit assumptions of another, and incapable of directing
the student's thought to philosophical ideals.

This is not

meant to minimize the achievements of the lo,r.ical disputer
nor is the term disputation meant to be derogatory--merely
accurate--and it is important for any understanding of

I

Platonic dialectics.

I

The dialect-ician, differing from th·e disputer, is not
satisfied with. mere verbal consistency, because his purpose
is to give a rational account of his statements and to make
others give an account of theirs.

In the elaboration of views,

inconsistencies and contradictions may become apparent and at
that point dialectic enters.

The systematic elaboration of

such inaccuracies, placed alongside of each other, provides
an opportunity for the asserter to see the contents of his
reaso·n .

It is often asserted by Plato that this analysis of

the contents of the understanding will have

a.

good effect

upon the participators,lOO but this is no easy task.
surface, it would appear to be merely a discussion, as

lOOJowett, .QE• cit., "Theaetetus, n· 16Sa, 169b;
"Euthyd," 2 75 o

L

On the

I

I
.I

I
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between friends, but, thouch it must be carried on in such an
atmosphere, its discipline and directness challenges friendship itself ..

The Lacedaemonian rule, "strip or depart," is

the spirit in which these discussions are carried out.lOl

To

remain is the acceptance of an invitation to become a participator and, as such, to risk injury of the ego and its defenses.
The disputer is invariably a defender of a tradition
or a system in 'lrihich he has some vested interest; hence the
rule t .hat the dialectician and the disputer are often antagonists.

The culture that can tolerate the dialect·ician is,

unfortunately, rare, and even when it does, it is often for
only a brief period of time.

Once the thinker is let loose

to speculate freely, he considers nothing sacred or profan-e
and nothing a restraint to his inquiring mind.

The State and

its foundations are challenged; and frequently, rather than
allow the discussion to continue, a bit of hemlock is offered.
In. the Sophist and the Statesi!lan of ·Plato's dialop;ues,
the dialectic .performs another valuable function...

Socrates

acknowledges thi~ other goal in his reference to hireself as a
trGadfly" who attempts to a\'raken the slumbering beast that is
Athens.102

In the delineation of the personality and motiva-

tions of both the

Sophist and Statesman, the recognizable

lOlibid., "Theaetetus,n l69b.
102.Jowett, .2E.• cit., "Apology," JOe ..
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features of the Tyrant and Dogmatist assert themselves.

The

Tyrant is always in need of a mask, as the Sophist needs his
smile, in order to continue to manipulate either the society
or the individual members.

Hence the a"mreness of character

and motivations enables one to recognize the difference
between the Tyrant and the Statesman, the Sophist and the
Philosopher.

Yet the continued existence of both (the Tyrant

and the Sophist) depends upon the ignorance of their respective subjects; once the awareness of their real natures is
manifest, they change their roles to the Despot or Dogmatist,
or they are forced to abdicate their illegitimate claim to
authority.

Therefore, t _h e second function or role of di-alec-

tic is a social function.

Hence dialectic has an effect upon

society -beyond the individual student of Philosophy in its
demand to reflect upon customs, laws~ institutions, and
States.

The object is to bring about a more r a tional order into

society.

Because of this, dialectic can seldom function except

in a free society.
The dialogues are marked by the presence of leisure,_
which is necessary for the discovery of what reason can know
(and it matters little if

fe<iT

or many words are used) •

This

central notion, so difficult to modern ears, is that a concept is not an entity easily defined, nor is it a matter of
some rapid consultation with a dictionary or encyclopedia.
Rath-er than this, it is a private thing with many clusters of

L

meaning connecting it with insights, notions., and, sometimesJ
dimly felt beliefs.

The object of leisure is to afford a

free atmosphere to investigate and demonstrate the concept
and to s-upply evidence in the form of reasons and analohies
so that the concept arrived at through dialectic is not
meant to be merely an arbitrary construction,, but the fruit
of intense thought, careful observations and reflections
upon life.

The concept that c.an be readily defined is in

all probability a learned response with all the flatness of
someone else's truth.

Someone else' s truth is- a 1 i e i.f not

integrated within one's own understanding and seen to be
defensible, not by some hypothetical person, but by the
upholder of reason.

Unless this is done, it is just another

idea living in constant jeopardy of the first criticism.

It

is no more than a contradictory piece o_f potential difficulty.
To act upon ideas that have not become one's own is to live
another man's thoughts, another's ideals-, and a betrayal of
oneself.

That is, if one can go so far as to assume a

betrayed. self when the self betrayed is another's thoughts
misunderstood.

Another's truth may in fact be the absolute

truthJ but it is not transferable.

They are transfonn-ed

and recreated by the understanding into a ne\'1 thing·
new thought understood is a vast achievement.

-A

Certainly

Plato would be the first to admit that truth is beyond

I

I

L
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words,lOJ but it is because of this that he can say this and
not in spite of it.

The idea of truth being beyond reason

does in no way mitigate the truth that it can also be grasped
through reason.

This is quite similar to the doctrine of nno-

mind" in Chinese Buddhism.

It assumes that th.e re is a devel-

oped mind or, stated more ironically, it presupposes a mind
to go through.
The catharsis brought about by the dialectic is
nothing else than ·e mptying the mind of incompatible notions
and raising the mind to see the more embracing unity under
one concept.

As noted in the Symposium, the beauty that is

seen in the final vision is beyond relations, eternal and
absolute.

This same beauty, the beauty that "has hold not of

an image, but of a reality,ttl04 is, nevertheless, previous to
that vision seen in inSitutions, laws, sciences, and in the
ordering of states and families, as ·well as that "which is
called temperance and justice."l05

The vision is the culmin-

ation of having realized the concept of beauty permeating all

spheres of life that finally vindicates the entire ideational
construction by an insight into something that is beyond all
the particulars, being its source and life.

1031. A. Pos~ (tr~ns.), Thirteen Epistles of Plato
(London: Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1925), VII b,-p. 97.
10 4aouse, QE• cit., 209c.
105~~, 2llc.
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Certainly one can "learn" this in the manner of cra":"t-

'I

ming for an e-xam that W-ill be fore-~,_,ott en in the followinr, morning.

But ideas cannot be learn-ed by rote; if they are not

transformed_ by the understanding, they will exist as misunde.r stood notions.
o·f the soul.

The confusion of such a mind is tr.e sickness
The doctor prescribes one remedy to regain a

clear mind--to empty it of all ideas that cannot live harmoniously with itself.

This cannot be done in solitary exile,

but only with the aid of other critical minds sensitive to
the difficulties of the task and capable of gently correcting
notions and guiding the thinking through all of its consequences.

The consequences of the thought, the implications

and the extensions, are the raw materials out of which the
n-otion becomes known.

The rationale for the belief and the

source_ of its birth must be brought to light carefully and
then placed in a discussion with the care equallinE the task.
By bringing the-s e to birth, by makinp; them explicit in the

answering of questions, one is for-ced to turn one's attention
upon oneself, obliged to examine the nature of one's beliefs
and the supposed evidence for their claims to legitimacy •
This is rendering them objective and transforming them to the
conscious and deliberative.

The idea that can be defended

without this process of extension is only a minor achievement
I

and insignificant victory.

To empty the mind in the attempt

to render its content significant is a lengthy task demanding

L

j
I

l

.

·- · ~

leisure and tranquillity of surroundings.
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Thus dialectic is

a task difficult to engage in and even more so to pursue to
its end.

Again, a midwife, a person who himself is not com-

mitted to any view, is as necessary as the very understanding
presupposed before indulging in the activity.

The ideas them-

selves are best if they are chosen from higher, more complex
concepts (ideals, as they are called today), rich enough to
justify the activity and sufficient in value to have meaning.
They should be of the nature of one's basic commitments;
one's fundamental premises of li2e, reflectine not merely
ideas unconnected with the reasoner, but also those to which
he feels an attachment; the things that politicians are fond
of praising, but denying in practice--these are the materials,
the ideas which start the dialectical process.

The dialec-

tical stage-setting of value concepts, sufficient leisure, a

I

midwife, and a student in labour, are transformed into a drama

l

within the drama of ideas.

The concept is developed, anal-

rI

ogies chosen for amplification, excursions into tangents and

'

digressions are tolerated all in the expectation. t ·hat reason
may be capable of finally presenting its product.

In this

sta-g e, the questions are intended to develop the general concept; contradictions and ·a mbiguities, when discovered, are
removed for the further purification of the idea.

Once having

achieved this stage, the critical aspect of the dialectic
begins.

.

t•

This stage is what Plato c-alls tr.e exam1na 10n

ttt

°
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determine if the birth
birth.nl06

£Or

t ·he idey is a true and noble

Th e asserter must now reply to criticisms and

counter arguments.

If he can still hold to the idea, answer-

ing all objections satisfactorily, then he can claim the
idea, and his understanding is- enriched.
The dramatic aspect of the encounter is reflected in
the participators' reaction to this process, for they becom·e
the players in the dialectical drama.

Some are eager to enter·

into it and find they cannot sustain after the "first fall"
and are quick to depart.

Then, too, such as Ademantas and

Polymarchus, stay only to hear themselves deliver an oration,
seldom desiring to remain long enour,h to listen to the critical examination of ~heir theses.

Or, from the other side, in

the critical role {as with Simmias and Cebes), they carry
their argument through to the end, all the while offering
objections and rebuttals.
conclusion.l07

Yet they are unable to accept the

Their i .nability to further cr..allenge brings

them to silence, but they still confess that they still cannot accept or believe the conclusions.

This is the case of a

participator who can follow the logic of the dialogue and
agree to its cogency and yet feel he must refuse the conclusion
without being able to offer any additional contradictory

106Jow.ett, £E• ~., "Theaetetus," 150c.
107Ibid., "Phaedo,, 107b.
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evidence or criticism.

He has, as it were, reached the limit

of his own understanding.

This is not to suggest that there

are levels of truth, only levels of understandine of the
participators in the dialectical encounter.

To pursue this

further would require a very careful analysis of the person's
beliefs to find just what is so repugnant that its disclosure
or admission would mean the cancellation of another more fundamental belief.

It would. be an attempt to locate t ·he notion

which precludes the admission of the tested concept, and,.
without the removal of the hidden notion, all else would prove
fruitless since it is a bar to £urther understanding.

The

idea of removing a concept that has precluded further development simultaneously as.s umes

tr~ e

value of other concepts.

The· idea reduced to an absurdity does have a curative effect
and so, too, does the n-el..rly acquired idea.
Part of the dialectic is an upward movement revealing
the value of ideas and another segment is what might be
called a downward movement--demonstrating the relative status
of the id·ea.

A ne\..r understanding of the concept of Justice

may gather many diverse notions under one g eneral concept,
allowing the holder the freedom to see consecuences in relations that he might never have envisioned with his previous
understanding.

The larger the area, the less distinct the

concept; the broader the horizon of the thour-; ht,. the less it
can be distinct and differentiated; and when it is finally
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seen to necessitate the Good, so, too, the less it has a
definite, precise referent.

However, along t!ds route tr.e

student must first arrive at def1"n1"t-e concepts 1n
· order to
proceed further in the dialectic.

This stage should not be.
II

minimized because the foundation of the dialectic presupposes
1a developed mind b-efore it can profitably enrole in the negative quest$-

The arrival of a new concept is the result of

l'''

jj
' .

seeing a new arrangement between a set of facts or ideas •

.
Its arrival is often accompanied by a sudden feeling of
elation.

It is the exercise of the intuitive faculty.

In a

recent publication of the Harvard Cognition Project, it is
stat·ed,
The attainment of a concept has about it something of
a ouantal character. It is as if the mystery of a conceptual distinction were able to mask the preconceptual
memory af the things now disti.nguished. r.~oreover, the
transition experience bet"'i'teen "not having it'' seems to
be without experiental contentw From the point of view
of the imagery and sensory stuff the act of graspine a
co.n ceptual distinction is,. if not unanschaulich or impalpable, to use the language of the VJurzburg investigators,
at least unverbalizable. It is:, if you will, an enigmatic process and often a sudden proce·ss. The psychologist's "aha experience" sinr.les out this suddenness
as does the literary man's "shock of r-ecor; nition." Something happens quickly and one thinks one ha~ fo~nd.some
thing.. Concept attainment see:-ns almost an 1ntrlnslcc;lly
unanalyzable process from an experiential point of v1evr:
ttNow I understand the distinction, before there was
nothinp;.1. and in between was only a moment of illumination .. niv8

i

I
.;

I
lOBJerome S .• Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and George
A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: John Wiley &. Sons,
Inc.~ 1956), p. 50.
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Quite naturally this must be correlated w 1·t~ th e 1ns
·
· ht
1~
·

·

jj

experienced when on the wrong_ end of a reduct·10 £...__
d a b surdu:n
argument, for at the moment the concept is found to be unnecessary, it comes as a sudden shock--a shock of embarraseed
recognition.

The t~ro parts o"f the dialectic--the midwifery

and the examination--correspond to these ·t-vw processes.

The

student proceeds in the entire proces::, hopinr. in the end to
have bettered as a result.
Dialectic is a movement of the
the Good.

underst~ndin~

towards

It is first tested and tempered objectively by the

disciplined discussion.

The twin methods, the concept

att~in-

ment and the. reduction of concepts, are the initial stap:es of
this dialectic.

However, it soon outstrips this early

sta~e

in the search for unity, number, and infinity, and reaches
out to the essential reality.

There, after much persever-

ance, by the aid of pure intelligence the very nature of
I

Goodness itself is grasped.
templation.

.

Thi.s dialectic fuses into con-

The object of the contemplation has been purified

of any image or outward appearance and carefully examinect to
justify the ownership.

The object of conte~~lation,

if one

can legitimately term it as "object," is not another's concept, for the essential feature here in the dialectic is that
the student himself must

d~~onstrate

his possession by

ing through all criticism, opinions, and appearance.

fi~ht"Eence

the idea must not be left outside but must be made one

.....
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identical thing with the Soul of the novice so that he . ·finds
it really hi.s own. nl09
kno\>1

If he fails in this task, "he will

neither Goodness itself nor any p;ood thing.nllO

The

object is actually beyond being and is considered as even
beyond truth and knowledee.

This object, the Good, is con-

templated and culminates in vvisdom.
When it arrives at this stage of contemplation, it
leaves the coil of premises, conclusions, and lor,ic, finding
th-ese now superfluous.

Plotinus considers dial-ectic to be

the precious part of philosophy havinr.; nothinr; to do with
theories and rules.

These became superfluous because once

having arrived at Unity the student contemplates.
te~plation

But con-

is not a separate activity from the dialectic,

since it is the outward move~ent of the quest for Unity.
inner and the outer dialectic are different.

The

Plotinus expres-

ses it well in his term "a certain super-reasoningnll1 marks
the inner dialectic.

The particular virtue induced by dia-

lectic is its affinity with the Universal.

Its similarity

has been stressed previously in its similar s-tructure, but
its affinity is much closer in that the vehicle is the
intuitive activity in both cases.

10 ~'IacKenna.,

oo. cit. _, III. 8. 6.

110 cornford,

.21?.• cit., VII. 534·

lllMacKenna, oP. cit., I .• 3. 6.

-
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Dialectic is marked by its abhorrence of a merely
speculative understanding
- , for it is in effect a method
d~~andin~

the intuition of its object.

In both the concept-

attainment and reduction, the entire procedure is undertaken
to awaken insight and bring about that illu•ninatinP" ex•)c
rience
t
l _1

known as intuition.

-E ven in the formal discipline such as

found in Plato's Republic, the object is in the percertion of
unity.

The intuition is experienced when what

a~neared

as

separate and unrelated elements are seen in a nevr order or
unity.

Hence, Plato's remark that perc ei vinr: relations is

the natural gift of dialectic.
The shift of emphasis from the outer to the inner dialectic is only distinguished by its vocal aspect.

True, it

.I- i
I

.s oon outstrips even this distinction, but not the- process of
seeking Unity among the dualities.

Again, the dialectic is a

process in which immediate awareness as an intuitive experience is the feature of the recognition.

In essence it is a

demand for discriminatio_n, a discrimination sharp and concentrated enough to transform the understanding--hence, consciousness itself.
A criticism of Plato would be that although he provides

!

!

ample evidence of dialectic as distinct from mere di.sputr:ltion,
as does Plotinus, the inner aspect--the conte~plative--is not
as clearly drawn~

In fact, he only outlines it and leaves a

tenuous tie to the outer movement.

Pl-otinus, on the other
I
I

I

~

-5g
hand, makes this connection more ri r..: orous, without, however.,
any improvement u p on the dialectic as a contemplative act.

-

CHAPTER II
THE DECLINE OF PHILOSOPHY AND DIALECTIC
I.

FOREWORD

At this point, it should be appropriate to return to
Plato's rule for the operation of the dialectic- and _a pply it
to this thesis itself.

He says,

. I think that you should go a step further, and conS1der no~ only the consequences which flow from a eiven
hypothes1s, but also the consequences which flow from
denying the hypothesis; and that will be still better
training for you.l

And later he adds,

In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not ·to
be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the
consequences in relation to the thing itself and to any
other thing you choose,--to each of th~m singly, or more
than one, and to all; and so of other things, you must
look at them in relation to themselves and anything; else.
you suppose either to be or not to be, if 2ou would train
yourself perfectly and see t .he real truth.~
Thus, to Plato, the argume-n t in favor of the dialectic
would only be one part of a real dialectic.

The other aspect

must be to develop the idea of what would be the conditions
if dialectic were reje.c ted.

It would include drawine out the

fram_e work to see if the den·ial is justified_ or if it is
itself _fraught with errors, contradictions, and ambiguous
assertions.

Following its development, we would be meeting

lJowett, QE• cit., "Parmenides," lJ6a.

2Ibid., lJ6c.
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the Socratic rule and would also throw a bit of light on the
curious problem of why the flower of Athens withered without
ever seeding.
However, to comply with the Platonic request in all
its aspect·s (for tracing the consequences fron the rejection)
would be a too lengthy task to be adequately t ·reated within
this more limited study.
There are two possibilities---either the conseauences
from the denial could be stated dogmatically, or illustrated
with the aid of an actual case of a repudiation of Philosophy
and Dialectic.

On the other hand, it should be investigated

to determine if the alleged repudiation is in fact groundless
eith-er because of the typical "s·traw-man argument" or through
lack of critical reflection.

If the dialectic- has actually

been validly shown to be in error, then its present disappearance should be welcomed.

Therefore, the requirement is

to find those thinkers who have claimed a victory over
Philosophy and examine their arguments.
As large as even this reduced task is, it has been
somewhat lightened since there is material available· as a
result of Christianity's denial of Philosophy as an end in
itself.

Hence, with apologies to Plato, it will suffice for

our purposes to restrict the denial to an examination of the
reasons and arguments for Augustine's claim that Christian
~hilosophy has superseded pagan philosophy and therefore

I

J
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eliminated the need of d1."alect1.·c.

Even

·r

1.

th e

ar~uments

are

found imral·id, it will accomplish a measure of service by
revealing the thought proc-esses, rationalization,. and com.~it
rnents implicit in a denial of philosophy.

To illustrate the

consequences of a rejection of philosophy and the restrictions
imposed upon reason is a study of dop,matism.

The word dog-

mat-ism is a·ften used as a derogatory term, but in this work
it is understood as a result of belief exceedinr, the cognitive grounds for belief. 2 a The selection of Aueustine pro-

vides an example of a rejection of philosophy as an end in
itself and also illustrates the mechanism of dogmatism.
It is often remarked that religion and philosophy,

faith and reason, are bit·ter opposed concepts and if the side
of religion -were to lose ground there would be a corresponding

developm.ent. of reason and a decline of dogmatism.

Granted

that there is a c-ertain measure of truth in thi.s assertion., it
is actually one-.sided..

The retreat from reason--dogmatism--

can take a modern form that has no direct theological connection
and yet may have just as much emotional comnlitment and exc-eed
the cognitive grounds· of belief as much as that of any religious
appeal.

The modern denial or rejection of philosophy will be

examined and demonstrated to be a continuation of the- process
of seeking "certainties, indubitable truths, and clear and

2astephen c. Pepper, World Eypot~eses: ! Stu~y ~n
.
Evidence (Berkeley a..'l1.d Los Aneeles: Un1.versJ..ty- of valiTornJ..a
Press, 194e}, p. 105.

, I

distinct ideas."

This modern rejection of philosophy is the

pursuit of History.

Therefore the s eco.nd part of this Chapter

will be review of the claims of History and will demonstrate
that the same processes i nvolved in the rejection of reason

I

or philosophy by religion contain the same elements as those
by the modern exponents of History.

i

Therefore the use of reason in a philosophy as a

I

!

I
r

dialectic has been outlined in the First Chapter and in this
Second Chapter the rejection is examined and the conse-ouences
traced in order to better understand and judge the merits of
both claims.
The salient features of this analysis will be assumed

.

-f or further sections of this paper, and therefore will greatly
reduce the need of repeating certain key arguments.

'

~

The con-

elusions are equally binding wherever similar arguments aremaintained and therefore it is taken in a more archetypal

!:

referent and not meant to be exclusively an attack or criticism

I

of Chr i stianity as such.

I

i

!

Naturally, the truths of religion may not present phil-

I

osophical probl_ems for the believer and it would not be

.I

II

denied that insofar as devotion is the central element -in
religion, philosophy is unneces s ary.
~ion

o

I

It is only when reli-

!

enters into the field of philosophy that these state-

ments are pertinent.

i

It may be that -J. H. Newman is cor-

o

I

rect in his view that "those higher Truths have been
revealed to us for devotion and, for dev-otion, the mystery

i

.

'

__!.
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presents no difficulty.»]
II. AUGUSTINE
It has often been asserted that ~hilosoohy was born on
Grecian soil some tvienty-fi -., e hundred years a.o:o in the City
of Athens, but wh ether this can be contested or not is of
small importance"$

V.That does matter is ·that from her many

progeny sprang Plato who was bold enourh to introduce into
philosophy the highest ideal and g oal of Ultimate l;Jisdom.
Whatever success he did a chieve can be seen by the
he left future

a ~ es.

herita~e

They fell heir to a Persistent oroblem

that was to remain a continual source of difficulty for some
time.

It was in fact an Achilles' heel.

The problem or

question reasserted itself and took the form:

"1\'as Christ

necessary if Plato found a way to the Ultimate Good:

If

Christ came with an exclusive truth, what of philosophy?"
This crystallized into the no,·! familiar problem of the proper
roles of reason and faith, but before it took this aspect it
was kno"m as the classical dichotomy betvreen philosophy and
reli ;-: ion.
It is argued th a t the Ctristian mess age relegates the
p~etensions

of r hilosophy--and

t ~1 erefore

dialE.·ctic--into

3J. H. . Newman (trans.),. St. Athanasius (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903), Vol. II, p. 317.
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obscurity by the utilization of the new organ--Faith• And in
the very same way as it resolved the philosopher's thesis, it
also S\·lept away the tragedian--condemned by being in possession of an inadequate and narti al view of truth.

It is

obvious that ther€' c .::n be little content or drarna fo r a
Christian in a

Gree~

Traredy, or any tragedy, if in the final

moment of the hero ' s fate,
by an act of faith.

his moira, he can claim s.al vat ion

Throur, h the act of faith, one exchanges

the two kingdoms and makes superfluous the one by contrast
to the other.

To the Christian, there is only one myth,

h€'nce only one drama, cne hero--the re!'ore one prototy pe .
Thus, he can conclude that both Classical drama and philosophy
have beer. s u perseded by a nm·1 donna comprehensive enough to
resolve problems of philosophy and fate. (But rat.h.er than
resolvinr, the problems of Classic philosophers, it absolved

I
I

them.} They ask, what need now for philosophy at all?

Ter-

tullian retorts in a famiJiar passaee:
So, then, where is there any likenes~ : between ·the Christian and the Fhilosopher? between the dic:cipline of Greece
and of Heaven? the man \'-r hose object is fame, and v1hose
object is life? betwe cn the talker and the doer? between
the man v-Jho builds up and the man -v-1ho pulls dovm? b·et\,Ieen
tee friend and foe of error? betv.reen one 1t:ho corrupts the
truth, and one ,.,ho restores and teac}:es it? betv-JeEm its
chief and its custodian?4

4-rertullian, ADolop,y, trans. The i1ev. S. Thelv-.rall
(Vol . III of The Ante-tdcine Fathers., ed. Roberts & Donaldson.
10 vols.; New York: Charles Scribners, lS:lB), Chap. YJNI , p . 51.

J
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This is tf:e funda.::mmtal breach from

w ~:i ch

has not yet compl et£:1 "'J' extricated its elf.

the v;estern \\'Or1d
I t 1s
· an a dmis~1on
·

of the r,ap between a c omm itment of faith and that of reason.
It is an acknowledgement that the articles of f:tith are forever outside the realm o:' reason, inaccessible to reason, ar.d,
further,

affirms an opposition between reli<i .: n a::d phiJ. os o;-hy.

It is fundamental to the understandinr: that U : is is in f:1ct

the case because vrhat developed later in Europe \':as an abortive philosophy having little in comr~:on 1.-:ith that of Plato's
Athens.

Tertullian states the doctrine of inc2.rnation and at

the ~ar:1e time defines an attitude thn.t has beconC' the :!=revalent mood, which is at bottom a rejection of the claims of

reason:
The Son of God vms crucified:
I am not asha"!led
because men must needs be ashamed, and t:!'1e Son of God
died; It is. by all means to be believed, because it is
absurd. And he was buried; and rose a ~a in; the fact is
certain, because it is impossible.5
An appeal to an authority ie the altar on which reason
is sacrificed.

Christ becorr..es the only avent~e to Truth.

Att ent.ion is shifted fror.l the demands of rear, on to the meaning
of Jesus' life.

The ne\\· objective for reason is to represent

the essence of the .scripture and outline the need for sal va-

5Tertullian, On the Flesh of Chr.i.st, ~rans. Dr. Holmes

{Vol. III of The Ante-Nicine Fathers, ed. Rooerts & Donaldsono

10 vols.; New-rork: Charles Scribners, 1918), Chap. V, P· 525~
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tion and eternal life.

It mi~ht be argued that these state-

ments of Tertullian_ reflect only the early teachings of the
Church and, as yet, do not contain

t~e

full truth, because

later Aug ustine wrote, "Can paganism,- I ask you, produce- anythine; ec:ual to ours, the one true ?hilosophy?1'6

A-ugustine

believed that he had in his possession a true philosophy
superior t o the non-Christian.

It is not a new religion _in

competition with philosophy, but a new reli c ious philosophy
t -hat stands above all other philosonhies.

If this is so, one

can expect the shortcomin,r:s of Plato and his dialectic to be

I

resolved in Augustine .

At tr.e sruae time, however, Auf.Ustine

accepts the role of faith.

How then can it be an irr..provement?

Essentially what v.ras accepted on faith"i

Both Athana-

sius and Ambrose elaborated the consequences of the Council
of Nicaea into a creed which took its name.

They became the

orthodox interpretation of John XX 31-2 Peter 1; which in
turn became the cornerstone of Christian apoloretics and the

6The Contra Iulianum (A gainst Julian) is not l _isted in
Fa rrar and Evans, Er_:--_lisr~ Translations from J.:edieval So~~-,
nor is it listed in t~e Cnion Catalogue of the Library of
Gonp;ress . In the translated vmrks of Augustine {both the
\'Jritir.{~ s of St. Augustine and the Hicine and Fost-Nicine
Father~ of the Christian Church), it is listed in the bibliog raphy but not included among t~-e translated v:orks. '!'herefore, it has been necessary to c1te this secondary source.
Latin text reads, ttobsecro te, non sit honestior philosophia
gentium quam nostra Christ:Lana, quae una est vera philosophia .
IV .14. 72n translated by Charles N. C_~chrane, Christianity in
Classical Culture (Ne\1 York: Oxford Un iversityPress, 19441,
pp . 231-2)2 ..

f
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article of

faith~

It is sirnificant that Ambrose's statement

of this dogma also contains a succir:ct viev.r of tbe function
of reason.

Augustine shares this vie'lr; in hiB statement that

arguments and differences of view or interpretations on this
subject, or fer that matter any subject of creed, are to be
.resolved by reference to the Scriptures and the writines of
the Apostles. 7

Reason, hence, was not a jucige nor was s·he to

be utilized without restraint, but became

~assive--accepting

premises which she should neither discuss nor judge.S.

The

Nicaean creed, the concept of the Trinity, provides th.e basis
for Augustine's thought.
But the transition from Plato to Augu-stir.e is not just
a movement from one system to another; there is a profound
gap separating them r-Jhich is only apparently joined by the

comt1on terms they shared.

Yet, these very terr.Js changed

their content so radically that any attempt to see then within
the same referent would miss their essential differences and
obscure the vastly different goals they set for themselves.
August-ine set a ne,·r note, a nev-! key, which for centuries
remained the basic motif of European -ohilosophy .

The confu-

sion was compounded by using the same terms in totally differ-

71.:arcus Dads (trans.), St. Augustin.e: The City of God
(New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1946), XIV. 7.
$Ibid., X. 23 ..

-
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ent contexts with vastly different meanings.

Primarily,

Augustine's quest was for certainty; yet, so too was Plato's.
The difference, however, lies in what they expected as their
certitude.

The object of Plato's philosophy was the Ultimate

Good, the mystic vision of Reality, as he himself freely
acknowledges.9

On the other hand, Augustine's quest was

certainty, based on the acceptance of a principle, a conceptual ·framework., which would resolve his dilemmas and tensions.
The highest ideal for Plato was the Socratic dictun, "I know·
that I do not know" and "know thyself," while to Augustine it
was the acceptance of faith and the belief in the principles
of the Christian Church.

.In Europe, the ·tradition of philoso-

phy continued the quest for certainty and indubitable truths,

and abandoned the quest of wisdom.

It chose Augustine rather

than Plato--the certain, not the dialectical.
To August·ine, knO\'t'ledge· is defined as "certissima
ratione" but he is cognizant of the fact that not all elements
ar·e knowable in this sense because it is obvious that man
accepts a vast field as knowledge based upon authority.

Re

believes that the matrix of human relationships would collapse
if this confidence in authority wer€ undermined:
If this faith in human affairs is removed who will not
mark how great will be their disorder and what dreadful

9Jowett, ££• cit., "Phaedo•" 69.
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confusion will follo\'1?10
and he adds:
• • ~ therefore, when we do not believe what we
cannot see, concord wi ~. 1 perish and human society
itself will not stand firm.ll
Yet, on the other hand, it is manifest that the authority
assumes, or demands faith in order to be operational.

The

restriction of belief on :.y to what can be se en is ridiculed
and, "many examples can be cited which sho:v1 that absolutely
nothing would remain intact in human societ,y if we should
determine to believe only what we can ,e:rasp by perce ption.nl2
In the acceptance of authority, knowledge is

possible.

Therefore, to Augustine, authority must precede reason and it
must also b e incumbent upon him to assume that faith is the
very condition of understanding.
Not have knowledge and believe, but "believed. and
known." For we believe in order to kno. . .r, for i£ we
wanted to know first , and then believe~ we s h ould not
be able either tc know or to believe.lJ

.
lO]ifarcus Dads ( ed.), The Writings of St. ~-us~.t~~
{New York: CL~a Publishing Co., 1947), On Faith in Things
Unseen, trans. Ray J. !)eferrari and I,·: ary Fra ncis l~'icDonald,
Vol:-fi, Chap. 2, (4), P• 454

11 Ibid., Chap. J, (4) ., PP• 455-6.
12Dods, .Q.E.• ill_., The Advanta~e of Believing,. trans.
Luanne Heagher, Vol. II, Chap. 12, {2 } , p . 427.
lJPhilip Schaff" ( ed.), The Nicine and Post Nicine
Father_£ of the Christian Churcii.-n\ew York: Charles S;,_ribners~
1903)., On The Gospel of St. ~n, Vol. VII, Chap. XXVII, (9J,
p. 177.

:
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Thus faith need not entail the blind acceptance of a Tertullian, and the rejection of reason is not thought by
Augustine to be the prerequisite of ·f aith.

Hence, he thereby

attempted to return reason to the field; but he carefully
adds, nyou ought not be taup-ht by reason first and only then
by faith.n 1 4

Augustine inherited a tradition that asserts

two things di_f ficult to reconcile, and he has attempted in a
masterly way to blend harmoniously these twin aspects.
First,
Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy
and vain deceit, -accordinf, to the elements of the
world.l5
and, again, the assertion,
Because that which is knmm of God is manifest among
them, for God has manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly
seen, being understood by the thines which are made,
also his eternal power and Godhead.! 6
In Augustine's task of the reconciliation of reason and faith,

he sees his work as superior to the Philosopher's.

That is

to say, he delineates the role of reason within a Christian
framework and concomitantly he sees philosophy as th~ possible

14nods, 21?.-- cit., The Advantage of Believing, Chap._ IX,
( 21, 2 2 } , pp • -418- 419 •

l5nods, The City of God, 2£• cit., VIII. 10, quoted
from Col. ii.8.
16Ibid., VIII.IO, auoted from Rom. 1.19-20.
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arena of deception

~..,r'1ich

only reiterates the suspect status

which philosophy has to those of strong beliefs.

Yet, the

other q-uotation, noted above, provides the basis of the c oncept of Natural Theology.

To these t\·.ro approac h es, Au,r;ustine

seeks a synthesis by arising to the notion tha t in Christian
philosophy, one can even g o beyond the natur:1l philosophers
by encompassing their -vmrks while at the sa:rre time demonstrat-

ine their limitations.
natural theology.

He recognizes the three parts of

The natural is seeking

~the

cause of exist-

ence," the rational as "the ultimate reason for the understanding," and the moral--"the end in reference to v1h ich the
whole life is re~ ulated.nl?

In the analysis of the natural

philosophers, he sees that "it is evident that none c or.1e
nearer to us than the Platonists."lg

In his statement of the

Natural Theology, incorporating the three aspects, he discovers
in Plato's works th8t the love of the Good eauals God:
~ • • but the true and highest Good, accordi~~ to
Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a
philosoPher who loves Cod; for philosophy is directed
to the o~ta ininz: of the ~lessed life, a~g he v;ho loves
God is blessed ln t h e enJO)~ent of God. ~

Hence, he adds ap;ain that nthe philosophy 1r:hich has cone
nearest to the Christian fc1.ithtt is that of "Plato himself."
If this is true, t h en it is important to discern clearly

L

17!£1£., VIII. 4.

18Ibid., VIII. 5.

19Ibid., VIII~ 8.

20Jbid., VIII. 9.

20
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their differences with regard to reason .since, if it has been
assumed t.hat in Plato reason can lead one t..o the Good, what
need then of faith or Christ·ianity:

Augustine,

althou~h

he

eives this high estimate of Plato, assigns no epistemological
role to reason as dialectic.

He

~ays:

And, as the study of V!isdom consists in action and
contemplation, so that one part of it may be. called
active, and the other contemplation., --the active part
having reference to the conduct of life, that is to the
regulation of morals, and the conte..."Uplative part to the
investigation into the causes of nature and into pure
truth, --Socrates is sa.id to have excelled in the active
part of that study, while Pytha~oras vave more attention
to its conternplati ve part, on which he brought to bear
all the force of t.is ," Teat intellect. ·To Plato is given
the praise of havin£ nerfected Philosophy by combining
both parts into one .21
In this statement of the philosoph;r of Plato, it is hardly a
fair or accurate su.11mary .

It lacks all of tr.e essential

features and, in fact, Augustine's general statement could
just as \vell be attributerl to other philoso-phers as well as
Plato.

The distinguishin;; feature of Platonic philosophy is

the double role of dialectic; the outward and inner.

In

Ausus tine's -a -nalysis, it apnears he did not utilize the
Republic or the major dialor:ues.

Further, many of his state-

ments attributed to the Platonists are not only misleading.,
but often can be seen to have no relation to Plato.

An

interestinr; examyle is vrhen Aug:ustine states that the Platon-

I

I
r

k.
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ists knew of the none true God" but "thour>:ht that sacred
rites were to be performed in honour of many Gods .n22

There

are numerous stateQents such as these, but it is not the purpose here to correct or to point out all the errors in Augustine's thou.<rht, but only to examine the use of reason by this
sa-called exponent of Nee-Platonism in Christianity.

It is

clear that in his statement of the philosophy of Plato he did
not see the ethical side,23 but his analysis suggests that he
had few o:-iginal \Wrks of Plato at his disposal '"i th v-;hich to
dravi an accurate conception of Platonic philosophy.

He. says

that the wo::--ks· he did read were translations from t t e Greek
into the Latin;24 hence it is novr obvious why his concept of
Plato and of dialectic was so inaccurate, as only a

~mall

part

of Plato's works were transla ted into Latin.
Assuming then that the central doctrine of Platonic
thought is contained in the t1vin disciplines of contemplation
and dialectic, then the issue \'Jith Augustine is much sL-npler ...
V/hat works did he have access to?

Were they basic and essen-

tial for the elaboration of these disciplines?

Did he know

enough Greek to read them in the originals, if they \'lrere not
translated?

It is asserted by

22 Ibid., VIII. 12.

Au~ustine

that he did not have

23Ibid.r VIII. 2, 3, 4.

24Ed\'lard B. Pusey (trans.), The Confessi.ons of Saint
(Collector 1 s edition; Nel·T York: Pocket Books , Inc.,

Au.~ustine .

1951), VII. 9e.

..
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this facility with the Greek languar:e~25 hence, the ouestion
is, vrhat texts then were available to hi:n for his est L11ate- of
Platonic thought':

Primarily there was a translation of the

Timaeus by Chalcidius, which, if really translated by A. D.

350, was not quoted by authors of his time, nor did
quote directly from this work.

Ausu.st~ne

Then tf:ere were- references in

Cicero's works and passat::es in Seneca 1 s letters, the fiftyeighth and sixty-fifth, and only casual references
in Aulus Gellius.

c cmt~ined

Some references were in Haximum' s collec-

tion of Facts and Sayings, and, of course, the works of
Appuleius.

There were some other references in Macrobiu3 1

Saturnalia as well as a com;1Jentary by him col!lparinp; Plato 1 s
and Cicero's philosophy (whic h is of doubtful value}, towards

a delineation of the dialectic.

Of the translated works of

Plato into Latin were the Meno and Phaedo by Aristippus.
'l'herefore, it is clear that the central doctrines of Plato
referred to in this thesis vrere not translat c:d into Latin a~~d,
accordingly, Augustine ~ust have drawn his references from
secondary materials
translat.ions.

withot~

benefit of

ori~inal

sources or

He had no direct contact \·Iith the Symposiwn,

Republic, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, and other major
dialogues.

A more decisive :udgement can be

25rbid.

~ade without retreat-

75
·ing into "historical evidence, '1 for this is at best a merely
provisional proof .

Augustine me ntions his contact with

Platonists and, hence, he might have

~etten his knm--,rled~e

through these contacts as a verbal tradition.

Even if this

is assu.11ed, it would fol :. O\-.' that eiti:cr thev did not teach
~

a complete Plato, or he f.:J.iled to C()mprehend its :.1erits.
Whatever the reason--it is manifestly clear

Augustine

th ~ t

never mentions the 'P latonic doctrine of purification throup;h
dialectic, the dialectical catharsis, nor '\>las he cor.;nizant of
the central concept that the Good is knowable . 26
is evident that he does not distinguish
tonists, and neo-Platonists ..

He

bet~e e n

Further, it
Plato, Pla-

assumes they all speak from

the sa,;-ne tradition and thE!.t they can be the spokesmen for
what he considers to be Platonic doctrine.

I

This is the source

of all the confusion and errors in his estimate of philoso~hy .
H~s

principal source appears to be a nee-Platonist of rather

dubious merit who authored the "Golden Ass. n

Ee ouotes him

nearly exclusively27 and draws nearly all his references fror:1
"The God of Socrates"--or, as it is sor.1etines called, " The
demon o ...:p Socrates."

Had Augustine the works of Plato, he

could have seen that this work bears no relation to t~e
Socratic Demon which .is mentioned in the Apolot::Y .

26nods, The City of God, ~· cit., X.. 29.
27Ibid., VIII. 13-22.

Therefore,

. .·

.......

it is an injustice to attribute these references to Platonists
when all the evidence he had to conclude from was that the
Christian doctrine opposes Apuleius' concepts and apparently
can succeed the Apuleian doctrine.

It is unfortunate that

"The God of Socrates" is no longer extant but, nevertheless,
Augustine's references and quotations demonstrate the classic
example of a "straw-man arp.;ument" in philosophy.

He thought

he was arguing against Plato and Class.ic Greek philosophy,
while all he was objecting to was a writer who was really
outside the Platonic tradition.
Augustine's attack upon Apuleius affords him an opportuni ty to establish the heart of Christ.ian doctrine: In support
;

of Faith there is a basic claim that
between man and God.

\

Christ is the mediator

The necessity o.f a "Christ" lies in the

concept that since man is mortal h.e is also miserable, 28 and
therefore he is not capable of enjoying true blessedness29 without the intervention of one who, by the mortality of his body and
!:

immortal righteousness of his spirit, can give divine help in
cleansing and liberating man)O

Hence a. man who is also divine

"remained heavenly even while on earth," providing the principle of the logos incarnated in man.31

The Platonic principle

of the Logos assumed in Christianity a human form32 "cleanses

2 Bibid., IX.

-

Jlrbid.,

x.

15.
24.

29Ibid., IX. 14.
32Ibid.

3°Ibid., IX. 17.
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the soul and flesh of believersn33 from this i~ born a new
act-- fai th--'\·.rhich by the act of belief cleanses and purifies .
Augustine finds this the answer to his uncerto.inty, o:1t he is
seriously puzzled by the- Plat onists r- reluctance to become
converted to the Christian Faith \"i_h en they so readily r:rant
the concept of the Lo ~ os (or nous).

AddressinF, his remark to

Porphyry, he says:

i

I

You say, indeed, that i~norance, and the numberless
vices result in:'; :rom it, cannot b c r E:.:.ll !J'l ed by any
mysteries, but only by the--~trikes no~s--tnat is, the
Father's mind or intellect conscious of the /ather 's
·will. But th~t Christ is this mind you do not believe .3 4
He is firm in his conviction that this c oncept of Ch:::-ist as
the incarnation ::>f the

Lo{~os

~~ust

is not

another v:a.y to the

Good, or to God, but is the "only true principle which alone
purifies and renews human nature. n3 5

If so, ,.;hat then of the

Platonists who assert ultimate wisdom is kno~·;able and v;ho at
the s arne time do not affir:rr this uni (1Ue cba rllct er to Christ 'i'
Aug ustine admits that the true philoco ~her is a lover of God
and that -v-:isdom is God, since it is a ttested

oy

divine author-

ity and truth, 3 6 yet he still holds that Christ is the unioue
and sole avenue to God.37

(
r

The issue is, then, v:!:ether Au~us-

tine grants that the nurification of t he soul, as ta'J.r;ht by
the Platonists, can regulate the life of man tov-Tards that

33~.

34-·

"d

!.Q.:L•'

J6rbid.-, VIII. 1.

x.

28.

3 5rbid.,

x.

24 .
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vision of the

Good~

He says that the Platonist Prophyry does

not recognize Christ and "understand by this third LPerson of
the Trinity the soul of nature," adding, "he spoke acco!"dinr,
to his light, or as he thought expedient" and that ·philosophers
"do not scruple to offend religious ears, "3$ which of course
to Augustine is an act of impiety.

He thinks it more cred-

ible and probable that so long as man is mortal, he is miserable and cannot attain wisdomJ 9 and, therefore, blessedness. ~D
This is only to say that he can more readily accept that
Christ was both mortal and divine than the assertion that

I

some philosophers can attain to wisdom41 (which to anyone but
a believer seems more improbable and incredible).

Therefore,

to recapitulate thus far, it can be said that Augustine did
not know enough of Plato or the Platonists to judge them, and
that the "one true philosophy" of Christianity is not only
inferior to that of the philosophers, but also that there is a
serious question as to its "truth."

Further, Augustine's

judgement of the natural Fhilosophers is inaccurate and based
on inconclusive evidence.

His ·unfamiliarity vdth the actual

works of Plato and, hence~ the lack of knowledge of the
i

j

I
f

3 Bibid.

39Ibid.~

X. 29.

40Ibid., IX. 14, 15.

41Ibid., X. 29. " • • • in accordanc·e with the opinion
of Plato you-make no doubt that in this life a man cannot by
any means attain to perfect .,.;isdom. "--one can only . . .-onder what
he would have thought had he really read all of Plato and
Plotinus. Cf. Cornford, .QE• cit., Republic IV; 4 76, "• • •
that the perfectly real is perfectly knm<Table.
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relegate it outs-ide the domain of verification.
'

The concept

of certainty, therefore, involves the concept of the self-

I

evident.

I

Naturally, the certain and self-evid-ent are meant

to preclude analysis of their coenitive justification by any
other measure than the criteria of certainty and the self-

I

evident.

I

Therefore, whatever degree of belief may be attached to a

This is the common breedinv grounds of

do~atism.

proposition (some "X"), it must always await the iiTpartial
analysis of its cognitive justification before any credibility can be assigned to it.

Needless to s-ay,_ this is

not asserting that at times, usually for practical or ethical
action, one must act as if one had all the knowledp:e sufficient for practical judgements.

Whatever subjective atti-

tude of belief there may be- attached to some "X," it is
still of dubious merit until it can be determined just what
evidence there is for the assertion.

The main contention is

that conviction is an attitude that does not actually seek
justification amon~ cognitive criteria.

Doubtless AuF,Ustine

is ~Titing from the perspective of a Christian, a religious
seeker, and it is common among reli~ious thinkers and dosmatists that they often c-onfuse appeals to belief with cognitive
justificat:ion in its o'\'m right.
Aside from these considerations, there is a more basic
flaw at work here.

Belief provides the very conditions

81
necessary for devot icn--it r-·rovides an ob ~ec·t

.

'.~he reli ,:~ ious

vocation can function to the degree that its object becomes
ideal and absolute.

l .n its abs;:>luteness, it furnishes an

appeal to an authority that affords the believer a feeling of
r:rotection , thereby takin~ the responsibility from the individual.

The p erfect fi ,?"ure bccones the object of its belief

and devotion.

Dut t his ic an unholy peace if the mtnd is at

all active.

If it once be~ins to doubt, it becomes strang ely

vulnerable.

To p:uard. ar.ainst t his ev·entuali ty, it seeks to

hide the flc.vl by an appeal to certainty and indubitability.,
In findin ~ this certainty, it rests, feels a~sured of its
security, and allows the devotional side free play without
the distressing element of doubt.

Yet, the "xn in which the

certainty is found does not gai~ anythin~ on the co~nitive
side by its conviction.

It does not remove by some gratuitous

act the resnonsibili t y to find just what is certain.

On the

other side--even if it is in fact credible, it adds nothing to
the content of ler.itimate belief by being asserted as ttcert ain"
sir:ce its claim Ii:ust sti~l rest uron its. cognitive justification.

Again, a further element of suspicious content is that

the principle itself is never advanced as a criterion because
it i:·:ould follo"I that there is nothin,r.: to preclude conflictine;
claims to different and r.mtually contradictinr; certainties.
Hence, it is usual th:1t the asserter clai::!S the unicue nature
of this particular nx."

This is of course nothinr:; else than

'·
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an appeal to faith.
In Augustine's quest ..for certaint1', he souf;ht for an
indubitable truth which would be impossible to doubt and
""hich would presuppose consciousness itself; the quest was
for certainty itself.

He sought for "something that is true"

and not a vision of that truth.

He demanded that reason

present her own structure for examination; that consciousness
display her fundamental elements, which, as such, would
have to be accepted.

It is a reouest for infallibl-e knowl-

edge and certain truths.

I

To secure this, he begins a phe-

nomenology of the human mind which, he believes, is induhitable simply because it is knowledge by the experiment of himself.

Whether this can be actually claimed as "truth--

indubitable truth"--is a point to be examined later, but it
is important to note that the answer or solution to this phenomenology would be some assertion about the constituent
elements of the mind, or an interior anatomy.

"Reas.on" then

looks for its own presuppositions and when they are found, it
acclaims them as certain knowledge.
building blocks of his

philos~phy.

of knowledge is the Good.

These in turn become the
For Plato, the only object

It is the onl y thing that is really

knowable because it is perfectly real.

It ·is not g iven tn a

c.lass of statements which are pre--zupposit ions, or for that
matter in any clas.s of statements.
First, then, what is it that is indubitable in Augus-

tine's philosophy?

He replies that:

The question being the nature of the mind, we must
dismiss from c ;}ns·ideraticn all not ions accuircd from
outside throu~h the bodily s~nscs and pay the most
careful attention to those facts of which we have said
all minds have knovJledr:e concerninr: the.111s elves and ,.,.hich
are indubitable.. I·:en have expressed doubt as to whether
the pm.rer of life, memory , intellif.!;ence, volition,
thouGht, knowledge and judgment is a function of air,
fire, brain, blood or atoms, or of some unkno•r:n body over
and above the four elements, and as to whether it is
Nithin the power of some concretion or arranf;ement of our
flesh itself' to uerforr.1 these onerations; and some have
ventured to assert one tteory, some another. But who is
tbere to doubt that he i.s alive, ru.1em aer~ , understands,
viish-es, thinks, kno'ltrs and ;iudges? Since even if he has
such doubt, he lives; for if he doubts he thinks. \'~hat 
ever doubts he has, tb ereforc,_ rer;ardin,n: other thin;:,s,
he ou~!':t not to have doubts re .r:a rdin g all the~e; for if
he did not exist, he co'.lld r..ot have doubt r er:arding
anything. 43
Here then is the argument f0r clear and distinct ideas, be it
fro:n Descartes or Augustine , which asserts tbe c·riterion of
obvious self-evidency.

Two approaches are

nos~ible :

first,

one to examine the criteria and, second., by the content.

But

to examine the criteria of indubitability would mean contrastin{'; this particular .state:7lent of certainty v:i th others which
may either disar:ree "Vlith it or may,
tive.

If so, the

princi~le

indeed, offer an alterna-

itself would be abandoned since

all would b-e self-evident and, if not, vrhere '::auld their
self-evident character lie?--unles~; Augusti ne would go .so far

------- -- 4JJ. Burnaby (trans .), Later ~.-iorks of St. Au,r:ustine
(Philadelphia: \'i estminster Press, 1<;145), .p. F5 (fr om the
"De Trinity" X.lO .14.)

I

I:
i'

as to admit of contradictory self-evident truths.

On the

other hand, if it were as.serted and then argued, it would not
be self-evident since its certainty would depend upon the
ac·tivity of the defense; therefore, its certainty would be
credible if, and only if, its rational cogency were termed
valid.

But that again would be to abandon the principle by

turning to common-sense appeals by depending on the logic of
argumentation.

The content of the certainty has this for~r: 44

1.

All minds- have knmdedge concerning themselves which is indubitable.

2.

If he doubts, he lives.

3.

If he did not exist, he could not have a
doubt regardinr, anything.

This is the origin of Descartes' dicttun, "I think, therefore

I am" and contains the same error.

The activities mentioned,

including the doubting, do not in themselves require evidence
of any "doubter" or any "he" apart from the activity of cogitation.

If this is an inference which asserts a "doubter"

then it cannot be indubitable since it need not be assumed .•
Again, this

~ppeal

to indubitability cannot assert the neces-

sary connection between

co~itat·ion

and the cogitator any

more than Descartes could join the extend_e d and the unextended as his basic el-ements of consciousness and the world.
Descartes had to insert the Pineal gland to tie this connection

44Ibid.
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but this only leads to tl:.e furtl:.er inquiry as to what ti·es
each with the third, and so on to an infinite regress.

3ut Augustine believed it was not an inference and
also not p;iven through the senses:
• • • but it apprehends itself with direct and
immediate awareness • • • as it apprehends that it
lives, remembers, knowe and wishes.45
Clearly· then, it is not understood by him as any inference
from cogitation to the "thinker, tt but direct apprehension.
The mere fact that an exa'Tiination. is offered to discredit
ttis principle of certainty argues tha t either there is not
corru~ on

knowledge of indubitable truths, or tte objector is

pervertinr: his ov:n intelligence, or it must be made clear by
soJ11e other technique tl:at it is really certain.

Nevertheles·s,

the only real argur!lent is that of "perversion," yet it is
found that one need not admit. that the existence of tl:e
doubter is anythinc but an inference; therefore it \'.r ould have
to be maintained that a retreat into log ical analysis is
itself a perverE' ion of tte inquiry.

If so, it demonstrates

that the pos ition is outside of lor;ic,. its "certainty" restin[ somewhere other tha n within "all minds": the first
assumption noted previously.

Therefo re, it is contradictory.

The elements that are certain, Augustine says,
It is beyond question that I exist, and that I know
and love that eyistence. In these truths there is

45Ibid., p. 80 (nDe Trinity ," X.lO.l5-16.)

···· ....
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I
I

nothing to fear from the argument of the Academics: ''/hat
if you are· mistaken? Since· if I am mistaken, I am. One
who does not exist cannot possibly be mistaken. Thus if
I am mistak~n., tl':is "'!ery fact proves that I am.
Because,
therefore, ~f I am m~staken, I am, how can I be mistaken
as to my existence, f or it is cert a in tha t I exist if I
am mistaken. Accordingly, since I must exist in o~der to
be mistaken, even if I should be mistaken, it is beyond
doubt that I am not mistaken in this, that I know myself
as knowing. It follovrs, then, that I could not be mistaken as to the fact that I know myself as knowin ~ . For,
as I know myself to exist, so, also, I know this, that I
know. And to these t\"ro, since I love them, I join that
love as a third element of equal value to those things
which I know.46
Here Augustine asserts the sub.stantiality of the consciousness of the self..

His elements are Being , Intellig ence, and

Love and they are self-evident and certain.
prescribes the character of indubitability
common to a11 men.

This triad
by

the experience

H.e f'urther adds that these three are one,

embracing one life, one mind, and one essence.47

Before pass-

ing on to other considerations, it is curious that Aur;ustine
should be engaged in a spurious problem.
ther~ to fear from the Academics:

taken?"

He says, "ffi"hat is

What if you are mis-

The possibility of bein& mistaken must take some con-

crete form; a poss ibility to be such must be explicit since
even a hypothetical pos s ibility is still expl.ici t •

A possi-

bility of be·ing mistaken_, to be a consideration, must have
sone form; a possibility to be such must be explicit since

46nods

,

The Citv of God~
----

QE• cit., XI~ 26.

47Burnaby, QE• cit., p. 88 ("De Trinity," X.llol$} •
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even a hypothetical possibility is still explicit.

A possi-

bility of being mistaken, to be a consideration, must have
some fonn and no.t a mere Possibility of nothinp:, void of content.

If on the other hand, it is purely rhetorical, it can

be answered by a similar play of rhetoric.
Asserting ·this triadic form of conscio:1snes!:: constitutes prima-facie claim to divinity butl alonp; side of t his,
he is still cognizant of man's misery .
cept of the need of man 's assistance
Ghrist for salvation.

This extends his c onby

the mediation of

It also l.ays claim to the concept of a

"natural Christian" because the Trinity is 1nirrored in consciousness.

As a result of this fomulat"ion, he can criticize

the claim of Pelagius that man must initiate the movement to
the divine.48

Therefore, to Augustine, God intercedes for Man

in the world to give grace or assistance on the path to divin-

....

l~Y·

A God who operates in time and history is the· working

of his divine will for man's salvation.
Augustine's search for certainty, therefore, involves
the acceptance of an infallible authority in the savinr, grace
of the belief and faith in Christ, and the indubitabili~y of
propositions he believed self-evident.

In his

C~nfessions,

it is quite apparent that he nev er discovers that the li~ita
tions of philosophy necessitated an acceptance of the Chris-

48Ibid., p. 197 ("De Spiritu et Littera," V) •
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tian religion since he had utilized flatonic philosophy itself

.I
I;
' '

in a way that resolved philosophic -nroblems· that stood in the

'i

I

I

way of his becoming a Christian.

He found he could not accept

the Christian faith because he t-tas torn by the dilerruna of t h e
I-:anichaeans--that Good an:i Evil are universal prin c iples and
that Evil has a substance no les s real than the

~;ood.

He dis-

c overed in the Platonic writinp;s a solution.,. 4S; and was able to
overcome the obstacles to his c om:n.i tment to Christianity.
Other men might have pursued Platonic philosarhy furthe-r, havin.f!, discovered this muc h o r value, but he was solely u s inr- it
to become a Christian.

Furth e r, it is clear that he

W ct S

searching for a Christian conversion, but not throur, h a philoso~hic discipline--if one can assert he knew even this much

about the Platonic, or philosophic, conversion.

Ee utilized

his rationalistic facil i ties tor esol ve his intellectual difficulties along pagan phi l os o phic l i nes-, yet retreated into certainty, self-evidence and indub i table truths in the construction of his o~m Christian philosophy.

If he could have read

the Theaetetus of Plato, one v:onders ho..,~· he mi ;ht have
ans.,·:ered:
• • • And v:hen she lthe mind or c o nceivi!l£:.7 h.as
arrived at a dec is ion, e i -:her p radually or o:r a sudden
impulse and has at ln~t.a gr ce d, a n d does n ot do u bt,
this is called her o p lnlon.50

49Pusey

op. cit., VII. 22.

'--

50 Jovfett,

2.£.• cit., "Theaetetus," l <;Da.

]
'
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Therefore, to Plato, all of this surety of thou~hts, t h is

I

:i

~I !

i

self-evident doctrine, \t>IOuld be termed opinion.

The test to

Plato is the ability of the unde.rstandinr.; to be· able to de:nonstrate its certainty by recourse to the t :: in p; s that are
certain--viz., the real or the Good.

The certain in Plato is

in the vision of the Good , but t h is does not have a content
that can be structured into dog.Ja.

Aur,u~tine'

.s purpose '\'!as

to secure a place for reason so she could be fettered and
·kept fror :1 doubt.

The furthest he could allow reason \'las in

borrowin?-; co-ncepts from another philosophy and, at the sa.."'le
time, restrictinp; its further movement to a closed system .
The final test of reason is whether she is ca pable of cleansinz the mind and ourifyin~ the intellect for a vision of the
Good .

r
f

The existence of a mediator (in Christ) is not to

extend reason, but for devotional purposes.

He admits

that if one does not m.ake that act of faith in the Christian
creed, the teachinp::s can be reduced to nothing:
• • • Those who hold it do so as a consequence of
faith; for. those v:ho d? not h old it by faith, . it ~~maiDy
a matter e1ther of douot or of contemptuous d1Sbe ~ 1ef.5Yet, the issue to the philosopher is, is the re a need incumbent upon reason to reco~nize the uniaue truth of Christian
dogma?

But it is obvious that there is not, since philosopr.y ,

particularly the Platonic philosophy, conta i ns what to the

5lnods, The

L

City of God, QE.·

ill·'

IX.
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Christian is a basic .flaw· of impiety: that it can ga.i n -.,.:isdom
\·:-ithout faith in Christ.

The security offered by indubita-

bility silences doubt that might have had as its object the
very figure of the infallible authority and, this would
recreate the initial fear that the commitment of faith meant
to resolve; it is a retreat f'rom the rational.

But far more

important than these limitations of appeals to certainty and
their cognitive criteria is the fact that any such acknovr.ledge~ent

of "certa intyn results in the severe restriction of

reason to pursue dialectic.

Once the acceptance of any "cer-

tainty" is P:r anted , reason can only function in a logical
capacity from that point of certainty.

It follovw that reason

would merely have only one object: the working out of the
implications from such a point of certainty.
element of

purifyin~

The cathartic

the intellect from all opinions would

necessarily be curtailed and arrested, at least on one point
--the point of its certainty.

'l'o the Christian, the est.ab-

lishment of an infallible authority stops his ouest for Truth,
since by faith one can be saved.

He is now free to speculate

about other matters with the only res·triction that he does not
contradict any of the sacred teachings of the Church.

His

soul saved, he can think--secure in h~s belief that further
..

•

philosophic inquiry alons those lines is unnecessary.

This

is t o sa.y that he keeps his thinkin~ Hithin the con::'ines of
theological belief and dop:ma.

He might think out new defenses

I 'I

·

.......

Cl
.

~

I

I

I

for his faith and belief, but not construct alternative
systems that could remove the neces~ity of' faith.

saved his soul; the only other realm open to inouiry is
nature.

man.

(

!ie l:as

God is secure; only nature nm·r awaits the mind of

He only lacks a tool to handle nature and when that iE

discovered, he will atte!npt to capture her,

as t:e did \d th

God, within a set of certainties.
'\':hen the Christian turns to nature,

time, he conceives it differently than
must see it as a Christian.
of the embodied Lop;os,

to the f'Lm·; of

tho~e

befo:--(' him;

The new element is

t~1c

I.e

doctr i n e

Christ, \'-rho came once and for

al~ -

tl<Jc.

The concept of this uniaueness is the bas i ..s o !_" the be'.. ief t.r .."lt
the creative principle discloses itself

rro~ressively

hence, time must be lineal and not cyclical.

in

ti ~ e;

The a:-rumen'.:.s

for the theory of lineal time are nowhere ~iven;

on t~e con-

trary, Aug ustine says reason cannot refute the cycl ica2. vievr
of time:
i

1

• • • Even though reason could not refute, f ~li tL '.-: o uld
smile at these ar~u"!lentations, \\'ith which thE:: r:odle~E:
endevour to turn our sir.rple piety froi"1 tr:e ri ~::1 t \",'a:·, tr:at
we may walk with them "in a circle. n52

The theory of lineal time is analor.:ous to his knov:ledp:e
of God, but what precludes his deity orderin~ a universe c ~r.
tained in itself~

This alternative he does not en~age directly

52Ibid., XII. 17.

C"l

'-

since it could be handled by deduction
Logos.

I

fro~

He traces the concept of cyclical

his embodied

ti~e

to:

..... For what specially leads these ·men astray to
?refer the~r Oi'm circl.es to ~he strair~ ht path of trutL,
1s, that tney measure oy the1.r m·m human, chanp.:eab:!.e,
and narrow intellect the divine mind, \·:l ~ ic!: is abso::_u ..Jclv
unchangE:!abl e, infinitely capacious, and, \d thout succes- ·
sion of thought, counting all things witL out nUP.10er. )J
Or, stated in other terms, the cone ept of lineal t h le c :; n be
smiled at 1tthen a Christian conunitment is accepted on

.:~ai th,

but without this convictio.n there are no reasons t ·:) deny o r

refute it.

It is indeed curious that anothe::--

ir:i.iic :~ ti ~) !l

~ ,f

his certainty--of 'Nhich he can:1ot doubt--is p;iven in thi~

. ...
probler.t of cyclical ..."' :une

Ar: noted above,

ttreason can refute" this concept of time.

he

a ! !J :-~i ts

no

He says :

• • • Of this, too , I have no doubt, that before the
first man was created~ there never had been a ~an at
all, neither this .s ame man hi!TIS elf -recurrinf by I know
not what cycles, and having made I knO\·J not hpw many
revolutions, nor any other of similar nature.J4
His appeal to certainty is no other than an act of faith in
8hris.t having come once and for all time tha t

esta i"J lishes a

principle which necessitates a new conce?tion of time.

-

l .: C>

I

'

cannot doubt it because to do so ·w ould be to doubt the uni ou.e
existence of Christ.

This is also the foundation of the

Christian concept of the personalit:r.
unioueness

0

It s ~-;.ares tte S[':::...rne

·
·
t'~-.1e lineal cone e::t
v,r10t
, s1nce
1.· t c:h"re
~ n
S
f ,h

{·

-

54I.bid., XII. 19-20.

l
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time, and v;e find he asserts this nev.' conceflt vtith the sa:-.'le

I

dogmatism as the lineal concept of tine.
Time is conceived as havinr a beginninr: and an -end;
,.,;hat of the end?

I

He says:

!he conversion of the Jews, the rei~n of the Antichrlst,. the -~econd coming of Christ, the last judr:e:nent,
separat1on of the good fro~ the evil, the conflarration
and renewal of the world •
• • • All of 1::r: ich we are bound to believe •·rill
c ert a i nl y come to pass • 55
This is the readinr:: into

i~istory

Christian v:J. lues he is

"bound to believe" since it is the
urovid-ence.

actin~

out of divine

"Everythinf,," Auf:us.t ine v.'ri t e:., "must be ref cr1~cd

to divine providence."56

III.

VICO

The Christian concept of history involves common
features with its philosophy.57

Apart fro~ the concept of

lineal ti me, it added a new kind of assertion to history-universality.

The early histo~ians, Herodotus, Thucydides,

I

{

and Polybius, never made such claims.

Theirs . .,.; ere moral,

ethical, and prap;matic s·tu.dies, and v'lith Polybius, genealor.ic .
The c a ncention of universal application of the histo~ian's
skills ·Nas a foreign cone ept to any but r..he G-hrist ian

55rbid., XX . ]J.

56r· . d

~.,

.. c

,,

.,· . 11"\
\.).

57Henreich Emil Brunner, Revelation and Heason, trans.
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: ~estminster Press, 1946}, PP· 22 f.
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It is v:ith the rise of Christinnity that r.ist8ri-

I'I

.I

historian.

cal methods are interpolated for dor;mat ic t cleolor.;ical and
nrovidential orderinp

o~

the entire course of time.

To the

Christian, God disnlays the timeless , pat ter-n" of his

I
'
'

in the flow of temuorality.

The record of his actions and

intent are the evidence of his V?ill.
Biblical account

im~osed

bei~g

1'r.e fr a.'Ti €\·!ork is the
Au~ustine's

unon history .

~

of

God outlines the six ar_es in history develo p ed in his Uible
and the actual history of the providential in the v:orlct .5 6
However , as the opposition to the Church's metaphysics ber;a n
to be felt, there t·rc. s a return to !··istory ,
along non-theolor:; ical values.

it

Thoup:h it lost this tie to the

Church, it still ren ained true to its
theory of time and t!'.e

int e r~Tetins

as~u.r:. '8t·ion

11

cert ai nties"--lineal

that certain !mO\·:lcdEe can

actually be found in this activity.

Machiavelli, Eobbes,

Vico, Herder, and Hegel ~1ark the reversion to Prafjno.Jtic non-

I

i

Christian historical vvrit ine;s .

Tl:e element thn.t f!er~ is ted,

however, was still Chr istian--the belief that man's existence
can be viewed i n a c ontinuity, ri ving his life an added force

i

~hich without this g ift would leave man alone

infinity of time--fror::l the vast be ::' ond t:J t:;e ec ua lly ~nys teri
ous future.

l

to face tte

From suc h ori.r; ins came tte concept o:f r ro r.; ress • 5S·

° ods ,. The City of
5 cD

G ct
___Q__,

on.

· . . , ".JO OK1 r ·J
·. -~X'JT

~ ...

j.J •

59John Bar:nell Bury, The Idea of Pror-ress (l<e\o·I York.:

L.

1
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By becomin ~ historical,

I

I

man acouired
a
.

should add... without breadth.

d~.;.~enSlQn
·
1
aLt,

It mo
·
··
, ve d h~ln
1ron

1...
•
clS

o::e

.I

rE.mote

r.ast and Sv./ept hi::.1 i.nto the present a s the r:eir of all that
came before, and insured hi.n a oromise of the future. CO

In

this sinr,le concept, man found an arw.or of security in the.
certainty of history.

It provided somethin ."':

tant, or insidious , depending upon the
was a "foal."

History ,

alan ~

lineal

.~· ar ~: orr:.·

per~nectivc,

conce~tiun,

itJ.?O r-

~nd

that

moves

tov!ards a goal, and t::erefore, if t ::: is end is '·:nov:n , one car.
consciously cooperate 1•rith it and find jus t i i'icati (; n for his
actions by such alle,; iance .
it~

:3ut the par.ticul.--.r evt:nt loses

·:r: eaninr; to the extent th,'J.t

it is ::1easured by such a ;·:y p::- -

thetical r: oal; tbis is t.l:c arctetypal forr:1 o .:· the ic.) ea of
sacrifice .

"P.istory ju~t ifies us," is the cr:r of every

dor:matist.

It is of little consequence whet1-:er it is oeir:r.;

asserted by ·the :!.evolutionary ;·.:arxist or t :1 e Christian Inqui~: 
itor, for the sa.":Je structure is beir..p; er.1 ployed by b ~th.
sessin:~ their "trut htt via the .route o: cert ;:.~i nty,

functions as a vindicati o n of their acts .

Fos -

i'if.tory

It does not ~atter

if the final appeal is oade to a divine authority or to the

(

r'

l

I!

;I
II

The r~·~acmillan Co., 1932.), "-Progress i~ a natural a~ :.l neces~r.:.~'Y
11
e·ffect of the conGtitution of the hl.ll7lan mind. ~ · c? .
6oibid., p . 92 , cf". pp. l ·:JS: and 126. "The ~ ound 'J in·,:s
.
] --t- 1 m
o f lnt e 1.... ..
ec ua_ . en in di.Lf'l"erent ~8neratior.~ ,.;ill c r; r.tir.ue
to add U")'J ."

·· ... . ..

!I

self- evident truths o:' tho mind, ~ince both 2~nenls ay-e
retreats fror1 reason h:t8 dor:rnati.sm .
thi~

procecure secures

po~sesse·.s

t ;· a~

Tl:e knmdedr·e s<litled by

aue>!":t oi' the troubled

~·oul .

It

an infallible method carable of "truth beyond

question, " as Gianbat t ista Vi co ·-v:ri tes:
• ... • But in the ni r:bt darkness envelopinp: t be
earliest anti('ll ~ ity , so rc:: ot e from ours cl ves , there
sh5.nes U:e eternal and ncver- f<':.ilinr li ··ht of a truth
beyond ouestion tL.'l.t. t } ; L ·.·o!·lrl of civil societY bas
certainly been :nade b~:/ men, and that its nrinciples
are tr:er~~ore v, be f o und •t:it h::.r: the 1~: od i ficat ion of
our ov,n n.lnd . 61
Vico ' s

ne"\~

science is , of course , history .

thi'l.t sir:.ce civil .societ}' is made
ety can be knoi<rn by recour.:· e
the lines

o~

his nev,' science .

t~

b~,r

man , the trut.hs of soci-

the historical metLod along
I!e arrues th2t it is by tl:e

examination of tte nature of !:tan that certair:

be found , since governnents must
those governed . 62

He arr,ues

confor·~l

~:nm·;ledr;e

can

to tr:e nature of

~te error cf the ~hilosopters, he goes on

to state, lies in that they " consider man as he r:hould be and
so can be of service to out very fe\·: -v:ho v:ish to live in the

61Giambattista Vi co , The ~:m·: Scienc e , tre.ns . from the
third edition (174h) by 'I'L0s2s G:>dciar(;_ :3errin and ~.ax Earold.
Fisch ( Ithaca :
Cornell University Press , 194e) , Book III ,
Se c. 331 ; c f . Book I , Sec . 349 • . " For tbis ~s the f i rst
indubitable princiole above 90slted that th1s ~orld of
nations has certai~lv been ~ade by men, and its ~~ise must
therefore be found vrithir. t~ : e mo :lifications a: our m·:n human
mind • 11

~

/

f

L

aepublic of Plato and not f.:: ll back into t:-:e
:lomulus,

while it is- t :1e lcr, islators v;ho

tT

11

C!'Cf:S

of

C,lns- ider rr.an as Le

is in orde r to turr: hir.l to r:ood uses in hu.rr.an E"ociety." 6J
The historian turns rro:n the ?hilosoPhic nurf;uit to the cer-

I

tainty of hietory and f!nds his repose in such certainties

for "tLeir ,.,rills at least rr:ay rest on conscience ." (;4
trast to philosophy, he

po~es

In con-

philolo?y viliich "observes the

auttority of human choice, Nhen.ce comes the c or.sciousness of
the certain. n65

He adds :

This axiom by its second part defines as philologians a~l the g ranr1 arians, hi::.:torians , critics, v.rho
have occupie-d the,. :'.S elves \,ri th t! 1e study of the Janr:uaGes
and deeds of people; both their do~ es tic affair~ , suet
as customs and la\·Js, and t h eir E'xternal affair~, :::;uch as
-v.rars, peaces, a lliances , travels and c or·;J:c-::rce.
•

$ ·

•

This sa'"1e aziom sLo·.-:s j-. ::·\1/ the :.-hilo~· o-:-:·l: e .r-s f aile d by
half in not J~ivinE certainty to tl:eir rcar0ni:tr· by ap!-eal
to the authority of t Le ph:.lolofians a~.d liket,·:isc Lm·: the
latter failed by half i~ not takin ~ care t 0 g ive t h eir
authority the s a nction of truth by ap ~ eal to the reasoninr--:s· of the ~~hiloso ~hers. If t~1ey tad both dor.f' th is
they ;:auld have antic i rated us in cone ei vin g t : : i~

Science.66
In findin t; certainty, any additional inquiry \·:ould be

(

redundant and unnecessary.

If t~is is so, t~ en the cathartic

activity of reason in dialectical rhiloso r.hy is foredo ·:::>rned to
f:Jilure.

No cathartic or purifying function can be anythinr-

but an illusive and a ~istaken task if rea~on ~u~t hnlt her

6Jibid., Bk. I, Sec. lJl.

64rbicq, Ek. I, Sec. 132.

65Ibid., Bk. I, Sec .. 13 7.

66Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. 13 s·-4:; .

-
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restles~

journey before such indubitable truthE;.

existence are thernsel ves !1aramount
the

~hilosophic

~uest

Their

oroof o ;· the

along dialectical lines.

valid intellectual activity to :: istory, if

absurc~i ty

of

If there is a

~~ .:story

c.::1n in

fact justify her claims and at the same time illuminate those
dark corners of ipnorance instead of

addin~

to its onacity,

then it has succeeded to p hiloso ohy and c an just ly lav claim

I

to her mantle.

Vico 1 s scope

~iven

European standard of education.

to history has becon1e the

There is a. historicnl method

to all intellectual studien.

I

a lofty goal to all the culturists; the anthronolorists,
sociologists, lin~u ists,

Vico

supplif~s

I'

a foundation and

and cultural analysts; it is withi~

J

I

such studies they claim certainties and truth.

This is the

nev.r Science--History.
The tacit a~Yurnption at work here is the same: as that

i
i

'·:hich is so -creve.lent tod ay , v:hich is that a thing is true if
it can be· reduced to something more certain than the object
of in~uiry, i.e., the reduction theory of truth.

The assu:nr:·-

tion predicates a sharp cleavafe between kn8~ledge and reality
and hence exhibits a scepticism as to the validity of t he
philosophic ouest that posits direct knO\ded r; e.

History,

includinp; the philosophy of history,. is an exainple of this
criterion at work.

The object is to find apodictic certainty

in a conce ptual matrix.
tial act

,

If knm:ledpe is seen as an existen-

not about somethin.g, but _sornethinr; in itself, then
~ ---~·

L

.

i~

co
"'
;

it precludes the reduction theory of truth as beine anything
but a convenicmt .!:'icti0n.

That

' 1 ~ o~-~ethir.r: "

is .:1eality and

that knO\'lledp;e i lJ-w:1es the knov:er ns rcali ty.
~'hilos onhy

tbis perspective,

FhilosoPhy does not use

Eence from

has nothing to do v:i th history·.

~:i~tory--history

is a secondary

method of cor.municatinr: idear: to readers who do not come into
the main stream of

\vork~~

thcrr.s elves.

Eistor:.', like auto-

mobiles, Must be contir,u<1.Uy rcdesir:ned to fit the f2.shion of

the day.
and need

Gibbon, Eerder, Lessing, Vico, and Marx are dated
restylin ~

to meet the newer fashions.

A fe\•T cursory rsrnu1·ks, of course, cannot be C.eemed

sufficient justification to reler:<:l.te history into Limboo
Hence, an analysiG of history is necessary because, ironical1y enour,h, a history of f.i5to ry yields a r-oor harvest.
The documentation of a vmrk, r-r.ilosophic or n ot , is a
nrocedure v;hich it is assumed gives continuity anJ background
to correlate 1.-·:hat,
or

ir.:nos~ible

to

~resu":"!~nly ,

cor.1T.Tchc~cl.

\·wu2.d other.-:ise be too difficult
'I'he

re01~lt

has been to return

thinke rs to the c erta.in and sure uomnir.. of "facts , hard and
:--ude."

\'le have become acct:.!:-t0r.1ed to doubt th~ validity of

metar:hy~ical

tbir:ki r..r.r , a<> ,,.;ell as any procedure for· the use

of cone epts not 1rounded m~on sense data.
of a rationalisl7! that
logical conclusion.

t:20

This is a result

no+:, 8ecn thcur;ht throu.r:h to its

It is based on Vico's distinction between

il
'·

·· ...
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the certun and the com.~, 67 and is a belief that philoso r hy
is in the realm of tte abstract and common, and therefore
lacks appeal in t h e certnin.
Tr. e abstract leads away fr ot• the security of the
familiar and hence it lacks

certainty~

A return to history

is a return to the concrete and comf'ort of the certain.

In

considering a work, it is as if one is under a stranr,e kind
of obligation to see it within a historical settinG and it is
this frame·work that lends it its autl: enticity. 68

The histori-

cal settinP.; is sou,P:ht as- if there were an historical a priori
form of the understanding, and \'l·hatever truths that :night
sift down as a residual product must first,

accor d in ~

to

these rules, be vouched for by the historical method.

The

insights must, it is arp,u.e d, f al l back U'!'JOn that realm of the
certain, i.e., the culture into which the vwrk has b een born
and from which its intelli~ ibility has its source and stren~tho
Indeed, a culture ttat has not developed her quota of historians is considered as "unhistorical" and this observation has
become a criticism.

To be unhistorical is t o he naive and

backward.
The distinction between the certain and the abstract,

f
67Ibid., Bk .. I, Sec. 137 and 144-145.

68cr. Vico, The Nevr Science, op. cit., B.ook III,
"Discovery of the
HO!ner," especially Sec. E82-8 f 8.

True

I -

'
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as well as the validit--y of such a dichotomy, aE:stunes a philosophical positiont hence, to be judged as other assertions,
i.e., its cognizance and consistency.
is still a

~hilos o~hical

analysis.

universality to h i s cla ims.
but demands the

sa~e

The primary task then

Yet, the his torian adds

His claim is not just

~ra~atic,

audience that her sister discipline

claimed:--the same universal ap plication as universal mathematics.

It is not an accident that this form of disci pline

arose at the same time a s the. growth and d evelopment of
mathematics.

The rise of symbolic techniques

~ave

vast

applications to mathematics, but left t h e particular, the content, bare and alon e .
this gap.

History vtas cast in t he r ole to fill

The historic a l approach is t h e dominant pedagogic al

tool today.

There is a historical meth od a pplied to all

branches of kno'\'Jledge--this is its additional claim to universality.

It O\'res its existence to a sixteenth and seventeenth

century distinction of rather dubious philosophical merit.
-At any one time, there are an unendin[ nurnbe-r· of inci-

dents, yet, not all things that happen are historical~

No

one could record al l the events in any one day, much less
c over a period of time that history seeks to embrace.

A rule,

measure, yardstick, or, if one prefer, a selection is assumedo
This princiPle of selection is a value judgement.

Indeed,_ it

might be argued that the historian is not cognizant of consciously choosing value judg ~~ents, but nevertheless, it is

I.
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clear that there is one at work.

Sir Keith Hancock, the

historian 's critic of history, states that tte historian cannot .s ucceed in refr.ain ing from judgement, "tLey simply succeed
in concealinf-: from themselves the vrinciples on which their
judgement is based.n69

vJhatever judr;ement is favored, the

conclusion follm·ls with mechanical rapidity.

The selection

of facts is determined by the value judgement and the idea
seen in history is read into history by the selection of
facts.

A historical fact is a product of a fancy,

·prefer, a phantom.

or, if one

History justifies whatever thesis it

first presuc~osed in its selection of fact~, and conversely,
the facts justify the scale of measurement.

The utilization

of the value judgement separates events into the historical
and the unhistorical.

The unhistorical are conveniently for-

gotten for they are the precise elements v1hich do not lend
themselves to the tr1es is nor tte choice of _;udgernent .

The

historical work then is a speculative pronouncerr..ent derived
from a value jude;e;Tien.t not defended on the basi.s of an explicit
immense
analysis, but s eeki n,Q; to assert its thesis by an
alone, sr,outs
accumulation of facts '::hich , as if by mere force
dogmatic appe.als, to
the thesis. It is an appeal, like all
something outside of reason and lor.;ic, to the arena of tbe

1

69sir Keitt Hancock, 11 ll·~achiavelli in 1'-Iodern ~ress"-- (~n
Incuiry into the Historical J-.·Iettod ), Journal of H~st ory,. XA.
( 193 5 )., 100 •
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c·ertain, the obvious, and the unouestionE!d assum!")tions of the
readers.

Dante's view no less ttan St. Au pustine's is a

matrix of symbolic interpretation in '\<.•hich man's fate is read
both in his soul's course and in history.
path written

lar~e.

return, no cycle.

This history is

Eistory is man's

lin~al.

There is no

The beginning was creation, the fall, tte

cominr: of Christ, th2.t unique point that changes the succeeding course of history and is followed by the .second cominp;
that drops the curtain upon the drama of God's mastery into a
cast of the saved and the damned.

Chr·istian history and

metaphysics are int ert\·Tined.
The Bible 1r-:rites metaphysics as ttou.c:h metaphysics
were history. In other words, in the Bible God is not
the most abstract and comprehensive universal but the
Abs olute Singular·, kno•,,rn not by speculative deduction
of the attributes from the pure idea of him, but by
meditation upon his recorded deeds in history.70
Karx utilized this same sche:'lc to lay the foundations of his
own system and in that sense he still renained true to his

I
;

In underst~nding this time-continuity, he

Judaic heritage.

caine into contact v.rit.h ·the lost re alm o.f' certainty that 1tras

I

once the armor and protection of the laity of

Christian

?OJ. v. Lan~~ead Casserly, The Christian in Phi~o~~phy
New
York:
Charles - Scribners & Sons, 19511, p. 142. Cf.
(

.
Bru:.rmer Revelat1on and "1-eason, QQ• c1t., pp. ?2
- f ., tl It l.S
chara.c·· t~ris tic nf the Biolical idea 0f revelation that it
T

•

•

cannot be expressed as an abstract idea . Tt~ 3ib~ical idea
of revelation cannot be separated from the.h~s~or1cal facts
• • • for ttis very ~eason an abstract def1.n1t1on of revelation is irn;Jossible."

--

]~
ill I
~
I
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Drea.:ns and ideals in a dead man r·.s head are hardly the accessible property of investip:ators.

But one thine is "certain"

and that is the institutions that were left behind, for one
can infer much

fro~

these tansible

re~ains.

They were certain

that the thought of the· past as;e must be embodied.
thou~ht

The new

can be seen mirrored in the institutions much like

geological deposits read by the
that are unarguabl·e ...

geolo~ist.

These arc the facts

From these firm facts one can build a

structu!'e by virtue of whicb all else c?.n be sesn as radiating
lines from a locus· of points.

If a nroblem j_s raised, the

task is to revert the process and see it within the

li~ht

of

the age's institutions and traditions molded in the firQ
stuff of objective certainty.
ian.

This is the field of the histor-

Exa'Tlining institutions and their effect upon PJan

includes the work of th·e anthropologist, sociologist, and
culturalist.

The test of this, the historian's hyootheais,

would be quite simple if there were in fact a oositive correlation between the

pro~ress

of man and his institutions .

Assuming this correlation, social man or hi~t~rical man is considered as a function of the tradition and institutions within
his culture.

He is not just influenced by th.em but is molded

and conditioned ·by them.

.

Thev become in fact the collective

wisdom of the race and culture.

Reflecting the

\-faT;,

in 1..rhich

man has resolved his proble.11s, they·, ra~her than man, become
the objects of knowledge.

L

Conditioned by society, his

1~

;1;,
i '
I
I
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thoughts

are a function of this process and it fall m·;s t.r,at

a lesser role must be relep,ated to him rather than to societvJ
or th-e state.

Both Locke and

r·,~ill

sought an alternative in

their conceots of natural la'\'1 and natur.al ri ::;:ht \'!hen c-Jnfronted with this obvious conclusion.
the

They

sou.~ht

to protect

individual and preserve the right of a constant criticism

of institutions without man

sufferin~

fran the absolute state.

Not being able to predicate where such criticis?:-J or insights
mi,Q:ht have thei-r- source, none, they thoup:ht, should be
excluded by any arbitrary rule.

This latter tradition

advances the concept of natural man
and not they he .

The

ori~in

affectin ~

institutions

of this concent owes itself to a

reluctanc·e to adva nce dor:matism in the face o.: their ad:.Iitted
thesis of only probable knowled.r:e c..

On

~he

other hand, if man

as a historical being was to espouse other theories, he would
seem to oppose the wisdom and history of the race.

Jlence, it

is not an accident that the deduction from such theories
necessitates the state to be untouchable and man a servant and
a.n

obedient one at that.

needs little exposition.

'The moral as-pect of t .his thesis

Yet, the alternative in natural man

places a value on thought and moral conduct precisely because
it may affect society by changing and red irecting it .

So

again universal status was now given to natural law and
natural right in order to insure the purifyin[ nature of rcason as crit i cism.

L

This conflict between natural man and

j

l

I

"

I

~'
i'

I
I
I
1J7

social man, or man's oblip.:ation to himself as his ideals and
t .hose imposed U!Jon hi:n by society as duties, only point to a
basic antinomy.

Rev,ardless, the issue is no lonr,er obscure .

Both concepts view man in relation to society and his effect
upon it...

The initial concept is therefore the same.

twins each assertin.r: the sa:ne thint;, but

utilizin1~

perspectives in applying the consequences.
both is the ideal whether the change is made
institutions .

They are

different

The society in
by

man or

the

by

Philosophy, on th-e contrary, starts t':ith a dif-

ferent approach.

It starts with man and endE with him.

If

i:1 t he course of phi loso phy unfoldinr;, the society is altered,.
so be it• but this is outside of its L1nedi.1.te con cern. 71

TLe

philosopher acts and if others seek to mirror hi.s actions, then
undoubtedly society is changed, but it is not inc~~bent either
upon society or the philosopher that it must do so.
no collective catep:orical imperative in the offerin[.

There is
Society

mi~ht indeed reject the philosopher, as- it so o£'ten has, but

it still matters not.

The institutions of society may indeed

chanr;e in the lip:ht of the irnpact of ohilosophy, but a g:a irr it
~hould be stressed that this does not re.flec·t any :Jriority

for man as a social or natural man .

It is in the strictest

sense indifferent to fictions held by society.
ference lies the 1:dsdom.

In the indif-

Philosophy starts ,..;ith the chanp;e

7lcorn.ford, .£2.• cit., IX, 592a •.

!;

I

1C8
in the particular tn3n l'il::.ich
ph ilo~ophy

.for himself .

the st<:.t r. , society,

Thi.~

do""·!'> n r-- t
.___

..

, I

"Y'l
•.

:i.r-. sti0ution~,

:)r

reel'' ':, e t r-•. :-_,· ~--~ :...
.... .

diE:ci~line

_

"'""'

2·"'
J...:.~1. :lcnces

of
:):..:t

·
E:OC:L-

'

c h c.mee~.

society as a v1hole
·.;

fror:! tLe

for if the ner-1:J£') rs o.\ society beco!,: e philosorhers tLen

etv
v

~:::;r

not

result ~

The ou t\·:ard

ci: ::m r.~e

of r.1an by

virtue of a change in his institutions does not insure any
philosophi c change.

It may leave

~an

as b : i E: , no different

than before except for a chane;e of plumbinr .
chan~ing

institutions by criticism and

Like\·.'ise,

rc~c iJ'ecti o n

v:iU:ot.:t

the individual undcrcoinr; a basic non-conditioned chanr.e is a
chance of dress v;J:'.'ich mir-ht be attro.ctive 'r; ut leaves :r:an

naked underneath.
P erh~pE it r:Ji ,r rht be inquired, ,:rhy thiE analysis,. this

effort to lay bare ::md rcrudiate the methodolor:y o f the
historian?

Grantinr: that philosop!-:y and history cr-m 'be seen

as antagonistic ir:tellectunl r ursuits, 1·.rh;).t ::-ur:0 se ,-;o',Jl.'i tr:is
adv:: nce if the thesis is a.t

arg:ument further,

once accepted'~

Or,

e:xtcndinr~ the

even :'::r ;: ntin[ tt.c asc-u -:-:P ":.i c n :Jf its irrec ~m-

cilable c-h aracter, \·That fol"\ov.'-G that justifies the crit:.r;ue"i
Pr~arily, \·that is a. cces~iblE: t0 ~e a s-::>n rr.n~t be treated

by reason solely ,,rith in the realm of reason.

,...

"1'!.., e auth o r, ..:..s

tine , his influer:ceE, and tis ~sycholc ~ica~ charac ter a~e of
no im portance.

The '\·.rork or tl:e idea is tr.e on.ly concern and.

it mo..tters little if he, the autl:or, did or did not v:ri te or

u t t-. . er +-'ne
. ., __. to""e
·"' - ·

"'"·rom evl.'dence t0 e _;:istence is ilJ.e _~itir1ate .

--

...........

11

.i :I!
10~

If the concept is obscure, contradictory, and

il~o~ica~,

so

the conclusion follm·:s.
It might be argued that this philoDophical analysis is
one thing, but the historian's cone epts are tJ:-.e tools,
respectable tools, and hence must fashion his work.
other side answers that historians arc also critics
selves and were it not that criticism plays a

les~er

The
o~

them-

role in

this culture than d-rea"':''S, there \trmld be little to s ay for it
a::-:~d

it "t·:ould have been dispelled
Tl~e

lon~

a go .

concept of \•!estern Civilization "TlOvinr.; in an

ordered straight line carryinp: idth it all the vte:.!lth of t!'ie
ages and depositinp: it alon . c::.: the shores of the -,:recent is t! ,e
main and most basic concept of the historian.

It takes the

name of the "Western Continuity" an ,; asserts the indigenous
character of western society--nothing; of value cane fro:- :! the
outside, all that is of worth can be seen to have been
derived from the Ancient Hellenics, the Romans, tr.e Dark Apes,
the Renaissance, to the Kodern Age~.
o~her hand,

If there was, on the

evidence to support the contention that the con-

cept of \;:estern

Continuity is a myth and that there in fact

v.'as no .such connection betv:een Greece anc. :t or.Je, 72 MUch less

7 2 1\icolas Berdyaev,. The ~- .earring of Eistorv (London:
Geoffrey Bles , Ltd., 1945), P? • lJt-9. Jerdyaev ' !:.· roir.t is
that J.enaissance Platonism bears but a sli[."'ht resemblance
to that of the Ancient ~jorld and "s·uch rcse::1b lances as exist
are merely superficial and illusory."

.;
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between Greece, Rome and Europe, it would be recornized as a
myth.

It is interesting to see the conclusions of the

scholars at this point, i.e., the r.rasters of
ing the concept of Western Continuity..

~: istory

examin-

C.harles Homer Haskins,

looking back on time, attempts to fix the

ori~ins

of the

"I··Iodern Age" and he advances the belief that the source can
be traced to the Sicilian Court of Frederick II where the
Jy zantine and Islamic influences were stron~ly felt. 73

Turn-

inr.; to Burckhart, he se·es the rise of the discovery of man in
the Renaissance and asserts this is "really"
tions of \'!estern Civilization has its roots.
ical techniques and

scholarshi~ oi'

,,.,.~ere

t h e founda-

But the

rd~ tor-

3urckhart have been care-

f ul ly re-vie1..ved and sub j ected to careful scrutiny by Jan

Huizinga and in this careful analysis, he demonstrates the very
noor scholarship and biases of Burckhart .74

One can readily

understand why he chose to argue that the r.1ode rn a g e has its
roots in the Renaissance since he is a Catholic historian v>~ho
naturally feels it incumbent u ~ on himself to mirror a theological belief in history.

Again, one ne e d not sjn_r>:le out

Huizinga, for Dr. Coulton does a similar analysis on Ca~dinal

73charles Homer Haskins , Studies in tl'. e ristary of
r<iediaeval Science { 1/ol . XXVII of Harv-ardUniversity h istorical
Studies. Cambridge: Harvard University Pres s , 1924), P· 58.
74Jan Huizinga, The Waninfi of the ~iddle ~- ( Ne\l't
York : Doub leday, 1954)o
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Nev.nnan ' s "Gothic l:ian ," the transmitter of the Greek-R oman and
Christ·ian heritage, and finds the same scholarship and biases
in Ne1rm1an as in Burckhart. 75

The example of Oskar Halecki

should be noted since he demonstrates the untenab le distinction involved in fixing the limits of v:estern Civilization
sl::m·rint; that this

prejud·i ced judr;ement shov:n itself in the

elasticity of tr_eir very boundaries as tl-.ey sl:ift from the
Rhine, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, and the Pyrenees.76

Or, the

course of reading may turn to 3arraclour·t \".'ha finds himself
in a quandary in his inability to define ,.;Lat he racans by the
familiar concept of \'/estern Civilization. 77

Hence v.rhat is

asserted as without m·erit by a brief philosophical vie\·/ is
seen by historians themselves as questionable.

Thus, among

historians, there is little accord or ar:reement , even ar.1onr:
the masters, since their conclusions dance as the premises
s1: ift.
Even if one \'v"ere to retain and define· adeouately t Le
distinct.ions necessary· for hietory , the nroblem \·.rould remain ,

75ceorGe Cordon Coulton, EuroDe's Apprenticeship
(London and Ne~·T York:
Thomas Eelson and Sons, lS·40), P • 7'C .
"Cardinal Newman's vision of the ;:ediaeval :.;onk as a clas s ical
scholar is largely ima ~ inary."
76oskar Halecki, The LLmits and Divi~ion of EJronean
History (Nelrl York and .London: Shced & ~·iard, Ltd., 1950 }, r' •

c£
'

0

77ceoffrey Barracloue;h, l1 ist ory in a .Chanp;inr; .: orld
(O·xford: Basil I3lach...,.Tell, 19551, PP• 3I="4t>.
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i . e ., hm-,r to choose am on g c onf1i ct in:'·

autl~

·:ri t i Gs •

Cons i (. er

th<!t if history could b .e predictive , a true history, a trar.i c
f1av.r v.:ould ners i~ t, becaus c by b ein r.: -predictive,
SUD, ':'·O.C:
_ ·8

nO

ne'd factor.
-

'I'l.-.r ~ "'re
,c

1
l'OU
,. ,
~d

it must

~: rc-

'oe a r,cr.c.' J.Or
-"
<1 'nls
. t ory

of the history 1 s effect upon hh·tory, and

0 ;:.

on t o

t ..he

in.:'inite regress frorTJ. Khicr1 Aristotle fled .
Returnir:g now, it can be seen that for

~hilo~:orhy ,

the

as:·ur:1 ptions of his tory must i.'irst be provcrl true ·n rior to
tLeir 6i1Jnloyment : univers<Jl applicnticn.

It ::: i p!~t be better

to suqp.est readinr; history for its dr<...m at ic irr.port,
entertainment,

other purposes .

for

or as a device to order salient fact:.; for
Th is n oint o~ vie,:: is a1~o expr-essed by

Ferdinand Schevi11 v.rhen he says that I!istory belom"::-; to the
v : o~1d

o-f Art:

• • • History still in the main, is v~hat it has be£-:n
since Herodotus invented the form. T!:e :-:-tajor chanr:; E:s
are (a) the recent advc.mces o f subject r'1<1tter o.ncl (b)
the recent severity of scholarly method . This h ~ ~ mi~led
many to call it a science. You may, i f you \·:ill , c<:.ll
its method scientific~ but the finished f. roduct belonrs
t:J t:-1c v:orld of art . 7 ·

7EFerdinand Schevill
University of Ch icago,

~ _tistorians (~hicar:o :

1956~, Notes on Histor1ography , P · 201 .

CHAPTER III
MISAPPELLATION AND CONFUSION OF DIALECTIC

I.

FOREWORD

Kant, Hegel, and Jung use the term dialectic, but it
seems that the only

·thi~

they share in common is their

disagreem-ent as to the scope and end of dialectic.

The

term "dialectic" now includes so many different meanings·
that the examination of these authors should be undertaken
to det-ermine what, if any, usag.e is consistent with the
original Platonic.
This does not imply or suggest that the private
vocabulary of philosophers -should be abandoned;· merely that
the new terms to cover new processes or concepts should not
be presented in terms otherwise well defined.
The conclusion to this section can readily be seen
·f rom what has preceded, but since these philosophers have
employed a similar ·term--dialectic--the eY.ercise sr.all be
attempted.

The examination will not advance the concept of

dialectic, but it is justified as an example of how the
concept of Dialectic has undergone a radical chanr,e since
its original. formulation.
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science and mathematics .

There men

f:.

oup:ht
t 1-:" e new k..now 1 e drr
c·e

under the model of self-evident and certain mathematics.
As '\'rith Descartes, their systems of

thou~~ht

';.;ere

meant to indicate that the nevf science could be a source of
knowledge and yet, at the same tir.1e, need not de.'71and a mechanistic concept of nature, i.e., theirs was actually an apologetics for their intellectual life and, in its appeal to selfevident truths, a defense
beliefs.

a~ainst

disturbing

theolo~ical

True, Hobbes failed to do this; yett he didn 't

offer an alternative to Christian salvation.
primarily c·ri tical •

!-!is work was

0 f course these thinkers v-rere

'·Ie 11

enoup:h aware of the r.enlir.;hteninr," force of the CLristian
Inquisition not to step too far .

Descartes himself withheld

the publishine; of his Y<:ork for three years because of the
Galileo affair.l In order to secure a philosophical f oundation
for the new science, Descartes hypo thesized two metaphysical
entities--the extended and unextended--but this brought ·w ith
it nrunerous problems.

The rationalists and empiricists chose

the unextended and extended respectively and accused each
other of foolishness.

Hume criticized both for not beinc

a~are. that cert a inty cannot be had concerninr, either ideas,

facts, or lor.ic.

He, like others of the e~pirical cchool ,

had drifted into scepticism and even denied the possibility
of inductive inference.

Hence some- .European philosopters,

e:>."tending the issu-e, thou:-.:ht they could even get by VJithout
l Il ene Deccartes , Discourse .Qll I:etho,d , t!':ms.

T
L' •

"'
• ..... ch
r.,e
l.v
·

(Chicaf::o: Or--en court Puhlishinf, r_;o.~ Chap. VI, PP · 64- 5 ·
0

l .

!.

!.l
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the hypothesis of God.

Concurrently with this, the growth of

science was increasing in spite of these philosophica1 conversations and it app·eared that a completely detenninistic
universe could soon be demonstrated.

God, Free Will, and

Immortality could be viewed as unnecessary concepts.

Kant

sought to .reintroduce these concepts, define their scope, and
also to re-establish the thesis that one could still be a
Christian, a scientist, and a philosopher, simultaneously.
He did not construct a system of thought towards a God; he
offered no alternative to Christian metaphysics; rather, he
intended to perfonn two services:

:O ne, to deny the claims of

"·speculative" reason to transcendent insight; and two, to
restore the ethical force of practical reason.

"I have there-

fore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make
room for faith."l

But speculative reason stood as an obstacle

to the employment of practical reas-on; in fact, it extended a
thesis discounting its value.

Therefore, Kant attacks the

claim. of speculative reason and attempts to reintroduce th·e
regulative s·ide of reason--morality.

However, the point at

issue here is not to recapitulate the rise of Kantian philosophy, nor chart the general rise of European philosophy.

The

point is that Kant claims to employ dialectic and therefore

I

l

lNorman K. Smith (trans.}, Immanuel Kant's Critioue of
Pure Reason (New York: The Humanities Press, 1950), Preface. to
Second Edition, Bxxx, (p. 29).
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the question is simply:

(1) define ·its nature and scope of

activity, and (2) examine Kant's contribution to the rol e of
dialectic.

Primarily_, his \•:ork i .s not a dialogue; it offers

no dialectical technique, no personal envolvement, no "risk"
in any Jungian sense:
reason itself.

it is a monologue.

Its subject is

The attempt is to deal with it in its uni ver--

sal character--the conclusions binding on all mankind$- He
says of dialectic:
In former times dialectic \'IG.s studied with r:reat
diligence. This art presented false princirles in the
semblance of truth, and sour,ht, in accordance v:ith these,
to maintain thinr:s in ser1blance. Amonr,st the GreE.:ks the
dialecticians were advocates and rhetoricians wh o could
lead the populace wherever they chose, becaus~ the populace lets itself be del,~ded with semblance. Dial r.ctic
v1a$ therefore at that ·time the art of se1~1blanc e. In
logic, also, it was for a lonr: time trea ted under the
name of the art,_ of disputat.i.Q.!:!, and durin r:; thc:J.t period
all logic and philosophy was the cultivation by certain
chatterboxes of the art of semblance. But nothin~ can
be more unworthy of a nhilosonher than t he cultivation
of such an art.· Dialectic in - this form, therefore, must
be altogether suppr es sed, and instead of it t t ere must be
introduced into logic a critical examination of tr.is
semblance.
We should then have two parts of logic: the analvtic,
..,.rhich will treat of t!:e formal criteria of truth, and the
dialectic, v-rhich will contain the marks an d rules by v:bich
·we can kno\AI tl·.at something does not a r.re e with the formal
criteria of truth, although it seems to a gree v.: ith th~.
Dialectic in this form would have its use as a cathart1c
of the understanding.2
Aside from Kant's i~norance of the theory and history of dialectic, it is clear that he has employed a special use for
2Norman K. Smith, A Cornmen~ 2Q Kant's Critioue of
Pure ::leason (Ne\·1 York: Humanities Press, 1950), PP• 1 TJ-74,
quoted from Einleitung~ by Kant.

llt'
this tenn.

Kant says that in regard to knowled _r~e of f' orm, as

opposed to its content, the criterion of truth
in

lo.~ ic

mu~t

be !'ound

because there the univ·ersal and necessary rul e s of

the understanding are found.
these rules is false.

11

~'J hatever

contradicts

li'or the understanding viould. tl: ereby be

made to contradict 'its ovm
contradict itself.")

Hence,

~eneral

rules of

tf:ou ~ ht,

and so

This is the General Lo~ic--the prin-

ciples of all logical critic ism--and is therefore entitled
the analytic.

If the lo g ical form is valid, the c ont c nt c a n

be examined to determine its validity:
We must first inde p endently of lo ~ic, obtain reliable
information; only then are we in a pos ition to enouire,
in accordance with logical laws, into t he usc or tLis
infonnation and its connection in a cohere nt vd:ole, or
rather to test it ·by these laws. There is however·,
something so tempting ·~n the posses s ion of an art so
specious, ttrough '\'Jhich 'ttle give to aJ.l our kno,.rledr-;e,
however, uninstructed we may be in rer-ard to its c o ntent,
the form of understa.nding, that general lor;ic v1hich is
merely a canon of jud~~ent, has been emn loyed as if it
were an organon for the actual production of at least
the semblance-of objective assertions, and has thus been
misapplied. G-eneral logic, when thus treated as an
organon, is called dialectico4
In the employment of reason,

c-ertain concepts may be u~ed

which have their origin i n and throug h tt:e em n irical or ptenomenal '\'Torld and no difficulties are encountered until they are
utilized beyond this specific domain.

Reason,

If these concepts--v-;hat

3smith (trans.), Im ~Januel Kant's Cr-iticue o f ~
op. cit., B84, AflJ, {p. 9S} •
4Ibid., A61, B$5,

{p. 99) •

I:
!
1
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h-e calls the categories of the understandin?;--are e'Tl!Jloyed to
characterize reality, then they have recourse to terms which
are binding only in tt:e phenomenal \·:orld and hence they are
misapplied.

If tte categories of the und erstanding are never-

theless used to apply to reality

itsel~

to what he calls the

noumenal world, then it is invalid--not lo.r:ically, hovJever,
;'

since they may indeed accord with the formal rules of loGic.
This misapplication of the categ ories of the understandinr: to
reality itself, the noumenal v1orlci, is

sim~ly

an error of

judgement, since tr:.e terms are valid only phenomenally...

To

demonstrate this spurious character, a crit icisrn is applied, a
technique of eliciting their error; hence, ·this is the function
of the transcendental dialectic.

The arguments in which these

categories of the understanding are misused have all t~e formal
aspects of a valid argument, but they are nevertheless illusions.

The function of his dialectic is to make explicit t his

illusionary

character~

Therefore the important controversy

between Platonic and Kantian dialectic at t his point is .,.;!:ether
the ultimate is capable of being reached, or, in Kantian terms,
if the transcendental dialectic is able to resolve and dissipate the illusion so that the real, the noumenal, can be seen.
In Plato, the dialectic is a discipline lead~n~ to the Good;
while in Kant, the dialectic can merely d~1onstrate t~at the
categories of the understandin-g are valid only Phenomenally

'

--

----

--- -- - - . . ,

1:20
and therefore must be confined to experience.5

It does not

by that very insight, however, in any way remove its force-the illusion remains.

The dialectic, in Kant's

presen~ation,

is rest-ricted to detecting the illusion of transcendental
judgements.

It exposes them; it does not destroy it:

• • • That the illusion should, like logical illusion,
actually disappear and cease to be an illusion, is something which transcendental dialectic can never be in a
position to achieve. For here we have to do witt a
natural _ and inevitable illusion, which rests on
subjective principles, and foists them upon us as
objective. 6
It is one thing to say that reason, or the transcendental
dialectic, is incapable of overcoming the ·transcend-ental
illusion, and completely another th i ng to assert that it is
therefore forever outside the grasp of man.
f

I
I

It is obvious

that man reasoning, thinking thoughts, will not by that very
activit-y experience a state of not thinking thoughts.

Or,

again, the habitual modes of conceiving the world will not
lose their function by thinking new thoughts.

To know the

w-orld as it is, the noumenal, the thin?; in itself, presupposes
that man knowing and experiencing must first remove the veils
and projective devices- that pennit reality to become assimilated, finite, and thereby understandabl-e to _reason.

The

5rhe term "experiencen is used strictly in the Kantian
reference.
6smith {trans.), Immanuel Kant's Critiaue of Pure
Reason, on. cit., A29 e, BJ55, (p. ]00).

; 'I

- ·-·- ---- ·- · --· ·- -1
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real issue to philosophy is whether reason functioning as a
cathartic tool can

re~ove

its own impediments to that vision
i

of reality.

To

ack.nowled~.e

that reality is beyond reason,

!I
I

i

supra-rational, is possible either by a dermatic statement
or by a discovery through reason realizin{'; its own limitations by the intuition, or nous,

~oing

beyond reason

itself~

With Kant_, it is a doV!Jatic assertion, hence it may still
work towards skepticism and ant·i -rationalism.

Kant, of

course, escapes the skepticism because the lack of certain
rational proof provides the grounds for the committment of
faith; but if one is not a Christian, it may conceivably
advance the cause of skepticism.
The illusion does have a vast popular appeal.

Kant

acknowlede;es that it furthers speculation and has practical,
or ethical, ramifications.?

This human disposition to specu-

late beyond the legitimate employment of empirical cate~ories
is a natural tendency.

On the other hand, this tendency can-

not be rationally defended.

The Christian accepts his thesis

on faith and appeals to reason., but no matter how comforting
it may be, it can carry no cognitive wei r;ht.

Stated in

familiar terms: one's conviction of the truth of a thesis.

7Ibid.

--'

L

A466, B494-A476, B504, (pp. 424-426).
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does not add any cognit ive evidence to the assertion.
fore, Kant's employment of dialectic is ner:ati ve.
loe:ic of illusion. 8

There-

It is a

This illusion is not, Lm'.'ever , a merely

lo£;ical illusion, for \·;hen attention is

brou.~ht

to bear upon

it (the logical illusion) nnd the forr.1al fallacy i~ denwn-

strated, the illusion completely disappears.9

The illusion

to v:h ich dialectic ad .J. res E." eo itself is, on the contrary, a
transcendental illusion

~ hich

• • • does not cease even aft -e r it has been detected
and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental
criticism (e. ~ . the illusion in the oro~osition: the
-v:orld must hav e a beginning in time)·. 'i'he cau.se of this
is that there are fundn:.1 ental rules and maxi!J1s for the
employment of our reason, and that these yave alL the
appearance of beinf objective nrincioles . 0
Therefore, t.he dialectic in Kant has a ner,at ive or regulative
employment.

He says:

The transcendental dialectic \\'Till therefore content
it_s elf \'lith exposing the illusion of transcendent judp;ements, and at the sa~e time taking orecautions that we
be not deceived by it. That the illusion should, like
loeical illusion, actuaJ_ly disappear and cease to be an
illusion, is somethin~ which transcendental dialectic
can never be in a posit ion to achieve--. F'or here '\ole have
to do with a natural and inevitable illusion, ;·:hich rests
on subjective principl-es, and foists ti~ em u n on us as
objective; 1r-1hereas lor;ical dial-ectic in its exposur? of
deceptive inference has to do mer~ly wit~ an ~rror 1~ ~~e
following out of principles, or w1th an 1llus1on ~rtlfl
cially created in L~itation of such inferences.
lhere

8Ibid ., A293, B350,

{p. 297) •

9Ibid., A296, B353, {p. 299) •
lOibid.__, A297,- B354,

(p. 299) •
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existsr then a natural and unavoidable Jialectic of Pure
reason--not one in v-rhich a bun;-1 er mi ~ht e.ntanrle hi:~!'>elf
through lack of knm·rled;:e, or one \·:hich so:·:f: ~onhist has
c:-rtificially invented to canfuse U:irrkinr; people, but one
1nsepa:able from hu.'nan reason, anci v:Lich,. even. aft-er its
de~eptlv~ness has been exposed, will not cea! ~ e to play
tr1cks \•:J..th :eason and continually entrap it into momentary aberratlons over nn·.~ ar-ain call i:1,r: for c'Jrrection.ll
The spe-cific. application of the didlectic reaches its culmination in the antinomies of nure reason,

f :n• it ic there that

Kant refers to t _hem as ttthc dialectic nlay of co.sr.wlor-ical
ideas."

That there are only four basic antinor:1i c s i.s obvious

since ·there are only four series of syntr:etic presuupositions
that a priori limit the empirical synthesis:
Ant ithesis

Thesis
The world has a bep;inninr.;
in time, and is also limited
as re~ards space.l2

The world has no bep,inninr.l
and no limits in space; it
is infinite aG regards both
tL~e and space.l2

Every composite substance in
the world is made uu of s~nple
parts, and nothinr an)~lhere
exists save the simple or what
is camposed of th-e simple.l3

No co~nosite thin~ in the
warld is made up of simple
parts, and there no~here
exists in the -..·rorld anyt hinp; s i:n pl e • 13

Causality in accordance with
laltlS of nature is not the only
causality from which the ap1_jear.ances of the world can one and
all be derived.
To explain
these appearances it is ne~es
sary to ascune that t~ere 1s
als-o another causality, that
of freedom .. l4

There is no freedol"'!1 j
every<.hinf. in the '.·:o:-ld
takes Place solely in
accord;_r.ce \•:itt la\vs o.f
nature .l4

llibid.,

A298,B355, ( p.JOO}~

13Ibid., A434,B462, (p.402) •

---

12rtid .. , .A426, 3454, ( P .J <;6} •
l/""Ibid.,A44L,3472, (p.4J 9) •

Thesis

Antithesis

There belon£s to the world
either as its part or as its
cause, a being that is abs olutely nece.ssary.l5

An_ab solutely neces 0 ary
b _e l:rrg now!H::re cxi ~ts i:1
tne w~ ~ld, nor does it
exist outside tte ~or!d
as its cause.L~

The four antinomies ar·e the
ophy.

centr <~ 1.

issue 5 in ··{; i 1 'J.S-

They are centrGl becc::.use they are tl .c

C · n-.c

ern

'l

f

~

predominantly Christian era th a t has woven a fnbric o f
thought from assumptions derived

fro~

thcolo ,. ical ·beliefs .

To admit they ar e the central issu es of rhilosonhy i.s but to
acknowledge the importance of t h is set of theolo_:·· ical h <· Licfs,
but, to the Platonist, these ouestions are nart o.f t::c· class
of "likely stories ," 'r:hereas the real philoso phical auc~tions
and

problems have a different er.1~h :: sis--tbe dialectical

treatment of concepts movinp; tov-Jards tLe r emoval o f ir:n J rance.
Kant presents these conflictin~ systems v:LicL ·a re
mutually exclusive these s , and attempts to de:no n~trate tr.e
antinomical character of reason.

He does not er.r<~ re in any

midvJifery; rather, he holds up to reason a st ate::H~nt o f its
m·m

con~lict.

Kant has claimed that ·he :r.as der:10n~tr~tcd t~e

logical character of each of these four antinomies o: ~ ~aso n,
botl: the thesis and antithesis, and t!:A.t

he has t ;: Y.en f :J ll

responsibility to thereby show the cert a inty of tte inevita ole

l5Ibid., A452, B480, (p. 415) •

r

I
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antinomy of reason.l6

Be that as it may, there are certain

reservations, since many of the arf-uments are poorly constructect.l6a Nevertheless, the issue is whether this accomplishes
his end, and if this is dialectic.

Let it be assumed that

these two arguments, the rationalist's and the empiricist ·' s
cosmological theses, can be held by some hypothetical person;
·w here then is the dialectic?

The Kantian framework presents

these positions formally in parallel columns; both are assumed
to be formally logical; and Kant argues the incompatibility of
these propositions rests entirely upon the mistake of extendinp;
\\•hat is valid merely as regards appearance to things in themselves, and confusing both in one concept.l7

The resolution

of the antinomical character of these theses is quite simpl-e.
Kant proves they are f.als·e be.cause they are founded upon a
contradictory concept.

It should first be remembered that

he demonstrates that both space and time are applicable
only to appearances since they have their origins in the forms
of sensibility, i.e., objects experienced always are known or
given within space and time and hence they can be considered
as the very forms through which, or by which, one conceives
the very experience of objects.

Or stated in another way,

16Ibid., A421, B449, (·p!J. 393-94) •
l6aibid., pp. 4S3-499.

1 7Ibid., A486, B514,. (p. 43 7); A490, B518, ( PP· 43$-J 9);
A525, B49-r,-{"p. 443); A506, B5.34, (p. 448).
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these cone ept s (space and t i.m e) are pres u.ppos ed in experience
before it can be experienced, but experience does not presuppose only the form of the receptivity, hence they are always
prior to the act of experienae. Or, as Kant says, they are a
priori.

Space and time therefore are nothine in themselves,

but only modes of representation.

Yet, these

ar,r~uments--both

the thesis and antithesis--assume just such an independent
character for space .and time, and they assume that space and

.I
;

time are independent of their representations; but, if they
are

only given throuGh them, why then defend the divorce?

Assuming they are not s·elf-subsisting apart from their representat·ion, it is contradictory to assume they are so for cosmolo~ical

considerations, i.e., the motive or intent of an

argument hardly can be considered sufficient to change the
character of the origin of concepts as well as regulate for
their respective

er.~.ployment.

At this point, it is -not even

important whether this is in fact true.

The issue remains:

.!
!

How does this dialectically demonstrate their untenability?
True, they are both mutually exclusive propositions and they
both extend the categories of the understanding beyond their
legitimate employment, -but this is· onJ.y true if the general
criticism of reason as outlined by Kant is valid.

The attempt

here (in Kant) is to judge them both guilty and therefore
invalid aside from their practical, spe.culative, and popular
j

1
j'

L

127

appeal.

The solution presupposes the individual accepting

such a stalematelS as conclusive evidence of their dubious
character and of concurring that this is in fact an extension of categories beyond their legislated scope.

Hence,

his conclusion rests upon a higher criticism, not upon a
dialectic.

The arguments have not been shown to be invalid

by any reductio, merely upon their mutual cancelling· weight
'

before reason.

The object lesson that Kant wishes to draw

is that suspicion should be aroused as to the proper use
of reason, or concepts, in such arguments.

However, the

dialectical encounter need not employ such a form..

It would

question the asserter, either the rationalist or the empiricist, and draw from him the· premises for asserting ·this
cosmological argunent, determine the reasons for its acceptance, and then judge that--not the thesis--for upon the one
the other rests.

The dialectician would approach Kant's

dictum of destroying knowledge in order to make room for
\

faith and would examine this in itself.

Certainly Kant's

main claim to fame is not in his anticipation of certain.
I

!

r

positivistic theo~ies, but in the practical employment of

lBibid., A502, B5JO,. (p. 446).
"It is impossible to
decide between them," and cf. A475, B503 (p. 430), presumably
a person can be in a "state of continuous vacillation"
between the arguments.

. I

I.
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reason in ord.er to make room for ethics and f a ith.
fort he dialectician \".'ould be to
roo ts in

~ractical

ex.:m~.ine

'l'he issue

if morality has its

reason; why the concept of wil l is central

to his thoup;ht, or \\'hy, if his inherited t h eoloF'; ical beliefs
are sho"''TI to be invalid, should they be saved for r:-ractical
considerations 'l

Or,. a ga in, y..•hy consider m.orali ty in the

li p;lrt of law or imperatives;

~·Jhat

would be abhorrent in

assuming morality to be a function of man • s im.rard growth?
Before

leavin~

Kant, there is a more eeneral and important
Granted tha t Kant's use o f dialectic

point to be examined.

is a private usae e and that he does not advJ nce any ad d itional
factor~ to tl1is study,

stil l his doctrine as such does invite

another issue o f general importance.
of content.

It raises t h e ouestion

Is it to be assumed that dialectic can learn

nothing t h erefore from Kant 7

Hovrever,. since· he mi e;ht have

employed anot h er tenn than d i al-ectic, the is .s ue can be
extended to the question:· Of v!hat value are the non-dialectical philosophies frcrn the dialectician's viev1 poi::1t 'i

This

question is certainly a central issue an d (!eeds examination.
Primarily, dialectic as a ph i losonhy beg.ins with the
individual who is "oree:nant " h ence it is an individual
~.

process.

C)

,

Whatever the formal grounds for as s erting a posi-

tion, the dialectician ,.rould profit from the r; enera.l k nmd-

ed~e that he may have of .some formal Philosophical issue or
problam, but that does not justify the use of any n i g her
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critical employment of reason on universal frounds .

That it

has this added factor is certainly i:1terestinr.;, but t!'- is is
1

only to say that it can be attacked from
of view.

mo~e

than one point

aeturninr_: the question to -P lato, v:c can immediately

see a basis for a parallel .

Theaetetus assumes knovil edge is

perception and is quite content to pursue the argument
strictly alone this line, but Socrates adds to this theory
the implications of Theaetetus' posi:t _ion anon;:, ont::>lot;ical
and ethical issues.

I
'

Socrates shows that r·. is (Theaetctus')

notion of kno1ttledge is in f;].ct Protagoras' doctrine of

1

I~ian

as the measure of all t h inr:s, and that this as::m .':'les that the
nature of reality is in a state of flux:
thesis.

or Heraclitus'

Sot too, the Kantian should be aole to denonstrate

that the asserter of any position, of either the thesis or
l

the antithesis, involves a conception of man, reli .: :ion,
philosoph.y and ethics or morality.

Both asserters, the

Kant ian and Theaetetus, \'Jould suffer more :roD
catharsis.

-I

t~e

ensuine

On the Platonic analogy, the issue was resolved

of t h e
ouite early in the dialo gue, out not the cons eouenc cs
assumption.

Hence the dialectician could effect more far-

reachine· results by the knowledg e of thes e f~rnal !1 0sitians.
It could and does act as a matrix from which to dra''' t he cons e:quences..

HO\·rever, to demonstrate that tte idea itself is

at fault by use of a higher criticism without an exa..'":lination
of the reasons of the asserter or of his pres ~ poositions,
I:
j

I

I

I

l;

---

1)0

indicates skepticism towards the role of ohilosophy as a
whole.

Therefore, from the consideratio.n s of dialectic, the

issue is always the individual and his encounter durinr the
midwifery.

One can of course raise the ouestion:

~hat

then

would be the final philosophical solution of the major philosophical problems?

Or, in other terms, what

content of the dialectical philosophy"?

is the formal

I .t is this oue.stion

that still needs examination, but which must be put off until
further examinations are made.

III.

HEGEL

Hegel reintroduces Anaxagoras' Nous and gives a wide
scope to philosophy.

He says:

The objects of philosophy_, it is true, are upon the
whole the same as those of religion. In both the object
is truth, in that supreme sense in \'lhich God and God
only is the truth.l9

He also employs dialectic and the problem will b.e to
determine the usag e and to see if it can advance t ·he concept

of philosophy as dialectic.
Primarily, Hegel was the recipient of Kant's c~ncept
of dialectic and to it he added further elements that in no

·
way made for a qualitat1ve
a d vantaae
b
•

Hegel was not content

19william \•iallace (trans.), Logic of Hee;el (London:
Oxford University Press, 1931)' P• 3 •

[_

r-
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with the antinomical character of reason he inherited from

l :
-;

Kant, he added a third term which was intended to blend
their mutually exclusive natures into a new thine--the synthesis.

He took the name Kant originally gave to this and

continued what

~

with Kant

for this the name of

~ misappell~tion.

dialectic~

He claimed

The essential thing in

his dialectic is that the apparent opposition between the
thesis and the antithesis are reconciled in this higher
union; they are harmoniously joined by this broader concept
of a synthesis.
Hegel's dialectic is subsumed under logic and is part
of a triad of the Abstract, Dialectical, and Speculative.
Each of these three- corresponds to the understanding, negative
reason, and positive reason.

It is not as parts, however, that

Hegel views these, but rather as the "'moments' in every logical entity, that is, of every notion and truth what ever -•" 20
The abstract side, or thought as understanding, is character-

ized by the distinct, and limits the abstract and treats it
ttas having a subsistence and being of its own."21

20~.,

par. 79:~ p. 143 •

21Ibid., par. SO, a), -p. 143 •

...

_

It is this

•'
t '
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capacity that is \'tell knm...'Tl in the sciences as the soirit of
classifying: it "is not satisfied with cloudy and indefinite
impress·ions, but g-rasps the objects in
ter.n22

t~:eir

fixed charac-

In this activity, understandinp: must not, however,

r-o too far, as Hegel says, becaus-e it is

n~t

an ultimat-e,

nbut orr the contrary finite , and so constituted that when
carried to extremes it veers round to its opposite. 11 23

Hence

out of the abuse o:!:' the understanding it sets un its ovm
opposite; therefore, it becomes negative reason or dialectic.
If this opposite nep.:ative factor is pr esented, then it is a
11

lrrere negation, n24 and is dialectical skeptici~in v-:hen its

anplication is applied to Philosophical theories.

It~

true

employment does not function in this restricted r:1c1.nner for
Hege l; rather, it has far ~ rander ~rounds since it "is the
very nature and essence of everything Predicated by more
understanding--the law of thinr,s and of the finite as a
wr..ole. tt25

Dialectic then is a factor of nature herself, for

here the
;

• . .
sideness
.
s t and 1ng

'

ind\ve 11 i np: ·tendency out v.;ards by v-:1 li c h the oneand limit~ti8n of the predicates of the under{s
. . _ seen in its true li~ht, and shown to be the
~ j

22 Ibid., oar . 80 , fl• 145.
2 3Ibid., par . $0 , p.

146.

b)

(I)' p.

147.

2 5Ibid . _, par. $1 , b)

( 2) , p .

147 .

24Ibid., par.

El,

:I

1))

negation of them.26
.I

Heeel's dialectic

i~

not just logic since there is no real

difference in his writinrr.s
between
,

lo ~.ic

and· met at:: h y::acs.
·

lienee the dialectic is ca;,;:J.ble of oortrayinp the movement of
life.:
\'ihe.rever there is movement, •·:herever tLere i5 life,
1'·rherever anythinr; is carried into effect in the actual
\•.:orld, ther·e Dialectic is at work .
It is ;; lso the soul
of all kno\·lled.F.e
i·:bicl': is trulv
..
. scienti:~· ic.27
The understanding may not concur with these
be reluctant to adrni t

findin ~ s

and may

tr.e act ion at' the dialectic, b:..1t He r: e l

insi.sts the recognition does not r e st within the un;1erstanding because the dialectic r-:i ves exnres~ion to a lav1 •·:hicl: is
"felt in all other r:rades of consciousnesst a~d in r;eneral
experit:mce. n2 8

Everythinr: finite chanf,es, is forced "to turn

suddenly into its

o-pposi te 11 29 and,

;

)

~

• • • in say-ing so, v!e have a vision of Dialectic
as the universal and irresistible .po-;ger before ,.,.:~ich
nothing can stayl however secure and stable it may
deem itself .30
Hegel finds traces of the presence of dialectic in tl- ~ e natural
wo~ld--in the motion of the heavenly b~dies--in that motion

itself allows for tLe nosr;.ibility of bcin.'!' in another locc.tion.

:;e finds it in laN and mo.rCJ.lity, in rolitics, o.nd in t lJ. e ethiI

--28Ibid.,

26roid .

JOibid.

-

.

27Ibid., -car. 61, b)

(2}, (I)

par . 81, b) (2) (I), p .• 150.

t

!"· 14S .
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cal life and, of c :mrs e, in history .31

Each realm in v:hich

it operates resolves itself by· its movement into its o;·:n
O?nosite, its own neF,ative:
• • • For the negative, which emer~es as the result
of dialectic, is, because a rc:sult, at tl : e sa:ne time
the oositive: it contains '·Jhat it rcs·ults fr8m ,
absorbed into it self, Rnd r.-;ade nart of its m·:n nature.
Thu-s conceived, hm·rever, the dialectical stare has tte
features characterisin~ the third ~rade of lo ~ ical
truth, the speculative form, o~· fom. of r·ositive
reason.J 2
Understandin~

makes distinctions ruinous to them-

selves as .it nasses into their o"\':n opDosites anci
negative reason or dialectic .

13ut this, too,

bec.o:-:~· es

e!~;ere;cs

as a

negative with a positive side because it abso rbs into its Elf
part of its own nature.

Thus, it becomes nositive or specu-

It apprehends the unity of pro~ositio~s in their

lative.

opoosition--"the affirmative, "''hich is involved in their disintefration and in t ~ eir transition.n33

Speculation or the

speculative stae;e of reason or lor,ic neans ti,.'O t.hinrs to
Hegel.

He says:

• • • first, that vrhat is immediately at band bas ~o
be r:assed and left behind; and secondly,. that the subJeCtmat~er of such speculations, thoufh i~ t~c first ~lace
only subjective, ·· must not re;:"~ain so, but be realised or
translate~ into objectivity .34

- -------- 31Ibid., par .

e·1,

b)

(2)

(I) 'PP • 150-51.

< 2__].~.,
rb · ·
par.

r:1,

b)

( 2)

(I) '

,/

3.3rbid., par. 82, g) , p . 152.
'.l4-t
"d
par •
~.,

./

£2,

[. ) ' n. 15.3 •

p. 152.

I
~
·I I

' !

i iI

i

• -r'· ·

lJ 5
It is not a subjective ~·roce5s tu~ ! ·.:.. ~E·~· ,1 i.J::y.: e: t:.e
op~; osition of subject and obJ'ect

has an "all embracinf'"
nature."
.

a.s a con~.,...ete,
,,...
.::.nu· ..." or· 1··: e"e 1
T':.1..
· ·· ,;

!,uaee of mysticism and a speculatl.'ve

·
lS

·

·

C>:)VlCll~

m~utt
.1....
~.

h,a:•

,

,.

.

::.:.(:

.~ uc.t.

lc-.n-

this

reference for Hegel:
Tf:e myr:;tical, as s~rnonyT.1ous v:i th tll e s -:- Jc cu L:. t 2.. ve is
the cone rete unit:,: o .f.' t1 : o~· e r r' o nor: i .t i o r.::-., · ·.::: .i c:·, u.n : ~:r
standinP' only accepts :.n their se'"'<: l· n ti:•r; .-~::d cr~:~o" i tion.35-·
!Im·rever, t;ds doctrine is
does not advance a

;;!y~~ tical.

myt~tici~ · m

only a private meaninr;;

beyond unc.er:::t .?:ndi nr: .J 6

rJ.s

only in one

sue;~,

f 'r

i:erc

it is mytJ tical un ly

It

:-:<.' !:Sr. .
t.: :~·

bcc:u;.~ ·

l:n~

t c r r:

(· i

L

'' ')C ~

But b:· t::is ru] e, ~o t o.::: .:..~· r~ ~. r.t ' r

c1 ialectic v-:hen se-en throu _P"h Hegel's Lor:Ic.

l)n• . £; : ·:::; t ~ : : ,d i.r!.; ,

the abstract acti v ity •.-; i. icb .liJnits and isol<:Lc:: ::~o:.:..ir;J ~- ,
becomes dialectical,

or ner,<Jtive,

and pas~c-:s int o

' x ·. i t ive

reason, and it is this ;; roce"~: thAt F e [" cl thinks is :r.T. tical:
It

tT Oe~

beyond the und ers tand.inf.
• • • But , as "'e have seen,

}i e

snys:

t .he a hs tr;• ct t.tinl·:ir.f" o:

under~.tanding is so far fror.1 hein!:' ei~r:E r ulti :r:::: Lc or

stable, that it ~- hovJS a perpetual t€TC.E.£tc;; t o '.~:o,·Y. i t s
own dissolution and swing round into its opnoslte.
,
...
•
t: ~· ·
c-..vc-; e._el.·n
:teasona bl e;nesE, on .c..'
une c~ntrctr)·, ,; 11 •. ·u .. . . -~· v..:

----·---35Ibid ... , nar • .S2 , g), o . l5li-o

E
3 ;Ib id .. , "

._
l. n ....... r=- ·--- • •• ; c ~· 1
• there is a riiysl.>cry
~ · - · ·: • L·-. __ ,
onl v however ·ror the understc:.ndim: ,,:r_ ic!t is r~tl c~ o;' t!.C:
"Gri~cinle o:f' abstract identity; ';:hereas tbe I·;:,rst:.ca~: .. 8 s ..
synonymous 1~.•ith the specuL1tive., ic· tr.e C:) r.crctE t.:.r:-;. :::.:
those pror.)Qsitions which under s tE!ndin£: only o.cce•·:.s J.!': ._ .. e . . r
separation and opposition .. "

i
I

I

l

I

l.
I
I

I
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embracin£ within itself these opnosites a~ unsubstantial
Thus the reason-\·:orld may b·e ecually ~tyled
myst1cal--not however because thourht cannot both reach
and comprehend it, but .merely becaut~e it lies -beyond the
compass of under.standinr: .3 7
elem~nts.

Thus it would appear thQt alJ. thourht that iE not
content v:ith the Abstract is mystical.

If so , that includes

the thour;ht of Karl t.:arx, \·:hich is certainly not \·Jitbout its
irony .

Hence, for Hegel, the laws of

1-av-r of being.

lo~ic

are in fact the

The consequences of his lop.;ic are bir.dinr upon

reality.

The bare particular cannot be kno~m by tho under-

~tandinr;

be-cause of its abstract nature.; so) too, tLc i:uman

beinr: can only be comprehended ·Hhen he r;i ves up his uni cuenFss and is regarded as an aspect of the ~:ole, o~ to the
State, t.he
then,

laq~er

Y.rhole to \'.rhich he is a member.

~ (cason,

is the Sovereif,n of the Uorld and "History presents us

v:ith a rational process ."J~

Thus, the drama of History is

but the other side of the coin of his structure of Lo~ic.
Nous is the concept of providence39 but not as intelligence,
\·,rhich would be self-conscious reason, but as \·; isdom "endov:ed
with infinite pm·1er ,,:hich realizes its aim:
rational desi.r;n of t .he •·mrlct."40

the a-bsolute

This design is t!:c exhibit-

3 7rbid.
3 8Georg ~Jilhelm Fri.e;tr~ch IJegel, The Ph~losor.hy of
History (NevtYork : Doverl'uollCtitlons, Inc., 1~: 56) , P • ~ .
39rbict., pp. 11 and 16.

40 Ibid • , p • 16 •

'
l J
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ing o.f Spirit, "in the process of vwrkin r~ oat the knov;ledp:e
of that which it is notentiall.y. "41

T'he conce~t cf Spirit

involves freedom for nit is the freedom of Spirit ldlich constitutes its essence.n42

liep;el then turns to history, the

r: istory of the world ,,qhich is ':none other th;m the
of the consciousness of Freedom .'1 43

rro _f~ ress

Hep;elian Pbilo;.o:hy,

then, works with history, and in f3ct rnust comprehend history
as its proper

groun~

of activity.

He says:

The insight then to v.rhich ohiloso~hy is to lead us,
is, that the real ' 'rorl<i is <:J.s it ou~-:nt to be--thc.::t tbe
truly good--the universal divine reason--is not a mere
abstraction, but a vit<.!l prir;ciple ca pable of r ca lizin~
itself. This Good, this Reason, in its most concrete
rorm , is God. God e-overns tbet.':orld; t:: e actual \·:orkir.r;
o ;: hiB g overnnent--the carryinr: out of his plan--is the
History of the vwrld . This plan philosophy strives to
cornprehend;· for on 1 y that which has been develor.ed as
the r (~ sult o.f it, possesses bona fide r eality .4 ~
He says further that:
Philosonhv
the real s:l.d~
much desnised
prehension of

wishes to discover the substantial curport ,
of the divine idea, and to justify the so
Reality of t hjn~ s~ for Reason is the comthe Divi ne work.4J

The full force of Hegel 's work is just that--a justification
of the ways of Goct46--it i .s , as he himself terms it, A Theodicaea.

Kant sought to " make room for Faithn and Eer:el

sou~ht the same end by his criti que--one chose th e ner,ative

,
I
.

l.

41Ibid., pp. 17-18..
43Ibid., p ... 19.
46Ibid., p. 15.

42Ib :.d ..., p. 18 •

4hibid.,

p. )6.

45Ibid.,

p. 36.
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and the other the- positive, but both saw th emselves as Chris·tians first and philosophers second.

Tli e ob je cti o n:: to this

system, of course, arc the same as those ·to Kant, hence it
\'Jould be merely a reduplication to repc~t; r-~ o•'' ever, t-he concept of the synthesis is a ne'\-.' and :J dditional factor.

It

matters little if t h e concept of synthesis is au ~ ~lied to
history or log ic.

The same fla\rl is exh ibited.

It is an

appeal to certainty,, r.tade certain by the construction of the
system itself.

It is a reouest to think in these terr.1s and,

presumably, to profit by the c h ant:;e.

The as s um pti on t 'n at the

Speculative follm..ls fron the dialectical is merely an assertion justified by an appeal to experience--yet if one does
not in fact experience it in this manner, then the system is
rejected.

On the other hand, if one does, it does not adva nce

any additional cognitive merit or evidence, it is merely a
statement or r e port of
lt!Orld.

hO'\I'I

a particular being conceives the

It is merely another form of do['Jflatic a!Jpeal.
These objections to the c oncept

of Heg el's synthesis

mi e::ht be t h oup. ht to be too formal and therefore a doubt mirrht
be raised, since a synthesis can ir. some way be seen in a
('Y'enuine dialectic-..

In Flato's

~er-ublic,

tte opinions of

Justice are examined and are defined in numerous v:ays:

1.
2.

3·
4.
5.

To speak truth and pay y~ur debts.
.
-T he gi vinr-; to each v:hat -ls proper t? hl~.
To be good to friends and harm enem1es.
'l'l: e interes·t of the strong er.
The greatest Good.

lJ9
These first four alternatives are rejected, but
they are incorrect, but because the asserter
defend his definition.

n~t

c-~nnot

because
properly

The final st,atement o.f the nature of

Justice does not contradict any of

t~e

~rev1ous

a.h~ays

it can be seen in them (as the definition is
to the t0st of the understanding).

four, since

fou~

The first

secondary
alternatives

are not synthesized into a nevi concept wr1ich embraces alJ the
others, nor does it arrive at a ne'w'l

c~nce~t

reconcilinr:; tLe.ir

contradictions: for if the individual kne\': his actur.tl debts,
knew what was proper, ,·.:hat was

~

to

friend~·

and

~·:t:at

\·g)uld

harm enemies, and if he kne\·.' in 1•1hat lies tr.c "stronu.:e r interest,n he 1-:ould have r-esolved the problem .

Hence in the Pla-

tonic dial -ectic, the synthesis, if one can i,P.:nore Hegel ts
reference, would not be a lo~ical one , but spring from the
recognition of the object.

There is no projlem of resolving

contradictions into a big-her synthesis--only an appe0l for the
mind to v rant a deeper understanding of v~:tat is essentially
the sa"'!l·e definition but in a new way, a more -profound i·;ay , and
in a ::1ore personal manner .

The elements i~ this nr.,.; non-

Her;elian synthesis •;!Ould rr:e:an t! Je resolution of many diverse
parts into a !".i~:her unity or complex , . ..::ole .

The insi r:-ht of

this hi[her referent vwuld provide an opportunity to see U : e
same nart in a richer i';hole anc.l, therefore, tbe sar:le defir.ition
~

could be maintained by a richer understa ndinG.

There is

absolutely no petit ion to the r econciliation of mutually

'

'
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exclusive thesis and
criticism of an
here.

antithes 1·~
~

apa~oric

1·n

t·r ; 1· 5 "'yn
~
th
·
- CS1S.

The

alternative nn.na'
"'"' not be rer-eated

It is far too cormnon.
The historical sict
- " e of the system has alree:!dy hecn
hi~tory

dealt with since this is merely another appe c l to
as such is fraur;ht

\'!i th

the

~2.:"?28 l·reaknE ~ sses .

pos s .ible to read into history any theory of

and

It is ouite
Li~tory

one

assumes as the orderinr, aFcnt.
The Greek term ''dialectic" (Hhich \·m::-.
a discussion betvresn equal ~artncrs'

r

undC.T!~ Lood

!erive'l ~ ·r :);.;

nmr includes or is meant to siP:nify· tl:lc study of
and their unity in either lo{"ic or ;; i~tory.
vate use of lanr:ua[, e in ~hilosonhy .

t!

as

u.::.al 0n:c"}

o~T , o!_":itcs

Suc h i~; tl.c rri-

l:owc'.:er, t : ~e llc,-elian

dialectic has no reference to individuals in a rhil o so~hical
0uest, has no reference to tte catharsis or involvc;nent rsychologically; there is no midwifer y , ancl he has no r: o ncent 0f
tJ-: e removal of ignorance os the c ondition for treat r.ercention
of the Good.

Similar to Kant, it does not extend the C'mcer:t

of dialectic, and has abrorated the tcr~ for r~i ~n te n ~~c~clature.

Therefore,

from. the ooint of vie\·: of its es~ential

.meaninp; , neither Kant nor Hef,el c0ncerns hiMself \·;it"!"-. a. re ,;_l
dialectic.

There is as little reason to allm-: tf:e ter.J r!ia-

lectic to be lep;itim~tely r.!pplied to t:ant ;:;. ;· t:-·. ere
vrho adopted the concept fror:J Kant,

:!.S

t. o !:cr-el,

since their use o f the terl

!:

II
il
11

II
I

con fuses or hides its ori,r:inal me:Jninp;.

This vie--: cioes n0t

il

'I
:!

l

lU
assume that a dialectical philosophy cannot profit from the
study of their respective systems, only that insofar as the
study of dialectic per se is concerned, it does not advance
that study one iota.

It might be that Hep;el 's syste.'Tl· could

provide the basis for a religious or mystical

~roup.

His

triad of the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis could, conceivably, support a structure of belief, yet all of this
would be beside the point, for the only question here is not
its availability for a discipline, a sadhana, but its contribution to the diale.ctic.

The movement from the antithesis

might be understood as a prelude to the synthesis and the
struggle to move from the one to the other- could be c onsidered
as a psychological preparat-ion for the latter--as in the
nature of a spiritual discipline--but~ even if that were
granted., the point is whether Hegel can advance the· conc-ept
of dialectic, and n.o t if he can or cannot become an element
in a religious or spiritual system.

By the same loRic, it is

not denied that Kant's system might also have a religious
function in the attempt to save the concept of Christian
faith, and again it would be foolish to deny that some Christians arrive at an insight into the nature of reality in their
vision of God, but the only i .ssue here is what extent they can
advance dialectic as defined in this dissertation.

.
t

{

Hence, as

with Christianity and Kant, the Hegelian contribution is nile

·l

,:I

q
q

'I

'I

!

I
I_
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IV •

PSYCI:OLOGY Ol•' .JGJ·;G

In the past fi.fty
year!':, tLc...rc.
.-~ ~
'--" .•·.- ·--

:)CE:n

r'L( : nO~i £:- r.J.l

a

g rowth of literature contributinr t o the: .::ol\lti:m 0 ~~ l':t;.:;: an

ills and it is significant that psyc:!':olo?"y Las been ru:ron~ible

v- e t ,

for a large share.

•' '1 e
\·.r.l~

t f1~[;
' .

.
1~

true,

it

i~

equally true thG.t there see:ns to be a rFluct :..:. nce o n ti. e roart
of psychologists to

st~r:. te

healing art depends .47

tLe nrinc ipl €'!:; u ~·o n \·:::i cL thci r

It nka ·y b e

t }:a t

t :.c
'
f O!:'r:-~a 1

o :· principles is alv;ays a late d ( velonm c nt of a
hence, one should bide one's tim£ until a r:;ore

st .~.te:-:1er,t

~cier:ce

:tJ:u ,

for.:-~idaole

bod:; of knowledr,e has beer: a:nassed, tested, and bc·<:n ;-; ade

respectable by the procedures of science.

A craftsr:1an, accor<: inr:; to Plato):4f. i.:. one ·.-:h:::J is
ignorant of tr.e principles upon \':hicL his art de r: cnd!::, \·:l.ich,
however, does not interfere v.'iti: the execution o: !:-::: art ,
and t his seems true also of tb.e tbera n ist .49

Yet this paucit y

of reflection does rnake it dif -:'icult to c ompre:-:end it "Y:ithin
the clas ~ of other intellectual nursuits.

Certainly ttcre is

no scarcity of material for the rsycholo ~ ists;

a~ite the con-

tra.ry, for insofar as its ap!Jlica.tion, scope, and teck,icues

are concerned, there is a vast body of l r arning ar d it !s only

j

-!
'J.,
i

ii

,,' I
F.

c.

47c. G. Jung, ~ Practi_c~ of Fsycl:otL~~ar.-y, trans. ~.
Hull (New York : ?antheon 3ooks, l95J), XII, par . lEl.
4BJowett, .Q£• ill_., "Ion," 532,

4°"'Jung, .£E.•

•t
£I.._.,

par. £6 ..

J'

-l l
'•"

54D·

il
-i

-

143
when one attempts to examine principles that there appears a
shortage.

Whatever the reason for this condition, undoubtedly

it is quite valid, the result is that it presents a problem
for the inquiring mind not formally identified with psycholo~y

to objectively determine its real contribution along lines

other than pragmatic.50

The few occasions in whi.c-h psycholo-

gists have allowed themsel-ves the luxury of reflection
resulted in a kind of provisional set of principles permitting
only tentative conclusions.

One of these men, Carl June,

found it necessary to extend his psycholop,ical perspective
beyond the narrovT confines of his oNn "art" into other
intellectual systems such as primitiv.e
mythology, and religion.51

psycholo~y,

comparative

He found this was necessary in

order to discover a matrix for the resolution of dream s)~bols and for their amplification.

This wide grasp and

a-cquaintance with other systems provides him with a basis on
which to compare and sift the residual produce of his analysis
and to report his results within the scope of not just his
special art, but equally well within other intellectual systems.

Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, he is con-

sidered the spokesman for psychology.

I

His acquaintance with

other systems of thought gives him the bas is for two interest-

50rbid., pars. 86 and 184.
51~., par.

.

l

44 and cf. par. 96 •

I _

lh4i nr, comparisons.
:ohilosophy

i~

Primarily he acknOi.;led .r:es t r. e role of

life and refers to his Oh'n role as tha t of a

~"~ hi 1 os opher:

I c~n hardly draw a veil over the f :s_ ct thnt we ~sycho 
theraplsts ou~ht really to be nhilosonhers or Dhi losoPhic
doctors--or r ath er tha t we are - alread~ so , thouF~ we ~re
unwi l.l_i:l..s to adr·1it it bec a use of the r:lar.inf" contr'lst
between our work and -,..:h a t passes for r· hilo~ or:J·,, r in the
universities.52
·
and further, he concludes th ..,_t 1:;estern man doe:> not !)ossess
any monopoly of human 'visdom. 53

J uns doc s mo r e t 'r.<J. n acknov.'l-

edGe the philosophical inquiry s ince he considers it
• • • as the mo~t com plex of psychic s tructur e~ , a
man's philoso:.;hy of life forms the counterpole to the
!)hys iologically c ') ndi ti :)ned r s -y che, an-:1 , .:s tJ-: e i. i :~l:es t
psychic dominant, it ultL"'lately determines the l.c~tter' s
fate .n54
For him philosoDhy is not chos en objectively, "it is an
es ;; e ntially subjective system . 11 55

i-

!

I

The intent h e re is not to present or r es tate his
theory of psychology, only to exa.11ine t he manner in v1hi ch
dialectic functions \"Ti thin

'

.

rllS

syst e.-11 .

Jun~

characterizes

the method of ~s ychotherapy as dialectic, a dialog ue or dis -

I

cussion between tw~ oersons56 and in his state~ent of the
role of the therapist he draws the figure of a dialectician :

r

52Ibid., par. 181.

5.3Ibid., par .

l fB .

5 4rbid., pars. 180 and 218.
5 6I b id., par. 1.
1

l

I
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If . I rTish
to treat
an'"'t'her
-·lDU.~VlrUiL.
'· · d , rsyc::olo·lC3.~Ly
·
.
•
v ~at
all,
I
uust
for
Detter
or
~orse ~·ve u · ~11 r ~t~ _
t- ·
t
·
. ~
'"" - .r\_; ~n
':'l~ns
o super_:o~ •~now~~edge, all aut.r:o~ity an-:! desire. to
ln_luence~
~ LU~t per1orce adopt a dia~ectica! r·rocedure conslstlng ln a comparison o.f ou-r ..-utu..,1 •· 1· ~- d1.' "'!""'
But this becomes nos::: iole o nly if I .ri v·~ ti:~-- o~L~r ~:~~~on
a chanc: to play h_i~ hand t? u·.e f~ll ' unha: .: pered 0~' my
assumptlons. In t~ls 1-!~!Y lus syst e.~1 is : c ;.!~·ed t . 1 :':'!i:'le
and acts ur.)on it; rny reaction is the on i. 'r tlt:.n1· \·li:..n
1~'Jhich I as an inclividual can lec:-itimatel~· con :·r ~H:t my
patient .57
June is cogni·z ant of the princi nle tho.t this procedure of the
dialectic neces: itates that the "theraoist must

ab~ndon

all

his preconceptions and technioues and confine l: .Lmself to a
purely dialectical

p:~ocedure,

shuns all methods. u5 8

adop':-in;-: the attitude th;1t

Natu rally this involves the tiwr:J.?ist

in the ·process as much as t: le patient, ti:u!:i

~! : ey

bnt:: bcco::1e

ttfello-.,; particinants in a proces~':i of individual devcloD~:Jcnt ." 5~:
The mantle of the doctor is r: iven un and he dons ti1c philosophie t;arment , for it is the ancien~ dialectical r ;1lc th."!t
reason from whatever source must be heeded; it i~ the only
"doctor 11·--dialectic is inconceivable i.: the therapist d ·)es
-....
(:;)
not emerge from his usual cloa k o f anonyr.uvy.

for Jung consists of the use of dialectic and he is a·,·:arc
t .hat :the dialectic is not t.o be utilized ,.lith all ratients
indiscriminately.

He ad.rnits that for S-')me a dose of -20IT'..:-.10n

57Ibid., par . 2;

cf. par . 8 .

58Ibid., pars. 6 , 239, and 28~?· .

I

59 Ibid., par . 7-..

,.·

l

.

6C.)Ibid ., par . 23; cf. -::- 3.r • ~- •

:!I
. I

I

-t
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sense, a slap on the back and some ~ood advice ~ay be sufficient and, hence, tf::: t

not all individuals n_ e(~d
_..,
_ t ,,

t {;e. be\'lilderin,c; nroces~ of tl1e dialectic. 61
from employing the dialectic if the

en~
- ~ ~n~
..._ _ .

cr:;~arc

·

~n

He also :-efrains

c·:: <·1n :"-~

\'.'OU

ld

involve too great a sacrifice on the ?art o:: the ra tient. 6~

In these latter caseo, the problem is "eit.her reLwe to treat
the patient or risk the dialectical nrocedurc _.. " 63

Further,

for others, the dialectic may be eTlga,r.: ecl on a limited scule
until such ti.r!le as the })atient can accent sor:1e collective
solution; i.e., r-eferrinr; natients t o tt: eir r c s r ective relifions for,

he adds,

"ther e iS DO ;J Oint in p.romotinr: inrl.ivid-

ual development beyond the needs of the ratient . n 61..-

If, hm·l-

ever, the ·i ndi vid'.lal refuses this ushering into relj r.ion even
under the guise of a cure, then JunG finds no other recourse
than to risk what ·he calls a "major nsychothera oy ." 65

Junr,

seems some~o·.Jhat reluctant to tc:d~e on these cases, since the
risk is shared equally-- and not ..;ust carried ":-J:r t!-le ~ atient .
He says:
The quE::stion then arises '·:h etr~cr tr.e ":.l-:era0 ist is r:repared to risk havin r: Lis c onvictions dashed. a :1d shc:.:.tercd
against the truth of the nat ;_ent. If h e ._-:ants ":. ·: ;:" ') on
treating the r~a ti ent he mi.Ist ab ;3 ndon a~l, r.r~c 0~~ c ei vect
notions and, f or ~ette~ or ~orse, r o w1~n tDn 1n search
of the relL::ions am··- ni ;ilo.sorhi.cal ide?.s that '::Jest . corres~ond to the patient 1 f.3 -er.:otional states . '1'l.".ese J.de&.s

:j

I,
IJ

6lrbid., par . 11.

62rhid.

64Ibid., par. 21 .

65rbid ., uar . 240 .

-

63Ibid.

,I,,t·
II

'

:j
I

!

147
presen~ themselves i~ archetypal form, freshly sprung
from tne maternal so1l whence all religious and philo~ophical systems originally came.
But if the therapist
1~ not prepared to have his ~onvictions called in quest1on for the sake of the pat1ent, then there is some
reason for doubting the stability of his basic
attitude.6 6

The search, he says, therefore, must be for religious and
philosophical ideas which almost seems to be a return to a
philosophy joined with the tool of dial-e ctic.

If so, it can

be expected that a new kind of Platonic philosophy will
emerge.

Yet, Jung does not deal with the perplexities of the

understanding, nor the contradictions within reason as do·es
the Platonic dialectic f'or Jung's course is different.

He

seeks for the archetypal images that, presumably, represent
these ideas.

Jung has a dialectic, only the object is not

Platonic since it is the "dialectical development of the
mythological material which is alive in the sick man himself,
regardless of history and tradition.n67

Confronted with the

mythological images of the patient, Jung has to risk treatment
and attempt to understand these images in a joint effort \<lith
the patient.

This methodology may be pragmatically success·ful

in psychotherapy, but. it does-n 't really matter if it is or
isn't, for what is of
dream S)'Illbols?

L~portance

is: Why he had recourse to

Jung says it is because, with these s·pecial

cases, "all rational therapy leaves them stuck where

66rbid., par. 184.

67rbid., par. 22.

th~J

•
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were.n68

It wou ld b e interesting to diccover just what

rational techniques he employed thnt fa 1· led.
are not noted.

Jun~
u

BO\·tever, they

wr1.-~.... .es au1.te
·
!'rankly of the orir:tns and

development of his system so it is possible to retrace the
steps that brought hirn to choose dream analysis. 69

lie says

that he is not tied to any mysterious dr-eam theory that dictates the outcome of every dream?O but states,_ quite candidly,
it derives "quite simply from perplexity.

I do not know ":here

else to go for help, and so I try to find it in drea~•s.n71
Here in dreams is somethin,; definite \>thatever its nature or
intelligibility "and that is better than nothinr.n72

In short,

he nshares all your prejudices aeainst dream-interpretation
as the quintessence of uncertainty and arbitrariness. n7J

His

choice of the dream rests on ~raEffiatic consideration:

• • • on the other handr I know that if we meditate
on a drea;1l sufficiently lonr; and thorour,hly, if we carry
it around \'lith us and turn it over and over, so~1 ethinr,
almost always comes of- it. 74
The reply might be that i i one ":ere to neditate on anythine,
any object at all, the same

thin~ would be s ai d--the oucstion

"
\'rould be to determine ,.lhat is the therapeutic e 1 er.1ent'
the content of the dream or the

proces~

of the meditation:

Jung does not pursue this line of inquiry.

72 rbid.
-

68rbid.

69Ibid.,
73rbid.

par.

£6.

74Ibid.

Is it

-

70rbid.

The reason

r.e

149
holds to this method is that:
• • • I must content myself wholly '\"lith the fact that
and sets his
on:...y one criterJ.on for the result of my labours: Does it work775
t~e r~sult r;zeans S'.)methinr:; to the r>atient
lJ.f~ 1.n motl.on aeain.
.I may allow myself

But just '\'that is it that lr.'Orks"i
factor?

In ":hnt lies the curative

Having accepted dreams, he discovers difficulties in

his choice, for some dreams are "sometimes incredibly strange
and baffling.n76

Therefore he turns to orL~itive ~sycholor,y,

mythology, archaeology, and comparative relir:-ion, "because
these fields offer me invaluable

analo~ies

enrich the associations of my patients.n77

with '\'lhich I can
At this point,

one can only wonder if Jung considers the "merely" loeical
point that the dreams may be incidental to the rich material
\-:ith which he analogi.zes and the curative element may simply
be in forcing the patient to think more profoundly not about
the dream symbol but with the material Junr, brings to it.

If

so, then why not deal directly through the understanding and
seek to resolve the op~osition to these ideas as in a genuine
dialectical

encounter~

On the other hand,. one mir;ht be led to the belief that
Jung has a drea~-theory, similar to a lo;,ic machine where
information is cranked in and the results automatically produced.

But he, himself, does not subscribe to t~is belief,

75I.bid.

-

76rbid., par. 90.

_.,

77IbJ..d

oar. 96.
.
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because "the therapist should give u r nl ~ tis t.heorct ical
ascumptions and should in every ca~e
:v..-;;
,b re~dy
~
...
to

totally new theory of drearne .u78

C"~nstr~ct

a

Ee amplifies Lis vic\..- 'ft::cn

he writes79 that the initial dreams arc often lucid, an indication that analysis has not touched "some i.!nportant layer of
the personality" and the measure of the depth of the analysis

is readily .measured by the opaqueness wl':ich at this

ti: ~:e,

"if

the doctor no longer understnnds the situ-

the truth. be told,

ation as a \'lhole. ttSO

He continuer. in a perfect ad hoc arru-

ment:
• • • that he does not understand is r.roved by the
:fact that the dreams become incr c asir:r:ly ooscurc, f:)r
,'fe all kno\"1 that their "obscurity" is a nurely subjective opinion of the docto::r;:. To the undcrstar.dinr
nothing is obscure; • • .sl
and, with an interesting time referencef dreams finally
reveal their clarity:

from a later stage o!: treatmen~ or- fr?m
a d.ista~ce ~f s~me yearn, "\'le l .ook bnck at t1!ese ..un.l~-~c~:
ligible dreams, v1 e are often astounded at our o ... n o H 1
ness .• 82
if

Jung' s ttconfes~ion" that te does not kno\'T \':!1ere el~ e to r,o-and so he went ·to the drear.1 Horld--must be ·looked u~'on
an element of

.

. on

susp~c1

+'or te is cuite knm·:ledr:e;:!b2.e about.
, ...
·
.
4n considerinr tte psycholo~y o~ ttc

Indian philosophy, "ar.d ..

78Ibid_. ,. par. 317-.

80 Ibid.

- ·

flibid.

79rb :.a.,

82Ibid.

-

~ar.

JlJ ..
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self we would do well to have recourse to the treasures of
Indian wisdom, nB3 and n~te can iearn a great deal from yoga
philosophy and turn it to pra.c·tical account .. n t.4
With these considerations : me mit:;ht still legitimately
\'TOnder why he did not pursue a psychology alone meditative
lines.

The only reason he gives is that the ideas of Alchemy

are richer in their extraordinary symbolism$5 and this
affords Jung an opportunity· to find a resolution of the content of the dream symbol in the matrix of Alchemy, i.e.,
assuming a value to dream
in Alchemy.

S)~bols,

he pursues the same motif

He is aware of all the burdens involved in

reviving the study of Alchemy, .86 is aware of the shortcomings
of dream-analysis, of the dangers the therapist must risk in
applying the analysis and of the merely "pragmatic" function
of his system as a 1·Jhole,_ but he chooses- this rather than a
formal system of meditation or a straightfon~ard dialectical
procedure-1-.rhich deals directly with the understandine; . .
Further, the meditative and philosophical discipline involves
a relationship between a student and teacher while the Alchemist is a solitary figure 1-rith practically no communication
even \'Jith other me.rnb crs of his craft. 87

The essential element

85rbid.

-

$7c. G. Jung, Psycholo.gy and Alchemy, trans. R. F. C•
Hull (Val. XII., Bollingen Series, XX.
Books, 1953), par. 301.

New York: Pantheon
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in the therapy process is the therapist, as is the teacher in
philosophy, but this is altogether missing in Alchemy.

There-

fore, it seems Jung is tied to the medical sciences, to
European institutions, and to the use of fictions whos-e sole
value lies in_ their pragmatic usefulness--even though just
what it is that is "pragmatic" is still open to question.
His value here is that he has contributed. to the- revival of
dialectic and posits an end for man similar to other mystics,
while at the same time does much to offer an alternative to
Christianity and thereby helps educate the European from his
narcissistic bent.
In concluding, then., it is manifestly clear that ·the
Jungian ·therapist fUnctions as a midwife in the capacity of
"matchmaker"--sendine patients to others--but not directly as
the "examiner" sinc-e he does not bring to birth those who ar-e
pregnant in the soul.

He also acknowledges a similar end for

man as the Platonist and Christian mystic.

And it also

~eems

he, as does the Augustinian,_ misunderstands Plato and the
scope available for dialectic--or the Socrati-c Method, as Jung
calls it.88
Further, the Platonic catharsis is the effect of the
effective removal of ignorance, the uncovering of half-truths,

88c. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical.Psychology
trans. R. F. c. H_u ll TVol. VII, BOllingen Ser~es, XX. New
York:: Pantheon Books, 195J), pars. 24 and 2(£).
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ambiguities, and falsehoods within the ·understandin~ by use
of the tool of dialectic.

To the Jungian Analyst, and to the

Christian, the concept of catharsis is differ-ent--to then it
is the result of the confession of past deeds and thoughts
considered as violations of the m.o ral code. $9
k~pt

secret.

These 2cts are

Being concealed, they isolate the individual

from the community--he participates but is in exile.

Afraid

that the secret will be known, he builds v1ithin himself a
sense of guilt and fear.

Hence the dynamics of the confes-

sional:· the fear, guilt, suspicion, and isolation become
intense and they live on as suppressed feelin ~s so that if
·the "sinner" could only share the secret with someone he would
thereby give up the very conditions of his own makimr,, i.e.,
the suppressed feelings and secret, and re-enter the moral
community.

The Church acted as the impersonal moral a~ent,

the confessor, and would, by its own inner laws, keep the
secret from the community.

It is undoubte-d ly a fact that for

some individuals this confessional catharsis does have a curative aspect and the -results are often astonishing.

But such

a device breeds its o1tm negative aspect: confessinp; ties ·the

89Junr.r
"\-a"ites in -The Practice -~
of Psvcbotherapy, _
on.
t"~
....."
cit., however, that "had catharsis proved itself a panacea,_
psychology "\•:ould have remained at the l?ve~ o:f tl:e confess~ on •
oar. 13 7. \'lhich is to say that the Chr~st~an frame1tr~rk ?f
belief is inadequate to meet the challenge of resolv~ng ~nner
tensions uncovered during psychotherapy, except for what Jung
terms merely a collective adaptation.
pars. 2 and 21.

cr.
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individual to his confessor which produces the phenomenon
termed the ""transference-. n

Naturally this problem is mini-

mized when the Church is the confessor, but \':hen th.e analyst
takes on this role he cannot hide his identity and hence the
serious nature of the burden of the transference takes place.
Actually this rests upon t\'ro different concepts of man--the
Platonist vie\'l that man is naturally good and the problem is
to remove the impediments to that good, while to the Christian,
man is in a "fallen state of original sin" and salvation is
the result of an act of faith, a repentance of sins, and a
belief in the mediator.

Hence it can be seen that the thera-

pist has assumed the role of the confessional pursuing a
catharsis, which does not affect the understanding directly_,
for the liberation of the suppressed

e~otions.

Returning to

the fixation, or the transference, the removal of t .his is
accomplished by bringing the individual to examine the attachment itself, i.e., educate the individual to see i ·ntelliF; ently
and emotionally directly th.e pattern of his own projections.
This accomplished, the therapy may conclude itself, but Jung
says that it may al.so contir.ue.

If so, this next stage he

calls the transformation, "the step from education to selfeducation is a logical advance that completes the earlier
stages .n90

The reauirement for this stage is the counter•

90Jung, ~ Practice of Psychotheraoy, 2£• cit.,
par. 170.
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application to the doctor to which "he says. that "as soon as
psychotherapy takes the doctor hims·e·l f for its subject, it
transcends its medical origins and ceases to be merely a
method for treating the sick.n91

Recognizing this basic

di.fference from the other stages, he nevertheless utilize-s
the same structure; therefore, it may be termed a philosophical quest employing psychological tools and methods.

The

critBrion for selection of his technique, rather than
strictly philosophic tool.s, has been noted previously.9Z
What is left to be said ·i ·s that he, or others, have yet to
test cla-s sic philosophic tools, dialectic and reason, for
this fourth stage of transformation, and only when this is
done can psychology truly enter into philosophy and Jung can
lay just claim to Athens.

9lrbid., par. 174·

92cr. ante, pp. 147-154·

CHAPTER IV
DIALECTIC AND CONTEMPLATION
I.

FOREWORD

To this point, the shortcomings of the Dialectic have
not been complemented, or corrected, to produce a more cohesive philosophy.

Hence, this section shall deal with the

classic dialecticians of both Vedanta and Buddhism--Gaudapada,
Sankara, Nagarjuna, and Candrakirti--to determine the extent
of their contributions to this problem.
II.

THE ADVAITA- VEDANTA:

GAUDAP.ADA AND SANKARA

European philosophy is as different from the classic
Greek as it is from the Indian.

One of the basic differences

between European and Indian thought lies in its relation to
morality.

In European thought--witness Kant, Hegel, and

Kierkegaard--it sought to give morality a basis, a justification, and a defense, while in the Advaita Vedanta it is presupposed before the study of philosophy.

The philos.ophical

discipline in the Vedanta has a four~fold prerequisite: discrimination, non-attachment (renunciation), self-control, and
a l-ove of truth.

These four are termed the Sadhana Chatushtaya.l

lswami .Nikhilananda (trans •.) , The Mandukyopanishad with
Gaudapada's Karika and Sankara's Commentary, (Mysore: Sri
Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1949), Preface, p. xxxvii.
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In Vedanta, morality needed no defense; rat"her, it was assumed
to be the very ground of the philosophical quest.

The end of

Vedanta is not the justification of a morality or an ethic,
but truth, in the sense in which Hegel remarked that God and
T·r uth were one.

It may be that a rational def'ense of morality

from the philosophical side is in fact extremely deleterious
in its social consequences since morality is taught and
defended not by its defensibility, but ·by its presentment
of an ideal to be imitated for some desired end.
On the moral side, the Sadhana Chatushtaya is the prerequisite for philosophy and it may reflect the social morality to which the student is a party.

It is considered as a

means, and its ·ultimate usefulness and validity are effective
as guides to action only as long as the quest has not culminated
in the realization of Brahman.

Morality is essentially an

external standard and, hence, the awareness o·f its binding
forc·e is indicative of the presence of a dualistic state of
mind.

But once having realized non-duality, it cannot func-

tion with this externally binding effect.

After the non-dual

is realized, Gaudapada writes, "behave in the world as an
insensible object.nla
This non-dual state even precludes the concept of one
as the knower.

Essentially the state provides no evidence

laibid., Chap. II, Sec. J6.
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for the belief that one is different, or separate

fro~

others.

Hence Sankara adds, "He does not consciously assume the role
of knower."

He continues his comnentary ·with the observa-

tions:
• • • In other words, concentrate your memory on the
realization of non-duality alone. Having kno1tm this nondual Brahman which is free from hunger, etc., unborn and
directly perceptible as the S€lf and which transcends all
codes of human .conduct,. i.-e ... , by attaining to the consciousness that "I am the Suprem.e Brahman," behave with
others as one not knowing the truth; that is to say, l~t
n.o t others know what you are and what you have become ..
Gaudapada presents the morality of a Sannyasin or,
more technically, a Paramahamsa Sannyasin--the realized
person.

It is a morality only in that sense in which a spon-

taneous process can be so judged since it has nothing to do
with

f.ulfillin~S

external obligations and comnitments.

• • • He should have this body and the Atman as his
support and depend upon chances; ie.e •., he sl;ould be
satisfied with those things for his physical wants,
that chance brings him.J
Sankara comments.:
• • • He entirely d-e pends upon circumstances, that
is to say he maintains his body with whatever !ood or
strips or'clothing, etc., are brought to him by mere
chance.4
The law to which the realized person adheres can be

2Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. J6.
3Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 37.

-

Sec. 37.
4Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II,
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considered as a "law unto himself," with the recognition,
however, that the term "himself" is .not a separate egoistic
entity, since it is "free from all desire for external
objects."

\'lisdom brings its own internal source of action or

it would neither be Wisdom nor spring from the

non-dual~

Therefore, the case with Advaita is not the savine of
some ethical standard, but to further the quest of Philosophy
as. a ·pursuit for realization of the non-dual Brahman.
Again, to restate direction, it should be remarked
that the issue here- is the examination of Gaudapada and Sankara from the dialectical perspective.

Hence there will be

no remarks as to \-Ihether Gaudapada or Sankara was a Buddhist·;
or if Sankara's ·writings are consistent or if they contain a
contradiction, e.g., in the comparisons of his commentary of
the Brahma-Sutras and the

Mandukyopanishad~

In European philosophy, the central question inherited
from Kant was the concept of a Transcendental Illusion impossible to

overcome and a bar ·to any direct kno,·lledge of

reality.

Advaita Vedanta not only resolves this issue, but

in so doing clears a field for the dialectical philosophy.
On the other hand, it may be that the proble!!l in understanding Plato's works lies in interpretative insights and an
esthetic judgement of coherence, and therefore, is always
open and plagued by interpretative questions concerning "his
m.eaning."

Indeed, an interpretative criterion is ne.cessary

lCO
for understanding Plato, but not so with the Advaita because
there the content is stated without the dramatic staging,
the play or myths or analogies that have always been a
source of pleasure and confusion to readers of Plato.

In the

Advaita, the pristine purity of the Mandukya has called for
a commentary.

It is a work of only twelve stanzas., to which

Gaudapada added the Karika and on which Sankara commented.$
In comparing it with the Platonic works, it shows the
brevity of the wise while the dialogues show the hand
of the consummate artist conscious of his· talents.

The Karika of Gaudapada added to the Mandukya has
often been called the Mandukyakarika.
divided into four parts:

The entire work is

Agama--because of its scriptural

references; Vaitathya--due to its treatment of illusions;
Advaita--from its concern for unity; and Alatasanti--the
reduction of alternative views by a reductio.

The last three

parts have little to do with the Upanishad directly and represent. Gaudapada's thinking.

In Sankara's introduction to the

Upanishad, he adds a c~~entary in which he summarizes these
four parts:
The first chapter, then, seeks, by dealing specifically
with Vedic texts, to· indicate the ffiraditiona17 means. to·
the realization of the essential nature of Atman and 1s
devoted to the determination of the meaning of Aum. The
.sec.ond chapter seeks rationally to demonstrate the
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unreality of duality; the illusion fduali~YT being
destroyed, th~ knm'lledge. of x:on-dua.lity ,Lb'ecomes evideny,
as the cessat~on of the ~mag~nation of snake, etc., in
the rope reveals the real nature of the rooe. The third
chapter is devoted to the rational demonstration of the
truth of the non-duality, les.t it should, in ltke manner,
be contended to be unreal. The fourth chapter is devoted
to the rational refutation of the other schools of thought
which are antagonistic to the truth as pointed out in the
Vedas and which are opposed to the knm...rledge of the
Ad.vaita Reality, by po.i nting out their falsity on account
of ·their mutual contradiction.5
As might be expected, .s ince the first chapter is a·n
attempt to reconcile the non-dual concept with traditional
scriptural sources, it will have little to advance this study
of dialectic.

However, there is much that is revealing within

this first chapter and therefore it is worth noting its content.

In this chapter, .Sankara forc-ibly states the thesis of

the Advaita in a most un-Kantian fashion:
The object is to realize the knowledge of the oneness
of the name and the thing signified by it. Otherwis·e,
ffihe explanatio!!l that the knowledge of the thing is
dependent on the name, might suggest that the oneness of
the name and the thing is taken only in a figurative
sense. The purpose of the knm..rle~9e of the unity [Or the
name and the thing signified2Y i~ is to simultaneously
remove, by a single effort, Lthe illusion ofl both the
name and the thing and establish {the nature ofl Brahman
which is other than both.6
The intent of this work carries the noblest intentions of
philosophy in that it is both a statement of the Ultimate and
includes an epistemological approach to it.s vindication.

5rbid., Sankara 1 s Commentary, Chap. I, Sec. 1.
6Ibid., Sankara 1 s Commentary, Chap. I, Sec ... 2.
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The concept of Brahman is c-entral to Vedanta and is
understood as Nirguna, without attributes, which when known
the knower recognizes, or rather he is cognizant that there
is .no difference betw-een himself and the Ultimate Reality
referred. to as Brahman.

In this knowing, the conc-e pt of the

individual takes on a new and more profound meanine and is
called the Atman.

And i .t is said that this Atman is Brahman. 7

The phenomenal world seen as dual is different from
the observer and separate from him.

This knower of the dual

is the individual as an ego or Jiva.

Therefore, an insieht

into the non-dual character of reality is dependent upon the
entire structure of the dual ceasing to affect its particularization:
• • • That which has no parts fboundles2J, incomprehensible LWith the aid of the sense~, the cessation of
all phenomena, all bliss and non-dual Aum is the fourth
and verily the same as the Atman... He who knows this
merges his self in the Self.S
To gain this insight into reality, the meditation upon the
symbol "Aum" is used.

J.Und is unified with this syllable9

and results in the knowledge that Aum and Brahman are inseparable.

The stages of psychological, spiritual, or meditative

?Ibid., Chapter II, Section 34·
8Ibid., Chapter I, Section 12.

-

9rbid., Chapter I, Section 12 (25}, p. $6.
should be-llnified with Aum • • • ·"

"The mind
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insight are four-fold.

They correspond to the waking state.

dream state, dreamless sleep, and Turiya:
Turiya is not that whic~ is conscious of the internal
ffiubjectiv.J world, nor that which is cons-cious of the
external ffibjectiviJ world, nor that which is cons-cious
of both, nor that which is a mass all sentiency, nor
that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is
insentient. Lit i~ unseen
any sense oreanJ, not
related to anything, incomprehensible fby the mind7,
uninferable., unthinkable,_ indescribab1e, essentiar'ly of
the nature of consciousness constituting the Self alone,
negation of all phenomena, the Peaceful, all bliss, and
the non-dual. This is \';hat is kno'\'m as the fourth
Lfuriyi!. This is the Atman and it has to be realized.lO

fby

The insight into Atman being Brahman, the non-dual, is
realized by meditation upon Aum, and the resultinr.; stage of
insight is the fourth or Turiya.

The ·philosophical justifi-

cation for this, the first chapter, is its consistency wit-h
the scriptures.

There is no attempt to formulate it along

strictly rational lines, for this is the problem reserved for
the other three chapters.

In Sankara's Co~~entary to the

second chapter, he begins his critique with the statement
that:
It is also eoually possible to determine the unreality
duality through pure reas~ning ; and for
this purpose is begun the second ~ha£ter wh~ch commences
'-1ith the 'llords Vaitathyam ffinreal~ty/ etc .l.L
Lfllusorines~

of

It is common among religious trad.itions to appeal to
their own particular sacred scriptures for validation, but an
appeal to authority- contains no cognitive criteria;- merely

lOibid.~

Chap. I, Sec. 7.

lllb"d
___!....·-' Ch ap. II ,

sec.,
1
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dogmatism.

Hence to find validation of a

reli~ious

work by

reason is rare and an indication or the harmonious blending
of both religion and philosophy.

It is

c~~onplace

to find

sacred scriptures equatine: their particular insieht witl: the
predicates of their creed and it is more often the case that
the cognizer presents the insight within the ter.ns of his own
idea, i.e.,
cepts.

~athin

the accepted traditional relirious con-

To determine the content of the experience outside of

these terms- is as difficult as the attempt is rare.
when Gaudapada

Thus,

says~

He {the inquirei7 co~izes only that idea that is
presented to him. It LAtmarJ assumes t"he form [Or what
is cogniz_eQ? and thus protects .Lthe inquirelj. Posse-ssed
by that [fdei] he realizes it []is the sole essenciJ.-12
It is an attempt to strip the insir,ht from traditional ideas
and provide a fruitful transition from the reli~ious content
of a particular creed t~ universal application by reason
through philoso_p hy.

The introduction of reason fr-ees the

inquirer from the temptin~- possibility of reli~ious dormatism

. I

i

in the belief that, since the realization is apprehended
under the form of his ideaJ it therefore validates the uni~e
truth of that religion.l3

This also precludes a possibility
1
of intolerance of different opinions. 4

12Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 2_9.
13
cr. Chap. II, Sec. 20, through Chap. II1
Ibid.,

14Ibid. ,_ Sankara' 5 Com!:!entary, Chap. II, Sec. 29,
Cf. Chap. IV, Sec. 1.

Sec~ 2e.
,,
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If the nature of Brahman or reality is non-dual, then
the dual, the phenomenal, is unreal.

Its unreality would

constitute no more than dreams and illusionsl5 when seen from
th.e aspect of Brahman.

Again, if there are no valid relations

then there is no dissolution, birth, and no one aspiring for

wisdom; nor a seeker after liberationi nor could there be a
teacher, student, or sacred scriptures .16

If so, and logic

seems to justify such a conclusion, then does that not also
·nec-essitate that reality itself be

non-real~

Sankara answers

that to conceive of such illusions· presuppos·es a: substratum
as the illusion appearing in the rope· as a snake, etc.l7

The

reasoning involved in th i s central argument also gives evidence of the Indian dialectic:
L.Qbjectio!J-·-This analogy is not re~eva:r;t as even the
rope, which is the substratum of the 1mag1nary snake, is
also an imaginary entity.
/Ji."eply]--It is not so. For, upon the disappearance of
the imaginat i on, the unimagined substratum can be reasonably said to exist on account of its unimagined character.
L9bjection7--It may ·be contended that like the imagination· of the snake in the rope, it [the unimaginary substratum? is also unreal.
/lf.epli/--It cannot be so. For it ffirahmanZ is ever
unimagined, because it is like the rope that ~s never the
object of our imagination and is real even before the
knowledge of the unreality of the snake. Furth.e:, the 1.
existence of the subject lkfiower ~r witness7 of ~aginat on

15Ib"d
Chap. II , .S ec~ Jl •
__!_.,

2
16Ib~d.,
--=- Chap. II, Sec. 3 ~

17rbid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. 32.
'

i·
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must be a~it~ed to be antecedent to the
Theref?re lt J.S unreasonable to s , th t L~aeination.
non-exJ.stent.
ay
a such subject is
i9bjectiori7--How can the Scripture if it cannot make
us u~di/erstand the true nature of the belf {Which is nondualJ.t , free our mind fr~~ the idea of dualityi
. ffieply--There is no difficulty. Duality is superJ.mpos·ed unon Atman throur_:h ignorance, like the snake,
e~c., u~on ~he rope.
Eow is it so& I am haPpy, I a~
.mJ.serable, J.gnorant, born, dead, worn out endowed with
body, ~see, I am manifested .and unmanife~ted, the aeent,
~he ~nJoyer, related and unrelated, decayed and old, this
1s m:tnd--these c:nd other such ideas are superimposed upon
Atman. The not1?n of Atman LSel£7 persists in all these,
bec~use no such 1dea CRn ever be conceived of without the
not1?n of Atman. It is like the notion of the rope which
persJ.sts in .Lall superimposed. ideas, such aif the .snake,
the water-l1ne, etc. Such be1ng the case, the Scripture
has no function with regard to the Atman :~;Jhich, beinp; of
the nature of the substantive, is ever self-evident. The
function of the Scripture is to accomplish that which is
not accomplished yet. It does not serve the purpos·e of
evidence. if it is to establish what has been already
established. The Atman does not realize its own natural
condition on account of such obstac-les as the notion of
happin.e ss, etc., superimnosed by ignorance; and the true
nature is realized only when one knows it as such. It is
therefore the Scripture_, v-!hose purpose is to remove the
idea of happiness, etc. fassociated with Atma£7 that produces the consciousness of the not-happy LI.e.,attributeless7 nature of Atman by such statements as "Not this"
"Not this, n n [ft iiJ' not gross." etc. Like the persistence
of Atman lin all states of consciousnes~ the not-happy
[attributelesil characteristic of Atman does ~ot inher~
in all ideas such as of being happy and the l:tke. If 1t
were so, then one would not have su~h specific experien~e
as that of being happy, etc., superl.mposed upon Atman, ~n
the same manner as coldness cannot be associated with fire
v-1hose specific characteristic is that of heat. It is,
therefore that such specific characteristics as that of
being hap~y_, etc e., are imai;in:d in Atman -. .~ hie~ is,
undoubtedly, without any attrJ.butes •. The Scr1ptural
teachings which speak of Atnan as ?el.nf. not-h~ppy, etc.,
are meant for the purpose of remov1n~ the n?t~on that
Atman is associated with such S?ecif~c attr:tb~te~ as _
happiness, etc. There is the follow~!lg aph?r~st1c stat~
ment by the kno1r.rers of the Agama: "Tne val~d~ty of ScrJ.pture is established by its negat1.ng all pos1t1 ve charac'.

I .
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teristics of Atma~ .LW'hich otherwise cannot be indicated
by· Scripture~.nl8
It will be advisable to compare this example of dialectic
~-:ith

another case for a joint analysis.

The second chapter

on illusion establishes that duality does not really exist,
by illustrations of "dreams, magic castle-in-the-air, etc .. ,."
and in the third chapter the object is to determine whether
non-duality can be established by reason.

The similar func-

tion of reason is employed and therefore the

exa~ple

prBvi-

ously noted is indicative o:f this third chapter as wd l.

In

the fourth and last chapter, Sankara employs .reason along
different lines.

He says:

Now is undertaken the chapter styled Alatasanti in
order to conclude the final examination for the establishment of the philosophy of the Advaita, by following the
orocess kno\\'11 as the method of disae;reement, which is
done by sho\"rinr; here in detail that other systems cannot
be said ·to be true philosoph!. For there are mutual contradictions implied in them. 9
An example of this usage is quite clear \'.'hen Gaudapada ";rites:

I1 the world is admitted to be beginningless Las some
disputants asser:!J" then it cannot be non-eternal. r-:oksha ,
or liberation, cannot have a beeinnine and be eterna1.20
nnd Sankara adds the corru:1entary:

18rbid ... , Chap. II, Sec.. 32.
1 9rbid., Chap. IV, Sec.

1~

20 Ibid •., Chap. IV, Sec.

JO.
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_Her~

is another defect in the arguments of those who
that. the A~man is, in reality, subject to both
bondage and l1berat~on. If the v;orld lJ.
the state of
bondag-e of ~he Atman7 be without beginninr, or a definite
past, then 1ts end cannot be established by any logical
reasonin~.
In ardinary experience, there is no instance
of an obJect "\-Ihich has no beginnin~ but has an end.

ma1nt2. ~n

.e.,

,LObjectio!!l'--'-,; e see a break in the beginningless continuity of the relation of the seed and the sprout.
Laepli7--This illustration has no validity; for, the
seed and the sprout do not constitute a single entity~
In like manner, liberat·ion cannot be said to have no end
if it be as~erted that liberation v:hich is attained by
acquisition of knowledge has a Ldefinite7 beginnir-g. For,
the jar, etc., "V-ii.:ich have a beginning have also an end.
£Pbjection7--There is no defect in our argument as
liberation,_ not bein~ any substance,. may be like the
d.estruction of a _jar, ·etc.
l[epli7--In that case it will contradict your proposition that liberation has a positive existence from the
standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. Further, liberation
being- a non-entit2i like the horn of a hare cannot ever·
have a beginning.
The dialectic displayed in the section on illusion,
chapter two, indicates a hifc:her framevmrk of reference.

In

the reply to each objection, the follm·ling can r-eadily be
seen:

1.

It demonstrates the reasonableness of the premise
on the basis of a more critical analysis of the
analogy.

.2 .

It shows the acceptable nature of the premise by
noting the presupposition implicit in the
assertion.

3.

This reply is an attempt to acquaint the objector

21Ibid., Chap. IV, Sec. JO, Sankara 1 s Commentary.

-
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wit~ the function of the scriptures in its role
of ln~tructor, i.e., it points to the moon and if

one Wlshes_to see! thEn one must follow the finger;
or t.t.? scrlpture lS .not itself the kno'ftled.r;e in
t~a~ lt does not reveal the nature of Atman. only
llrnlts predicates.
There is no evidence here of dialectic·; not all dialoeues nor
a ll discussions are dialectical.

~~ather,

sen~e

in vhic h a posi-

acce~ted

truths or from a

the conclusion of an informant in that
tion is corrected from either prior
vantage point of a hi~her learninc.

the evidence supports

True, there is an appeal

for reason to exami.ne its state.'!lent.s with more care: i.e., to
:I

ex amine the analog y, to be cognizant of the nature of pre-sup-

I

positions as ~rell as to distinguish betv:een a si p- n and its
referrent.

lj

The acceptance of the repl_ies to the argument, by

the objector, is dependent upon his o"m faculties.
incumbent upon him to validate the content.

I.

It is

It is, as it

1-1ere, the individual '-Iho has the obligation to accept the
reply and reject his own objection.

The objector either does

or does not object depending purely upon tLe force of his

resources~

O\'m

This technique, of course, is not new or novel.

It is the familiar pedagogical approach to knm·Jledge--the
teacher knows and the student need only come '\ofit!-: cap in hand
to receive the "correct" teachings.

Whatever difficulties he

might have, either ,,rith the answer or 1·: ith his m·m puzzling
object·ions, he must accept these "correct notions •"

At,ain,

I

i

i

this is not to say that the answers are not correct, only that

I~
I·
~

!

0

1

'

[

I

•
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there is no attempt to engar>:e the individual on a- personal
basis of dialectic·,

no a t t empt to dra"1 out his O"L-:n statements

as a preliminary to the knowing process; no atte.~ipt to draw
the "correct" notion fror1 him as in Plato's Thea·etetus.

T.r.e

use of reason. is th2.t of a higher truth co!'"rect :i.nr; the assertions of objectors in the same manner as a student's test
paper is graded.

The answer may indeed be corrected, but

there is still the problem of v1hy the ob.iection

W;J.s

lated in the manner in which the error was framed.

constel-

If the

cause of the error remains, then presumably it can ar.ain
reappear in another form.

There is no indication that these

objections are basic in the mind of the objector:
v1ere the case, it '\I'Wuld,

If tr.at

of course, be more curativ-e .

There--

-1

fore, from these points it is clear that there is no dial·ec.t ic
in operation in this section.

The fourth chapter, that Fives promise of a dialectic,
needs analysis and can be rewritten as:
~tatemen~--As the ~orld has no be[innin~ ~o too
liberation has no b~~inning and tt8refore c~nnot be

finite [r1on-eterna1J •
ffiommeny--If something has no beginnim:: t.hen it
cannot be reasonably sr.o"m to have an end.
the contrary look at t~e ex2. :~rl_e o~
the se~d and the sprout ''~hich, though ~d.·~utted h to ~~e~~
a beginningless relationship--one turn1n~ on.tde o
it can be seen to have definite marks or pe·rl..o s.

lJ5b ·ectio!J--On

·
1 · both c~n be seid to have definite
ffieply--But 1f t ley res~ably they do not constitute
per~ods or m~rks, dth~g P they both have a be~in~ir.~.
a s1ngle ent1ty an
en
. I
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. 4Pbjectiori7--Sir~ there is no real objection here for
lt ~s agreed that l~beration is no object that it is no
substance.and may ~e like the non-entity that results in
the break1ng of a Jar made of clay.
ffieply7--Look nov:--if ·i t is admitted that it is a nona hare, tt then surely it cannot
again, if it is true as you say
that lt has deflnlte marks or periods, then hm-1 can something which is aQ~itted to be as an non-entity have such
d-elineations i
ent~ty 11 lii:e ~he lnrn of
have~ beg~nnln~ •. And~

Aside from the -specific cont-ent of the argument hinging upon
the unmet premise that a substance, a jar (or i rr:norance or
bondage, analogically), can be the causative factor in the
nroduction of a "non-entity, n this nevertheless- does provide
an example o_f reason or dialectic in operation.

It is obvious

that the causative question permeates this argument and it is
also clear that it is not treated direc-tly.

If it were, then

th-e argument might have a more far-reaching effect than the
s ·i mple reductio ad absurdum that is here presented.
However, the issue is not the shortcomings of the
argument, but only its availability for testing the presence
of dialectic.

First, there is evidence of critical reason,

as there is throur.;hout the entir-e work, but the question
remains '\'Ihether this is in itself sufficient evidence of dialectic.

The central and most basic distinction that Plato

makes between the disputer and the dialectician should be
rec-alled.

He defines the disputer as one '\'Tho is only able to

.

!

.

draw contradictions from another.22
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The disputer's skill is

I

'

an imitation of one phase of the . art of the dialectician.
The dialectician goes beyond just seeking contradictions.

He

must draw from the student the birth process in his capacity
of a m·idwi.fe.

True, the loe;ical examination for inconsistency

is one phase of the dialectic.

The dialectic, to be completed

then, must move into the birth process.

Further, it is ·to be

remembered that the logical examination of the student's
ideas is subs-equent to the

dra~1ine

out process, i.e., the

birth process and the examination to determine whether the
b.orne is a wind-egg or not.

There is no birth process here

in this work of Gaudapada or Sankara, no involvement of an
intensive dialectic.

II .

Rather, there appears only one side of

dialectic_, i.e-., recalling the passage in the Sophist where
the value of refutat·ion is discussed.

In Plato we found that

l

I.

dialectic is coextensive with his epistemology and hence a
parallel s·tudy is necessary of the epistemological side of
Advaita Vedanta.

I
I ..

I

There are usually two approaches to episte-

I '

: I

.I

mological problems, but one has fallen into disrepute in
Europe for some

ti~e.

Epistemological questions have domi-

~

r_

t .

J.

,

,;i

;

nated European thought since Descartes, with the main question

l"
~-. -Ifl

revolving around the problem of the method and source

-l

22J owett , on.
""Gorgias" 458.

neces~ary

"t ..-, "Phaedow 261·, cf. "Sophist" 232, 225.

c~

-~

..,

'
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fo.r men in general to acquire valid

knowled .~:,e..

The other

auestion is the way that knowledge can be acquired not by men
in general, but by philosophers--those that seek the Good,
Tru~

and Beautiful, or the Absolute in the form of being,

bliss, and consciousness.
different..

Naturally these two approaches are

Hen in general do not acquire kno\'rledge except in

the most conventional sense, since their end is seldom, if
ever, the· quest for knoviledge..

r~en

·in general, in the quest

for knowledge, are concerned with questions of validity, percention, inference, pos·tulation, theories of error, revealed
truth, etc.

Whereas, the philosopher may be aware of these

problems, but his concern is rather for a way to achieve
knoNledge as a direct experience or a way in \vhich direct
realization o..f truths can be achieved.

:I .

Primarily, the

J.iandukya makes the assertion that the mind itself is non-dual
though it appears dual in both dreams and in the waking
state.23

In both these states, consciousness is the highest

reality and is c.ommon to them--common in the sense in which
mind has superimposed upon a substratum (consciousness) the
characteristics of deternrination and volition.

The concep-

tion of Advaita directly attacks the condition of duality and
23Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. JO. "There is no daub~ that
the mind. which is, in. fact, non-dual ap~ears as dual ln
dream; in like manner undoubtedly that which is non-dual,
appears as dual in the wakin~ state also." Cf. nost n. 26.

.I
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invokes a discipline to restrain the ceaseless activity of
the mind, for when the mind ceases to function duality itself
cannot be experienced.24

It could be objected that when the

mind ceases to act,. it can no longer be properly termed the
mind since \'.;hen there is nothing cognized, there can be no
idea of cognition, hence it is illegitimate to invoke the
concept of mind as non-dual.

This is certainly true, but

only when the mind is understood as a facult.y of a self and
therefore different fro:n it.

This is made clear when Cauda-

pada states:
• • • When the mind does not imagine on account of the
knowledge of the Truth which is Atman, then it ceases to
be mind, and becomes free from all idea of cognition, for
want of objects to be cognisect.25
Therefore_, the conc-ept that the mind is non-dual is
not intended to assert when the mind is no longer functioning
as a faculty, but as t ·he ground of the mind itselr.26 Duality

is a function then of the mind's activity for "all modifica2
tions are mere na~es arising from efforts of speech.n 7

24Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. Jl.

25Ibid., Chapter III, Sec. )2.
26rhe translator is not consistent in
term mind is used as c·onscious:1ess (III. 30;
3 4; III. 3 5; IV. 46) and then cl.early not in
other se·ctions (IV. )6; IV. 45, etc.) but as

his

usag~,

for the

I, 12. (25);

this sense in
a faculty.

27IQi£., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. III, Sec. )2.
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Therefore, the central task is to control the mind and free
it from imaginations, since mind itself is the condition of
duality.2$

The conceot of ignorance bec omes embracive,

including within it not only the

illo ~ ical

but the very

structure of duality implicit in the activity of the mind.
To achieve this g oal of control, a techni oue of yoga is
.

employed which is different from other meditative techniques
in that it does not resort to any m.e chanical devices.
paramount tool is dis·cri..-nination.

The

It presupposes the Advaita-

Vedanta teaching of Gaudapada and Sankara and in its application, it vindicates the teaching..

Gaudapada. makes this mani-

festly clear when he lvrites:

'

The mind should be turned. back from the enjoyment of
pleasures, ra-nembering that all this is attended witr.
misery. If it be remembered that everything is· the
unborn ffirahmariJ, the born [<fuality \>till not be seen.29
The teaching as a method becomes as ·i t were the yoga.

The

simplicity of the teachin~ orovides a control or guide in
life, and liTe in turn b-ecomes the condition for its emergene e.

The achievement o-f this state is i ndeed difficult and

would require unrelentine; effort .30

Hov1ever, the teaching

possibly may not be fully fathomed and it might not be

2 $Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. J).
29rbid., Chap. III., Sec. 43.

30Ibid., Chap.

-

--

III~

Sec. 41.

!I i•
I

.I·
II

! I
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realized that the non-dual .s tate 1·n no way
oblivion.

i~p1

ies a state of

It is for this reason that proper means are
1.

stressed_.3l

I

Ironically, the proper me a ns fall back on the

proper understanding of the 'vork itself .32
If, ho\'rever, the I:lind does fall into a state of obliv-

ion, or distraction, it is urged to return it to the state of
tranquillity .33

Onc-e havine; g ained this state, one is

advised not to disturb it.

To accomplish this end, the

intermediate stage of knovTing the desires even in their
potential form is reauired.34

~hen these condit i ons are ful-

filled,
• • • When the mind does not merge in the inactivity
of oblivion, or becor'les distracted by desires, that is to
say, when t~ e mind becomes quiescent and does not rise to
appearances, it verily becomes Brahman.35

!

!II

~

I'

and
• • • This highest bliss is based upon the realisation
of Sel.f, it is oeace, identical with liberation, indescribable and unborn. It is fUrther described as the
omniscient Brahman, becaus-e it is one ~t;~tl: the unborn
Self which is the object by Kno'lr!ledge.3

:I
I

I
I
!
'

3 libid., Chap. III, Sec. 42.
i

3 2 Ibid., Chap ... III, Sec. 43.
JJibid., Chap. III, Sec.

44.

35~., Ch ap. III, Sec. 46.

3 6Ibid., Chap.

III, Sec. 47.

i
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34rbid.
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This should not, hovtever, imply that the object is the
control of the mind.

Control of the mind for fearlessness,

destruction of misery, knowledge of self, and eternal peace
is d-ifferent from the technique noted above.37

Such a method-

ology is dualistic and would acknowledge that the desired
state can only be achieved when the cohtrol is effective.
The technique may not be considered the same, for in the
Advaita the condition would be permanent since the object is
to cleanse the mind of the very propensity, or potentiality,
for such modifications of the mind.

If the control, on the

other hand, were in any way relaxed, the modifications-vrittis--'\"lould reassert themselves ..

Hence the aim is not for

some psychic state, because the vmrld seen in its t _rue character is itself Brap~an.

It is from this perspective that the

student is urged that "Lfhe min£7' should not be allowed to
enjoy the bliss that arises out of the condition of Samadhi. n3 e

,i

I

'

I

II
I

If Samadhi is desired as a separate object, then it would be

contrasted--and thus dual--and if sought to be enjoyed, then

;

I

.

I

, I

.I

still attached to the opposites of desire and aversion-'lrrhereas in the perf-ect state, it is not meant to -b-e "enjoyed •"
Sankara has added an excellent commentary to this lastmentioned Karika of Gaudapada (Chap. III, Sec. 40), drawing

3 7ill.£ •., Cha_p. I II, Sec. 40 ..

38Ibid .. , Chap. III, Sec. 45.
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the distinction between these different approaches to Reality.
Primarily, he makes the significant point that when the mi·nd
and sense organs are regarded as "seen apart from their
identity with the very nature of Brahman, as mere imagination,•
then it is that these men,
• • • who look upon themselves as of the very nature
Brahman, spontaneously enjoy, as quite natural to them,
fearlessness and eternal peace known -as freedom for ·which
they do not depend upon. any mechanical effort.

or

For this discipline, however, "no duty Lerro~, whatsoeveri
exists for the Jnani. nJ 9

Sankara acknowledges, on the other

hand, that those who look upon Atman as separate,. "who possess
inferior or middling underst-a nding·," can experience fearlessness and destruction of misery as a result of the dis.cipline

I

.

·II
I '

of the mind..

But, however, "if the mind, /JonsidereQ.7 related

to Atman, becomes active," then they can never experience these
states.

Sankara concludes with the statement:

• • • Besides, their knowledge of self is dependent on
their control of the mind. And similarly, eternal peace,
known as :Moksha [Or lib.eratio.!ll, in their case, depends
upon mental discipline.40
Hence this section ·is consistent with Advaita-

39Jnani, a term used for the yogi who follows the
discipline outlined in this Upanishad. This yoga is also termed
Asparsayoga. "N·o salutation is made to the Yoga taught by
the Advaita Philos·ophy, in order to extol it. The word
.
Asparsayoga in the text means the Yoga.whic~ is.always a~d 1n
all respects free from sparsa or relat1onsh1p w~th anyt~lng
and which is of the· same nature as Brahman. Thl.s Yoga l.S
well known as the Asparsayoga to all Knowers of Brahman." ~.,
Chap. IV, Sec. 2, Sankara's Camn·entary.
40rbid.• , Chap. IV, Sec. 5, Sankara's Commentary.

:I
I

'

' i
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Vedanta, for the error of the dualistic yop,a lies in the
assumption of the mind as separate from Bra hm~ an.

j
•i

But the

Jnani sees t _he identity of mind and Brahman, hence does not
seek for control of the mind.

This vie\"! is borne out in

Gaudapada 1 s statements:
• • • L,Thi~ Atman. ii( b~o~d all expression by words,
beyond all acvs of mlnd, Lit ~il all f;Cace, eternal effulg-ence free from activit_y, and fear and attainable by
concentrated unders~anding Lof the Jiv~.4l
and,
... • • In that Brahman l'thich is free from all acts of
mi-nd there is ne-ither any idea of acceptance nor any
id-ea of giving up [Of anything_7. Estn.bl ished in the
Atman ffielfl, knowledge attains to the stat-e of birthlessness and sameness, that is to say, chanr;elessness.42
Three elements are joined ·together in Advaita-Vedanta

- I' ''
I

'

and each in turn complements the others.

The test of the

truth of the Advaita-Vedanta is corroborated by scriptural
evidence, reasoning, and personal experience.

If it v:ere to

i-

I

rely on the scriptures alone, it would be no more than belief
or faith and, as often hap~ens, deg enerate into dogmatism.
Reason may arrive at the concept of Atman, but may not lift
itself above the soeculative.

On the other hand, it may

degenerate into a rationalization of a private set of beliefs.
Personal experience, as such, with all the certainty· of the

41Ibid., Chap. III, Sec.

37.

42Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 38.

.!

.
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personal experienc-e can offer nothing more than dogmatic pr-onounc.ements and is incapable in itself of correcting the
tendency to\'tards self-deception.

In the three-fold method,

ho,·Tever, the very notion of dogmatic pronouncements being
uttered would be contradictory to the

thesi~

itself.

Or,

stated in other tenns, the self to ,,Ihich the crime of deception is being fixed is nowhere in evidence:. The factors that
nourish deception have been detected and destroyed.

(This is

also vindicated in the morality of the Advaita mentioned in a
nrevious section.)

Christian metaphysics is an example of

the twin efforts of reason and scripture with priority p;iv·e n
to the scriptures.

In the V"edanta, the student is first

,I

taught the scriptures, to reason upon them and attempt to

I

I

experience the content within the discinltne of his contemplation.

The student is warned that "the Self cannot be known

!

.j

'

.

. I

by study of the Vedas aloneAn43

The epistemological side of

Advaita-Vedanta develops questions that were not even entertained by Plato.
:··

In the Symposium, Plato's meditative steps

or stages involve the use of mechanical or external devices
,,I:·lich from. Sankara 's view is a disadvantage in that it assumes
obstacles which later must be resolvect.44

It is not a ques-

43swami Nikhilananda (trans.), The Unanis·hads {Ne1tr
York: Harper and Brot.hers Publishers, 1949): I, "Katha
Upanishad," I .. ii. 23, p. 143·

44sankara does not discredit a dualistic yoga as such

..

.
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tion of which is more. eff'icac-ious, but \•;hich can insure the
permanent possession of the object---knO\iledge.

Recognizing

,;

~

the advantage of the one over the other leads to a major
issue.

Is it pos s ible to add to dialectic Sankara's episte-

molo~ical

approach and still have consistencyl

Can the

asparsayoga be viewed dialectically and thereby add to it
t h is immeasurable advantage$

To this last cuestion, the

issue would be Vlhether dialectic can re."!love the conc-eptual
errors as well as the seeds of future- acts that may either
restore or add to man's state an additional increment of
ignorance.

But the

linkin~

of the Platonic art of contem-

plation with dialectic indicates that it should not be separated from it.
The asparsayoga of Vedanta recuires a continual examination of dualistic. thought patterns and silences them by
understanding.

The term ·nunders·tanding" is the key· in the

I

'- I

-'

asparsayoga, for understanding is a result of the prior nrocess of discrimination.

"\'i hat we have called dialectic is the

movement of discrimination in lan~uage, or rather in understanding , correcting it and r~oving ignorance, and at the
same time it is also the belief in reason, tha.t reason
through discrimination can undercut its m-~n processes.

There

for he is fully aware of the need when it is a function of
the understanding. Cf. his commentary, in :dkhilananda, ~
}!Iandukyopanishad, .£E.• cit., Chap. III, Sec. 40.

' I
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is no attempt to control the mind, only to allow the understanding to discern the identity which lies at its base; this
is the task of discriminatl·on.

Plat o was un d oubtedly correct

in not separating dialectic and cant en:t!)lation,- but he did
nevertheless separate it as a consistent activity with the
dialectic:

The retreat into models for the contcmnlative

!netted leaves the discri.l'!linative role only to the outer dialectic, whereas the role of the

understandi~~ ~n

this asparasa-

yoga is the

~ararnount

dialect-ic.

True, the outv.rard form of the dialectic (verbal)

employment of discrimination as an inner

and the inner, as contemplation, bear a close structural
similarity,. but it has a different focus of attention.

The

addition of this technique of the Advaita ~~phasis on continuine discriinination (if on-e can be rash enough to call it a
technique) to the dialectic \'J'Ould not only make it a consistent system, but would also ha.ve the advantages of a direct,
uncluttered, and extremely profound carry-over of the very

:

. ~

. i

same activity into the conte.'!l?Jlative.

The concition for the

direct experience is operative ·i n both cases--discrinination-and by its continual m::)V ement and exercise the realization is
deoendent upon the total reduction of ipnorance, i.e., d~ality.
T!:e inner movement of the dialectic vwuld c-onclude in an acti vity beyond words and form, and even the silent monolo~~ue v:ould
reduce itself to "concentrated understanding," thereby r.;iving
birth to the intuitive.

Henc-e this ,.;rould be a hif,her contem-

- I
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plation and "inner dialectic" because of the question and
answer quest, though

silent, is in fact critical reason con-

i

!::

frontin~

its own content.

..

The p rocess itself is a catharsis

that Plato would have considered a blessin p; to have knm·m.
.i

There is always a ouestion of ho\'r complete the Flatonic
catharsis actually is, but tb. ere can be
the Advaita- Vedanta.
method and evolve a

Gaudapada and
teachin~

n0

San~·: ara

i

such question 1t:ith
formulate a

!.

that is mor e profound because of

its deeper g rasp of ignorance.

'l'her·efore,. the Advaita does

not further the explicit use of dialectic beyond further
exa..'n?l-es of seeking to uncov·er inc ::msistencies, i.e., lor. ical
analysis, but does provide another conteMplative technioue
consistent with dialectic and bearinc the same form as the
"out·N ard d i alectic.''

r:/here the technique o·f Plato 1 s conte..'n-

plation bears an architectonic similarity '·:ith dialectic,

' :

Advaita-Vedanta asparsayoga has closer ties with the r rocess
as such and therefore an advantage and an i.":lprov em ent beyond
Plato.

III.

J.~AHAYANA BUDDHIS1~I: l'iAGARJUNA AKD CANDRAKIRTI

The Vedanta insight that reality is concei 1.red under

t h e concept utilized in its apprehension car. also be used as
a m.etr.odoloe;ical key for an a n alysis of the para'nount and

fo~ative ideas of a system.

It is fro~ this Ders?ective

that ~.~ar.ayana Buddhism shall be examined.

The centra l idea

. ·1'
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there is Nirvana and it is understood as:
What neither is released, nor is it
ever reached,
What
. neither is annihilation , nor is
l.t eternality_,
What never disappears, nor has it
ever been created,
This is Nirvana, it escapes precision.45
Within Hahayana everything is considered as relative,
hence no real origination or annihilation is :nossible.46

·i
. I

Yet,

if this is so, then there can be no deliverance from ignorance; therefore, no possibility of Nirvana.

On the other

hand, if everything is real, substance, then neither creation
. .i

nor destruction, nor even Nirvana is possible't7 Thus, from
both sides it appears that Nirvana is impossible.
both sides are denied and termed Nirvana:
cis"ion. n48"

Therefore

ttit escapes pre-

Nagarjuna proceeds further in his analysis of

:Nirvana and denies that Nirvana is a kind of ens, then not an
ens, neither both and neither together simultaneously:

f:

t

45Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conceotion of Bud :.~ hist I-~irvana,
including trans. of Madhyamika-Sastra O·~ula-1·-:adhyamika Karikas) of Nagarjuna and the l'ot!adhyamika-vritti (Prasafolnapada}
(Leningrad: Publishing Office of the Academy of Sc1ences of
the U.s.s . . R., 1927), 25th Chapter of l·Iadhyamika-Sastra, .Sec.

~

III.
4 6Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. I--XIV.

47rbid., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV.
48rbid., 25th Chap., .Sec. III •
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The Buddha has declared
That Ens and non-Ens sh~uld both be
rejected.
Neither as Ens nor as a n0n-Ens
Nirvana therefore is conceived.

.!

If Nirvana were both

Ens and non-Ens
Final deliverance would be alEc both '
Reality· and unreality tog ether,
'
This never could be possible.
;i

and,
If Nirvana is neither Ens nor non-Ens
No one can really understand
This doctrine which proclaims at once
Negation of them both together. 4-9
This standpoint carried through to its limit would
na turally assert no difference between Nirvana and Samsara,
or Reality and the Phenomenal.

If no distinctions, then no

dema rkation of ends or ideals can be contrasted.

\'Jith this

Nagarj_una concurs:.

I

I

'I
!

There is no difference at all
Between Nirvana and Sarnsara
There is no difference at all
Between Samsara and Nirvana.
Nhat makes the limit of Nirvana
Is also then the limit of Samsara,
Between the two we cannot fi·nd
'l'he s l i ghtest shade of difference.• 50

1

I

The terms in this analysis are suspect themselves and,
if a conviction can be had on a suspicion, not even this much

l

1:.: I
~

can be said.

: I

~·

To speak in any valid sense of "difference"
:i

' .

'

.. ' i
49Ibid., 25th Chap., Sees. X, XI, XII, PP• 75-76.
50rbid., 25th Chap., Sees. XIXF XX, P· 77·

-

/I
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'

\
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.: I

!I 'r ~~\.
!
i
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•j ;

. I

assumes a distinction between identity and difference and
assuming this, then even if the above comment of "no dirference at all between Samsara and Nirvana" can be affirmed_, the
terms of comparison must therefore be said to be valid.

But

even these, the terms of identity and difference, are finally
reduced to absurdity.

Nagarjuna concludes his twenty-fifth

ch apter of the I'.'J:adhyamika--Sastra with the lines:
\'!hat is identity, and what is difference?
vlhat is eternity, and what non-eternityt
vlhat means eternity and non-eternity together,
What means ner,ation of both issues?
The Bliss consists in t he cessation of all
thought,
In the Quiescence of Plurality.
No L5eparati7 Reality was Ptrached at all,
Nowhere and none by Buddha-. )
In the Advaita-Vedanta as well as in the

~1adhyamika,

concepts like orig ination, annihilation, deliverance, creation,
destruction,

eternality-~'

non-eternality, death, de-c ay, cause

and effect, independency, phenomenality, and any

~redicate

of

reality that can be said to uniquely qualify or particularize
Reality, is- rejected.

Hence, both systems have a share in

t h e profundity of their grasp of the critical side of reason.
Gaudapada and Sankara are the basic thinkers of Advaita
while Nagarjuna and Candrakirti are considered_to b e the
foundation stones of the ;L :ahayana with the1r "mrks of the

5lrbid., 25th Chap.,- Sees. XXIII, XXIV, p. ?B.
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r~·:adhyamika-Sastra

!_

: I;

i'

(Hula-:r.Iadhyamika-Karikas) and the Jli:adhyaJ

II
I

mika-vrtti (Prasannapada).
Candrakirti provides a commentary on Nagarjuna's work.
The Nahayanistic concept of Nirvana based on Nagarjuna furnishes an excellent occasion for a Candrakirti commentary.
This can be seen in Candrakirti' s ansvJer to the question:

:I
I
!
l

fJ.

• • • Now if the Universe is really suc-h
Unity, if
it is no pluralit-y, how is it then that our ~mnp.;ination
has built up defilers,
an illusion of personal
identity and desires7 through a suppression of which
Nirvana is supposed to be attainedl Or how is it that
our imagination. has built up separate elements throur:h
the annihilation of which Nirvana reveals itself?52

LI.e.,

J
I j

,.

1• • •

Candrakirti states that "as long as these constructions of
our imagination exist, Nirvana cannot be reached, si·nce it .is
reached just through a suppression of all Plurality. n53

An

'. L
'

t:

-4!

' I :
:·
' I' : ,

I i :. :

anonymous objector recognizes a g.ood point and replies that
"it may be as you say, but surely the defiling elements or
elements in general do not exist when Nirvana is reached--but
before Nirvana is reached they must exist and Nirvana is only
possible through their annihilation.n54

(The objector returns

:

t

' I

:!:

:: ;~ Il
~

I

,

li! ~

and there appears a form of dia1ogue capable of analysis for

t' ~

dialectical content.)

. ,_:
. .

,

.

.r (
lj,

li

l

52rbid., 25th Chap. Sec. II, 521.14, p. 167.
53rbid., 25th Chap. Sec.
54-rbid., 25th Chap., Sec.

II, 522. 2, p.
II,

H~7.

522.,3, p. 187.
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A~ objectio~ is_raised.
If this is so {Will it not be
possl.b;e tc: ma1nta1.z: thay Nirvana has been denied by the
Bud~ha.
vJ.1.~l not h1.s doctrine be absolutely useless,
L£h1.s doctr~ne \'Jhic!V establishes correspondi·ne antidotes
f?r every k1.nd ?f worldly career· in order to enable· mankl.nd. to re~ch l'hrvana. \'l e ans\ver. This critic ism would
?e r1ght, 1.f there were any absolutely real doctrine, or
1f there were an~{ ,Labsolutely rea1] beinp;s v.;i:ich ,,..m1ld
attend to th~s.law, or if there were any - absolutely real
teacher, a d1.v1.ne Buddha. But [Since in a monistic
Universe that does not exist, we are not hit by your
accusatiori/!

Our bliss consists in the cessation of all
thoueht,
In the quiescence of Plurality.
To nobody a-nd nowhere no doctrine Labout
separate element27
By Buddha ever has been preac-hed·!
In this case how can the reproach wade above affect
us ! Our vi e"\'1 is that Nirvana. represents Qui esc enc e, i • e.,
the non-applicability of all the variety of names and
ffion-existence o!l particular objects. Th-is very quiescence, so far it is the natural zgenuine7 quiescence LQf
the world7, is called bliss. The quiescence of Plurality
is a1so a bliss because, by putting an end to all defiline
agencies, all individual existences are stopped. It is
also a bliss because, by quenching all defiline; forces,
all instinct Land habits of though!! have been extirpated
without residue. It is also a bliss because, since all
the .objects of knm•rlede;e have died a\-ray, kno.,.,:ledge itself
has also died.
'.tlhen the divine Buddhas have entered blissful r.;irvana
in which all Plurality has vanished, t~ey are like reeal
swans. soa:ing in ~he sky \-Iithout any. sup,.Eort, ~r.ey are
hover1.ng 1.n tl:e w1.nd produced by then" Ltwo7 w1nr.;s, the
wing of accumulated virtue and the wing of accumulated
v:isdom, or they are hovering in the vlind of Space~ E_hat
Space whichl is the Void. 'l'hen [from this elevat1.o!!7
all separate objects having become. indistinguisi;a?le, the
Buddhas have not preached neither about the de-f1l1nr:
elements
life7, nor about its purifying elements,
neither in the divine worlds,. nor in tr~e hur.lan. vwrl~~ neither to e;ods, nor to men. Th1.-s s·h ould be real1zed.

L0f
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'
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55Ibid., "25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 5JB.J-5J9.2, PP• 208-209.
I .

.

.

__._..;,J

"!' ------,

'

1e9
Here in this quoted passage, "·'e find th_e same distin~uishing

marks that \'Tere apparent in the Advaita-Vedanta.

It

is es_s entially a higher criticism, from an analysi-s of the
I

opponents' argument, tracinr out misunderstandincs of their

I

__ ,1

doctrine and correcting interpretations.

The feature of dia-

!!

lectic present in other sections is the renderine explicit
the inconsistencies and contradictions.

.
'

'

In this section, as

-'

it is in th-e entire Nadhyamika-sastra and r:Iadhyamika-vrtti, no
original

arg~ent

is advanced, only a basis for a systematic

criticism of the -understanding of an opponent.

'i;iith Nagar,I

juna and Candrakirti,. this is formulated into a systematic

;

-·'l . .
I

method.

Candrakirti; : in a sec-t ion titled, "The r.Iadhyamika

'I' : :

I

1-'I ethod Explained," makes the follov-ring methodolo,:-;ical points:

::· !

Ordinarily, when someone is assertinG some position, it is

'!;;

his desire to convince the other party...

~: !

He attemnts to prove

his areument in the manner in which he hLI!lself arrived at his
conclusion, i.e., just as he c ~nvinced himself.

Hence the

respondent pursues a line of argument in order to prove his
ovm thesis and thereby convince another.

But the I·Iadhyamika

proposes a different technique:
w • • He does not vindicate any assertion in orcler to
convince his opponent. He has no reasons and examples
[Or 1-vhich he himself i~ convinced/. ·!-!e se~s forth a
thesis of his o1rm and undertakes to prove 1.t only so far
as it runs ~arallel {and destroyi! tte ar[ument lQf his
opponent?. He thus brings assert i ngs which cannot be
nroved.- Ee i ·s in conflict even wit~ himself. Ee certainly cannot con vine e ~1 is opponent [Of his imagin~d
thesi~7. 3ut can there be a more elo~uent refutat1.cn of

..

-

~

, 1\ 1
(

'

I
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an opponent than the proof that he is not capable of
establishin~ his own thesis?
Is ·there r~ally any
necessity to produce counter arr,uments~5b
Therefore, we have in this dialogue a clear

stat€~ent

that

the reductio ad .absurdum arr,ument is central to the Jl.1adhyamika and, by their own admission, is "The
1•-1adhyamika. 11

~·iethod

of tte

The Madhyamika repudiates argwnents from the
'

·principles admitted as valid by the opponent while claiming
not to advance any original arguments of their own.

I
\

.!

However,

i .f , in fact, some orieinal thesis is advanced, then "all our
arguments will also be wronp,, because the rea.s ons which will

. '

;(

be adduced will eitl:er be non-entities themselves, or they

\

Nil l represent something appertaining to a non-entity.n57
Ca ndrakirti

~

:I
...

does note that some I•ladhyamikas, like Bhavaviveka,

:1

)

:I

do assert independent theses and to them he says that, if so,

I;

then the same criticism should be applied:

~~

fh€

But we,
says?, do not resort to ·proof by syllogism.
Our arguments can have only the result of repudiating the
tenets of our opponents, for us they are not valid by
themselves. 58
The :Madhyamika asserts that separate entities are not
caused, but such an assertion equally allows the converse-- .
that every single thing is caused and exists.

If the argument

·: I' .

'

I:
i

'!
'

lst Chap., Sec. XIV, 19.J-lS'.6, pp.

5 7rbid ., 1st Chap., Sec.

XXIV,

34.1, p. 117.
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5Srbid., lst Chap., Sec. XXIV, 34-4, p. 117.
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of the denial o.f causation is founded upon an argument., then
the following factors are pertinent:59
1.

How many are the sources of knowledge their
es s ence, scope, origin, and
'

I
'

2.

Have they arisen out of themselves, out of
something -extraneous, both, or out of
nothing.

On the other hand, if it is not founded upon argument,

'

'I

I:
'

'
\
'i

.,I t
I

I!

1.

It must be rej ected.

2.

"Cognition of an object deoe.nds uoon the method
cognized, if something is not kiwwn it cannot
become known othervlise than by appropriate methods.. If no .t.::~ethods then neither ·v;i l. l there be
cognition.nuv

•·

I,

I

~
!

I

.

i

I
~.

7hus, it appears the controversy rests upon the validity of

I
i

logic and its employment.
and

Candrakirti'~

engagement~-

I, ' '

The point is acknm'lledeed fu-l ly

answer discloses a fine grasp of logical

The issue i s really the other side of the major

.:,

i

I

lI
:i.
.,

I

:,..

contention \'lhich underlies t h e entire I-ladhyamika.

~~

Included

' !:

in this would be the solution to the auestion of the content,
;

if any, of the ~.~ahayana dialectic as found i n both Na garj'una
and Candrakirti. .

The objection is stronely put by the

"anonymous logician" in the l":adhyarnika-vrtti when he raises

1

l

.

L
'i

the issue: 61
59Ibid., lst Chap., Sec. L\.XIV, 55.11-55.12, p. 1)6.
60Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXIV, 55.12-56.0, p. 1)6.
6libid., lst Chap., Sec. XXIV, 57 .4, p. lJ ?.
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• • • You thus insist that you make no assertion
But . ''~'? hear from you a proposition which
looks l1ke a defln1te assertion, viz. that entities
a~ise neither out of themselves, nor ~ut of something
d1fferent, nor out of both, nor at random. How is it
to be explained?

;

whatsoe~er.

I.
I.

j
! :

!
;j

i!

The point is ansvv-ered by an illustration that c ammon people
• • • impute to entities a reality which they do not
possess, a reality which for the saint does not exist at
all. It then happens that these ordinary men are tormented by some particular thing which they somehow
imagine to exist. Then the saints try to rouse the-ir
skepticism by some argument that would appeal to them.
The general and more central issue still remains.

It is

continued in the reply:
If our answer did allow assertive judgments, L~plying
the transcendental reality of a substratum, the question
would then_ arise whether these judgments are founded on
sound m-ethod or not. However, there is no LP'lace for
them in a sy-stem of universal Relativity. The reason
for that is just t h e follm·. 'ine one. If problematic judgments regarding reality '\':ere admitted as possible, we
would be obliged to ad~ it the counterpart, the possibility
of problematic judgments, regarding the transcendental
reality of a substratum, h0\'1 could we make the correlative
assertions, -s ince they \'Iould not be correlati-ve with the
other unexisting member of the relation. Land as a conclusionJ} It is not our business to anS\oJ"er all these
questions162
Therefore, quest i ons are only entertained as part of a technique to educate and, on the other hand, they are repudiated

,.
~~~

:··,.1'
. ll

'

'

J:_
·,

1
'·

[;
I
., _

.

I

.: :.

I

.,

apart from this !Jedagog ical device.

Candrakirt·i

says:

We first assume the reality of something impossible
I

62Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXXVIII, 62.4-63.8. Candrakiriti's quotation is from the "Questions of R.atnacuda" of
l~agar juna.

'

:I

'I ,

I,
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'

~
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and then condemn it.63
However, the criticism is often raised that this method is
itself impos s ible.

Tr..e denial of a t h esis i.r.Jplic_s the acce.pt-

c>.nce of another and ·therefore it is

im p os ~· ible

to have a

-!

system that is critical and yet not advance a theory of its
o•.-m.

It may be that the Madhyamika assumes it has no position,

but in order to deny a thesis, t!'-.ere must be some vantar:e

I
'

·I
-I

-!

i
;

point from

~1ich

this itself can be as s erted.

Hence, a care-

ful examination of this syste!'1 1:1ill r.1 ake expl icit the irr.plicit
assumptions of the r--1adhyamika.

it

:I
i

It matt.ers little if the

l'·'; adhyamikas are not cognizant of this.
that it must assume such a pos-ition.

The point is simply
In the repudia.t ion of

f-

f

-

.

~

-I

,1_ • ;

:i· j
-,' . .
I'

the t :,eory of causation by a reductio ad absurdum, does it

j,
.

involve the acceptance of the opposite theory, or does it

i.

i
I

!'

necessitate the ex&uinaticn of the reductio for premises that
can be seen to be a part of another theory and therefore presuppose it for the very criticism of the reductio?

But this

.I

is itself putting forth a theory that must be rationally
defended by evidence and example.

.I

·I

Without documentation, it

is a theory without substance,- another cry of the dogmatist •

:-~adhyamika replies: 64
63Ibid. _, lst Chap., Sec. XXXVIII, 56.4, P• 136.
64Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XVIII, 23.3, p. lOJ .._

•.

.,

i

.

.

\.
I \

'·

. ___.j,;J

'

[

i

-~

\ve have declared we have no theory of our own. lJle
therefore cannot be accused of contra dicting our o\in
principles.
and,

The only result of our deduction is to re nudiate the
theory o·f our opponent. Our acceptance of the converse
theory is not at all therewith im pliect.65
There is a difference between asserting that the
Nadhyamika maintains no "position" and
1>-~adhyamika

contains no ontology.

adva nce the theory that.

thou~h

a~.sertinr;

that the

It would be more exact to

they do not admit any onto-

·i t'
:\I

lop;ical theory (because they find none defensible b-efore
critical reaFon and \I'Ihich c a nnot be vindi·c ated by an intuition
of reality), nonetheless they still have an ontological .referent

in the sense that the intuition is not of anything but

sunyata whic-h is equal to "tat hat a," thusness, the unique
reality of the universe.

If it >:-:ere of ·n othing , it "'ould

characteri.ze r eality as non-existent, but:
Now, if Nirvana is a non-Ens,
How then can it be independent?
For sure, an indepcndent non-Ens
Is nowhere to be founct.b 6
An intuition of nothing is hardly an i n tuition and undoubtedly much of the difficulty can be trac-ed to t -he tra.nslation

',

o f "sunyata" as nothingness \'Jhen the referent i ·s understood

65Ibid., lst Chap, Sec. XVIII,
6 ~bid.,25th

Chap, Sec. VIII.

24.6, P• 104.

' '.
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as a non-Ens rather than the re£erent of
qualifying reality.

non-predicatin~

It is interesting that Stcherbatsky

translates the term as "relativity" thereby
literal translation.

or

·

escan~ng

....
tue

There is quite obviously a logical
I

jump from recognizing that Nirvana "escapes precision" to the

assertion that it is "nothin..n:."

:j
i
!

The task is lessened v-:hen

the focus is on the perception rather than the universal
aspect for then it takes the tathata rather' t _hcn sunyata.
When experience is

~iven

precedence over speculation,

when logic is silenced by logic and reason asked to reflect
unon itself, there is ahmys a value given to

self-disci~! line

and here in the l·iahayana the sarne thing is true.

It takes

the form of introspection, the discipline of meditation.

An

outline of the 1••1 adhyamika discipline is stated as a practice,
which presumably parallels the dialectic, and also includes
its final intuition and realization:
Considering consciousness he i[he 3odhisattv~ investigates the stream of thou.r(ht and asks v:herefrom does tt
come. The follo\'.'ing occurs to him. Consciousness arises,
if there is an Limr.1aneny object does that mean that cansciousness is one thing and the object another, or that
they are identical? In the first case \'le have a double
consciousness. But if they are not identical, how is
then consciousness to be cogniz-ed through consciousness"i
Consciousness cannot apprehend -its O\'ln self. T~Le trenchant of a sword cannot cut its trenchant. The t1p of a
finger cannot touch that very tip. Similarly this, consciousnesc cannot be conscious of its own ~elf.
Thus it is that \'Then [5. sain1]' is thorour.h~y at~enti ve, then it appears to him as undefinable, 1 t ne1.:-h-e :
has an end nor a beginning. It is not change~ess, 1.t l.S
not causeless, it does not conflict with the 1nterdepend-

·.

.·.
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ence . ~f the
elements?,
but it i .,.... ne 1·ther "'d
· 1 nor
.
.
. . . en t lea
non-~ ent~cal ne~ther with itself, nor >·rLth othe-r s., He
then cogn1zes a stream of thou~ht Las thin as7 a

·the thou~ht
. element,
. indefinite thou~ht
. ·' t · non=ma n1·rcretepder,
es e
ht
th
. oug , ll1lp~rcept 1ble. thought, thou.~ ht as a thinP-; in
1tse~f. He 1~tu1ts th7s fUnspeakable thought? as "thisness
ug~que Real~ty of the universi7, he does not
suppress 1t. ·r
I

fth:

Such is the analysi.s of thou r~ht which he realizes and
intuits. This, 0 noble son, is the "Bodhisattva' 5 exerc~se of.a~plication.of mindfulness c o nsistinp in the conSlderat~on of \'rhat 1n our consciousness represents its
[essencif. 68
This exercise: of th-e "application of Mindfulnes:s"
clearly

s ~: O\·.rs

the movement of an inner dialectic.

.I

The re jec-

tion of the duality or subject and object presented as c onsciousness and its object, however. does not of itselr insure
the intuition.

There is a vast difference bet wee n acknm'lledr,-

in.r; the distinction to be \'Tithout foundation on t h e basis of
a learned response, a teaching, or

so~e

revealed scripture;

and another thin~ to actually realize it.

Hence the "recol""-

nition" of the illusion does not of itself automatically
dissolve its form, merely loosens its claim for atten~ion and
c o nsideration.

Attachment to the objects of L'!lap;ination

l
j ·· : i

depend upon an unreflective, unque s tioninf. acceptance o: its
externality, desirability (or repulsion), and reality.

The

doubt cast is more than a mere "as if," for the repeated

67Tathata • Sunyata.

.\

6$Ibid., 1st Chap, Sec. XJ.).~II, 61.10-64,PP• 145-6.
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questioning insures a dimini·s hing tie to the object relative
to the success of the proces~.

Therefore, this nrocess strips

the essential element of the object--its apparent inteeral
reality.
object.

This could be termed a procedure of unattaching the
Not being attached to the imagination, it is

,.

pos~ible

I

to sit attentively but not before.
of its unreality shifts the focus of
seeming-objects to the

The increasing recognition
consciousnes~

process itself.

fro~

the

Of course, the

imaginative process has little hold on the individual •:1hen
,,

its claim is se-en to have such a provisional basis.
The success of this exercise comes \':hen the "thusness"
is not suppressed but allowed.

It is- further interestinp, to

note that the inner-dialectic functions not merely in a
negative capacity as in a formal "Not this, not this,

tr

but in

an analytical manner mirrorinr: th-e outer movement of the dialectic.

Throu.f,h this exercise, the student intuits the unique

reality of the Universe and the technique is a thorour,h-rr,oing

i: · ·,

dialectic.

r.. ~

Dialectic is the cleansing faculty, the prcltminary
discipline to the insight, and the ~rounds for its activity.
The technique of "The l'•·l ethod of the Madhyamika," noted. previously, is utilized here in the exercise.

:· 1

The student's own

thought process· is the material; the premises and methodology
follow the sa11e lines as the outer dialectic.

The method is

the use of the reductio ad absurdum techni~ue in both the

1'

1

I

·---l
!

• \

I

.

I
\
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outer and inner dialectic.

The experience of Nirvana is

dependent upon dialectic functionin~ as a catharsis, as a
purifier of the de:filin£7 eleT'1ents.

In the l<adhyamil:a, the

catharsis is thoroup:h and exhaustive.

'l'he catharsis as an

ac·ti vity ·is formulated by both Candrakirti
and is central

to their thought.

'i
il

and Nagarjuna

Candrakirti

Actually it

c~nsists

I

:i•I
:I,,
•I

states that

neither suppression nor annihilation really takes place in
the experience of Nirvana.

·iI

I

,! I'

"merely in

the suppression of absolutely all the constructions of our
imar.;ination. 11

The term -n sup:oressi .: m 11 could more nrobably be

coined "cessation" as in the stateracnt of NaE,arjuna from the
Ratnavali:
Nor is Nirvana .non-existence
How can such an idea come to you~
We call Nirvana the cessation
of everv thou~ht of non-existence and existence.69
~

<...;

The essential ele.<-ncnt is that the phenomenal \·:orld can be

ca1led Nirvana when the conceptual freme\·.·ork is silenced.
Nagarjuna writes:70
'
<

Coordinated here or caused are [separate th .-Lng.§_7
VJe call this i\I'Orld Phenomenal
But ;ust the same is called Nirvana
\'!hen"' vie\-;red without causality, v1.ithout coordination ..

'.

I

Therefore Nirvana is merely the ~eeing of the Phenomenal world
-..·:hen the imaginatiore cease their play.

Candrakirti

ex~resses
··,

69rbid.,

25th Chap., Sec. II, 524.5-524.9, P· 190.

?Orbid.,

25th Chap .. , Sec. IX, p. 195.

.

f -.-·,
I
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this negatively when he writes:71
. • • • as lone as con~tructions of our L~a;.ination exist
N1rvana cannot b9 reached, since it is reach~d just
through a suppression of all plurality.
The experience of Bliss is coincidental with the cessation of
all thought, "Our Bliss consists in the cessation of all

..
ii
:i

\:I

it
I

thought. n72

The claim is not for a m.o mentary abandon of

·'.I
;I

!

thoughts and instincts but rather for a permanent ~tate:73
• • •. It is also a Bliss because, by qu£nching all
defiling forces, all. instinct {and habits of thour,hy
have been extirpated without residue.
The

as~umption

at work here in the exercise is the

concept of the Prajna ( intuitior.}.

This term,

-,.~ith

its close

affinities with Plotinus 1 parallel concept, is translated by
the same term--Intellectual Intuition.
Prajna is tha.t t..;hen

t~1 e

The concept of the

entire conceptual frar:J e,·.'ork a.nd

activity loosens its tie or l: old on the mind, only then does
the Intellectual Intuition natur 2. lly ft:.nction.

It is not

thought of as a separate faculty, but is understood as operative only when the obstructions arc re~oved.
elements removed, intuition reveals itself.

The obscurine
It \':ould be a

I
.1 •

I

mis understanding not to ac }:n o;,-!l edge thfl t this intuition is
thouzht of as a direct experience, not mediat i n~ between

71Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. II, 521.14, p. lf~7; cf. 524-5,.
p. 190; 522 ... 10' p. 188.
72 Ib1o..,
.'
25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 53 e.3, p. 209.

73 Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 53 E. E, f'• 20S.

..

\
.,

'

200

objects, and thour:;hts for it are termed "thusness," nonmanifested thought,

.i ndefinite thout:ht, and the uns~eakable

thouf,ht.
The method of the

I.~adhyamika,

the reductio ad

ab~urdurn

technique, or as they call it, the Prasanca.padanam_, is carried
to a limit that Plato would have been proud to have encountered.
True, this sar.;.e element is :>resent in Platonic thour;ht_, but
not carried to its limit as it is in the J''::adhya;nika, nor was

i:\ ,.
t-

it ever considered as the exclusive tool of the dialectician.
And balancinp; the scales, tr.e Eadhyam.ika has no parallel concept for the mid·wifery of Plato.

il

1·'
·'j .

The conceDt_ of i _r;norance in

Platonic thou~ht is thought to be the barrier to true knowledp,e~ but on the other hand,

it is certainly not developed

into its more specific form of
as the condition of Nirvana.

11

the cessation of every thou&:ht"

To this insi.o:ht, bot h the

Advaita and l--Iadhyamika are in agreement and botl-: !:ave direct
tec-hniques for the removal of this veil to intuition.

The

Platonic- technicue does not ~roceed as dir-ectly as does the

•

i;
l!
I_

'

· ·"

A..dvaita and }\·i adhyamika, nor- is it as consistent v;ithin its
system as they are v:ithin theirs, -..-.· hen taken as a '.-:hole.

''

.

CHAPTEi~

V

CONCLUSION AND SYNTEESIS OF THE POSITIVE Ai-:D I~EGA TIVE DIALECTIC
I.

In the Platonic

FOREVWRD

'.'rod::~ ,

the nee<It·ive dialectic "ras nei-

ther extended to its limits nor 11as tbe method rendered into
an explicit methodolocy as in the kadhyamika.

'l'h-e Flatonic

catharsis was a function of the negative dialectic but the
l-atter never was the sole and paramount tool of both tl1e
catharsis and the insir:ht into the Good, or Reality.
usee the neeative dialectic to initiate the
tion and self-criticism.

~rocess

Plato
of reflec-

On the othe-r hand, the hadhyamika

accepts the negative dialectic and extends it to the limit of
self-reflection as an epistemolor,ical tool to remove al .1 the
impediments to the vision of reality.
The recognition of the Asparsayor,a as the inner dialectic extends it beyond the boundaries of Plato and offers
more than merely the acquisition o_f another contemplative
technicue because it ~ rovides a r.1ore profound gr-asr of the
concept of ienorance and, therefore,
concise content.

bri~gs ~ith

it a more

Thus, the addition of both the conte~Fla

tive technique of the Advaita-Vedanta and the negative dialectic of the Nadhyamika t"J the Dialectic is certainly a
decided advantage ior its development as a ph~loso~hy.
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It is interestine that both the Advaita-Vedanta and
the 1-Iadhyamika have developed those elements that were \':eak
in the Platonic dialectic, and yet neither of these schools
added to the positive dialectic-...;vthat Plato refers to as the
"noble birth.n

The three aspects of the Dialectic--positive,

negative, and inner dialectic are the elements of the Platonic concept of Dialectic.

The positive dialectic is exem-

?lified in the quest for unity as it f -eels nev1 strenr.;th i .n
fresr. discoveries and intuitions of relationships, ha~ony,
and order, all the '''hile seckinp; its object amonr; the True,
the Good, and the Beautiful.

The essential feature of this

positive dialectic is that these notions are brour,ht to birth
by

a special technique of auestion-and-ans\",rer by a trained

dialectician who is, himself, restrained from either dictating
solutions or offerinf, positive answers ...
The negative dialectic is not a separate and distinct
~I

part of the positive dialectic, for it assumes some conclusion

;

.,i

',

from the positive dialectic.

:I

Its function is to expose contra-

dictory assertions which claim some certainty, and is essentially
a

neg~tive

nrocess in the reductive orocesses.

Locic is

employed and an examination of the asserter's tf:esis is made
to determine if the birth process, the positive dialectic, has
been a true birth or if it must be aborted.

Sir..ce· it prefers

explicit non-contradictory propositions with clear and precise

''

meaning, it is suspicious of metaphors and analoeical thinking.

__JJ'
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Inner dialectic 1 the contemplative, is an interior
orocess of dialectic that has as its end the vision, or
experience, of reality.
The dynamics of the positive dialectic is a function
of "its use of analor,ies and metaphors that

as~umes

a differ-

I!

·I
I

ent set o :f presuppositions than the negative dialectic •

The

analysis of these presuppositions \•:ould demonstrate ·the
mechanism of both the positive· and the negative diRlectic and

I
\
1

-I

l

'l
r
~

I

also reconc-ile a curious problem .

The r-roblem can be re.1.dily

se en if these two activities are considered separate .

Then

I

.I::·

t h e nroblem is obvious, for each seems to contradict the

;~
!

other.

i

The positive sees the negative a s unable to say any-

thing since a thorough criticism must also cancel itself.
The negative dialectic sees the positive as a system of
analoeical assertions and discoveries which, adr.1ittedly, cannot be the basis for any literal truth.

Hence, what is needed

is an analysis of the analogical and relational form of judgnent within each of thes e tools of the Dialectic.

II.

ANALOGY AND POSITIVE DIALECTIC

The positive dialectic does not examine languar,e with
any degree of severity; it accepts it and prefers to utilize
the structure it assumes for its philosophical ends.

The

characteristic feature of the positive dialectic is its
acceptance of the use of relational terms, or ter!:.s v:hich

')'·.
'i

r: i r

I' '

I; ;
j :'
I

I

.'

'

.

'

1~

I ,
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assume some relational matrix for their meaning.

An example

of this can be .s een in Plato 1 s quest for the nature of the
Statesman and Sophist.
terms are relational.

It must first be granted that both
It must be further assumed that there

is a position of authority and a populace in whose interest,
or against such interests, this authority c2n exercise some
c')ntrol or exert some influence.

\'lhatever issue or ques-

tion is pursued, if it assumes a relational character, then
the positive dialectic seeks to uncover those relations that
are necessary for the t -erm to be meaninr;ful by seckinp; the
essential relations.

The ability to discern relations vTOuld

I

1:

be the pre-requisite .far this employment of the positive dia-

)
ri . :

lectic.!

i. '!

On the other hand, the distinctions found, dis-

cerned, perceived or conceived depend in

t~eir

turn upon

either an arbitrary discovery or there actually being relations to cognize.

\'lithout order, there ce>n only· be an

I

. i

!.

!
I

arbitrary concept of relation and, therefore, merely arbitrary
definitions.

Analogy and relation both depend upon the exist-

ence of some order, and to communicate by analor:ies involves
lcr. Cornford, Plato's Republic, QE• cit.~ II. 25$.
(A term can, of course, be both a relational term and a.nonrelational term, depending purely upon the extent to w~1ch
the term is examined. An interesting example to note 1s the
concept of Justice in Plato's Republic: this ~erm has ~ :elational referent in respect to its soctal funct1on [Cr • 1bld. •
VI, 50~, and a non-relational character in respect to
Justice itself £Cr. ibid., VII, 259;7)

.--J.i
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a perception of their connection and also presupposes an
acceptance of .some conceot of order.

It is essential in

analogical thinking that the. terms involved in the analoe;y
are actually ''seen" in the relation indicated.

I

To actually

perceive them in this way is in itself a discovery--an
insight.
It miP,ht be argued that these orders and relations
e·x ist--but only in language and within a conceptual frame·~:mrk.

The argument would vroceed to ass-ert that it is an

analogical leap itself, and hardly legitimate, to move from
rel~tions

in language to relations in reality.

All the

available. evidence points, to ·continue the argument, to

': :

·: l'i

1

The reply would be to agree entirely with this contention and extend it a bit beyond those narrmr.; confines.
The assertion that the nerceived order is in

lang~a~e

and

within concepts vrould certainly be ad..11itted, but if the
assertion were

I

l.
i.

,.

meaning in language -and nothing else.

to add that it is "merely" and "only•' in

lanp:uage and concepts, then the line '\'·i ould be drav.:n.

On the

.other hand, the assumr::tion that this order, asserted by some
analogy, is "actually" the order of reality \·muld also be
going beyond the bonds of respectability.

Both of these

r::ositions are excluded and yet both usBd.

The analogical

thinking as;umes that the relation indicated is in some way
in reality--perhaps totc.lly mysterious, but it ne·ither

~

I:

!; ;
'.

~'j

.!

I
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qualifies it uniquely nor exhausts it.

The assunption of the

analogy is that two terms are related to t"TO others--''as,

n

or

"as if"--and this is not meant to indicate that it "is" some
oth.e r rel-ation.

Hence \vhat is: being assert:ed ·is really only

a possibility and not a unique tie or identity.
usage it should be called a poetic tie or

In strict

identity -~

Analo-

gies invite the participator to detennine. if indeed it is
"like" the other terms, and to see if it does seem to bearsimilar relations.

To assert a strict identity is totally

missinr the point of analogical thinking.
The reason that the analogical function in lanEuage
is not often acknov-Jledged \vith the credit due it, is that
analogies and metaphors are often looked down upon as indicative of an undeveloped reason that is incapable of expressing
complex and profound thought patterns.

-This is, of course,

The case is ~uite the
2
Logic is actually one special case of analogy, a

merely an example of raruc prejudice.
contrary.

novel is an expansion of a metaphor_,3 and mathematics is
anot-her example of a systematic use of analogy that is often
disguised by the Latin term proportion, rather than the Greek

2 scott Buchanan, Rhetoric (manual used by St. John's
College, Annapolis, Maryland, n .d.), (Jo.iimeographed.)
3weller B. Embler, "The Novel as l"ietaphor," Etc •,
Vol. X, No. l, ~utumn, 1952), PP• 3-12~

I
I

I
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Again_, the scientific method itself, in

its statements of relations between thin~ s and their math-ematical properties, can be seen as -a sys-tem of analor:ies .4
The mathematical descri ption of the Keplerian astronomy ·will illustrate this usage in matJJemat i cs.

In the state-

ment of the Eart h and its path:.
• . • • the earth revolves around the heav-ens
trac1ng the path of an ellipse while the sun is
at one of the Foci.
The elements needed are:

1.
2.

3.

4.

The orbit of a Planet.
The Sun.
The circumf-erence of a conic section,
i.e., the ellipse.
The foci of the ellipse.

\"lhat the proposition can be really reduced to would be:
The orbit of a planet is to the sun as the circumference of the ellipse is to-rhe foci.5

Which of course holds t o the basic form of analog y with the
classic type:

A is to B as C is to D
4scott Buchanan, The Doctrine of Sienatures (Lond on:
Kegan "Paul, Trench, Trubner ~-:. Co., Ltd., l~JS), p p . 2~-5 0 .
5This is itself a shortLand form of a mathematical
process because the ellipse is derived from by-_ a ~ rocess of
oas ~ in~ a olane throu~h a conic section at a p, 1ven anF,le.
T_he rat-er ~athematici~ns may fail to recoe:nize that t h e
al g ebraic form of the ellipse is a special c~se_of the
analog ical use of e eometry and algebra when 1t 1s seen
through the Cartesian coordinate system.

i,
'

I
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or simply,
Planet's Path

:

Sun

..

Ellipse

the Foci

The only difficulty l'tould be if this becnme an assertion that this is really the way the earth moves.
conclusion should at this point be anticipated:

Hence the
that tbe

dogmatist, in any of his many disguises, is sim0ly a person
who confuses a language problem with his convictions and
feelings.

He insists that a particular

analo~ical

ex~rcssion

uniquely characterizes some "x" and no other and, therefore,
he believes his assertion is literal, self-evident, and
indubitable fact.
In everyday usage,_ the metaphorical or analocical
function of language is .not obvious.

Usually the literal

'

. I

I

statements have a very definite and non-analo n·ical int-ent, orso it is believed.

When a person shouts,

nr

hate John Smith!"

is it hardly intended as a metaphor or as the statement,
!:something like hate I experience for John Smith."

i~cvcrthe

less, it can be seen as such in the analysis of its str,tcture:
1. I hate John Smitho
Objection: ~hat does it nean for the "I" to hate? The
grammatical first person sinr;ular, does it hate?
2. I have a hatred for John Smith.
Objection: :~ ow does one have it? Like an arm,- the moon, or
a spoon?

3.

I feel an emotion which I call hate, which I
feel for John s~ith.
Objection: How can one feel for Johh Smith'?

__ _j _i
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4.

I feel an emotion which I call hate, wnich I

5.

I feel an emotion which I call hatred which
causes a feeling of tension within me; as a
result I seek its resolution by reactin~ to
an object that appears to threaten my p~evious
nlacid state.

project upon John Smith as the objEct of my
feeling.
Objection;- Project? How? Carry it over? Place it upon
hi..-n?

Naturally, this process could go on to further explore
the content of the terms "call," "seek," object," and
flappears," for these are all heavy terms that te-nd to obsc-ure
the metaphoric content that they possess within this context.
The more complete the analysis, the

rno~e

the investieation

would tend to define the basis for the hate; hence, the easier
its resolvement, but only if our activity were not entirely
intended to disembowel poor John Smith.
The analogical structure for Mr. I and John Smith
mi0ht be viewed in this form:
tranquil state : turbulent state
a non-threatened matrix
a threatened matrix
the understanding of the matrix
the blind and immediate acceptance of the natrix
understanding action
emotionally base action

....
...-·

'!'he dialectic would explore just what it is that is threatened.
The uncoverinr: of this content would brinr, light unon "Hr.

I's" behavioristic natterns and account for the ambiguous elements.
It is not often recognized that language can be seen
within this scheme, but this is simnly because of a predisposi-

__ )_j
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tion to view them within a structure that langua~e seems to
provide.

Language presents a model but it has its ov:n

implicit metaphysics as a linguistic structure which, if one
is not caref:1l, vlill be dictated to the unsuspectinp:: . 6
linguistic model stresses "static"
ships, or

relations~ips

question arises;

thin ~ s

Our

and their relation-

and the thinr,s related.

Thus, the

Could there be an alternative conception

,. .J=h ich '-muld then offer entirely different conseauences?

I

!
I
!.

The basic factor in the model is the proposition, and
it is agreed to have the ele.11ents of a subject-v-erb-object.
The subject-noun is isolated, the verb imputes some aspect of
motion, while its determination becomes the object.

This is

.

i

the customary manner of treating this division but it is. not
at all n.e cessary to assume.

Ernest Fenollosa :presents an

alternative in his request that if we

~ et

back to the basic

etymology of words they would reveal rich metaphorical con-tent.

He ar.!Tiles from. the case of the Chinese ,·,- ri tten charac-

ter to draw conclusions for other languages, and clains for
Chinese the " purest" meaning in that it has retained its
ancient origins intact.

He says of t he sub~ect-v erb-object

relation:

6i3enjamin Lee ''Jhorf, Lanpuage, 'Thou"'ht and Reality,
ed. John B. Carroll (New York: Published jointly by the
Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and John vliley &·. Sons, Inc., 1956), P• 252.

l'
I
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A true n~un, an isolated thinr,, does not exist in
nature • . Th1ng~ are only t~e term i nal points~ or rath.er
the_meet1ng po~nts, of a~t1ons, cross-sections cut through
1
act;ons, snap-s~ots •. Ne1ther
can a pure verb, an abstract
mot1on, be :pos.:-·1ble 1n nature. The eye sees noun and verb
as one: th1n~s in motion, motion in things and so the
Chinese concention tends to represent them.?

It is. often argued that it is only when words lose their
archaic reference that exactitude can be had throur,h laneuage.
Fenollosa counters that, on the contrary, tr.e Chinese lan~uage

in its ~~itten character retains the meta ~hor and, he

points out, that the intellectual and philosonhical ";orks of
the Chinese are evidence of the ability of metaphors to communicate complex thought patterns :
You \<till ask, how could the Chinese have built up a
great intellectual fabric frarr the mere picture writing':
To the ordinary ~Iestern mind, which believes that thought
is concerned Nith lor;ical categories and \·rhich rather condemns the faculty of direct imap:ination, ·this feat seems
quite impossible. Yet, the Chinese lan,:,uage '\·rith its
peculiar materials has passed over from t he seen to the
unseen by exactly the sam-e process '\'Ihich all ancient
races erroloyed. This process is m-etaphor, the uge of
material images to sur;?; est imnate~ial relations.

i

1, .

The conscious use of analo.p;y can furth-er understanding and
create conditions for ne\·I insights.

It can also limit under-

standing if its proper er.tployement is not understood.
~ecently,

an effort has been made to determine its proper

function in mathematics and in reasoning, and G. Polya has

?Ernest Fenollosa, The Chiner.e Written Character {New
York: Kasper & Horton (Square$ Series), n.d.), P· 60.
8.rbid., ·p. 72.

-
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authored. a work coverin~_-_ th1."s fl."eld.9

p o_ya
1
' s work argues

for the use of analogical thought in mathematics and ·reasonine rather than the deductive method because it is his claim
that the truly creative mathematician must be a
fir~>t

of the

and a r,ood prover a fter.
proo ~ ,

~ood

r.uesser

Both the guess and the idea

he points out, rest heavily unon tr.e· utilization

of analogy:
• • • And the layman is not surprised to hear that the
naturalist is EUessinr. like himself . It may appear a
little more surprising to the la)~an that the mathematician is also guessing . The -result of the mathematician's
creative work is demonstrative reasonin~, a proof, but
the proor is discovered by plausible reasoninf , by
guessing .lO
The deductive method only can be -employed after both the
euess and the idea of the proof are first grasped .

Polya is

aware of the dangers in the use of analogies and begins by
stating that in "discussinp.; analogy, we tread on less solid

.i
\

~round.nll

He lists several points of interest:

The essential difference between analopy and other
kinds of similarity lies, it seems to me, in the intentions of the thinker. Similar objects agree with each
other in some respect. If you intend to reduce the
aspect in which they agree to definite concepts, you
regard those similar objects as analogous. If you succeed in gettinf> down to clear concepts you have

9a Polya Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning
(Princeto~: Prin~eton University Press, 1954) •
lOrbid., v·o l. II, p. 158..

llrbid., Vol. I, P· 13 •

_j _j
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clarified the analogy.l2
He defines the concept, or condition, of analo~y as follows:

. . • tw? systems ar? analogous, if they agree in
.clearly def1nable relat~ons of t i~ eir res r- ective !)arts .l3
The only difficulty in the analogical method is when it is
not clarified:
. • • And rer:: ember, do not neglect VJ p:ue ana1o.ries.
Yet, if you wish them respectable, try tc; clarify 'them.l4
The role that analogy plays, to Polya, is clear in his
statement:
• • • There is perhaps no discovery either in elementary or advanced mathematics, or, for that matter, in
~ other subject that c .Juld do \·Jithout these operations
u,ene.ral.i~ation and specializatio_!!7 especially without

analogy.l::~

Hence, h ere is further evidence t .hat analogy has a
large share in the intellectual processes.

The positive dia-

lectic finds in the analoe ical tool a way of analysis and also
a way of discovery.

The keen eye. for analoe:ical relations

marks the d·ialectician and the almost playful

u~e

of them

80m€times makes it hard to distinF,uish him from the dramatist
in the concern for plot structure.

Hence, a critioue of

analogy assumes the value of a relational matrix.
The development of a relational matrix in vihich a
value is given presupposes that similar relati0ns can be
predicated of totally different things.

12Ibid.

13 Ibid.

Without this facility

l4Ibid., p. 15.

214
there could be no assertion of this s~~e or similar relations

between the last terms.

In the example,

King is to Subject as Father to Son
or,
Father to I-Iother as Heaven to Earth
or,
Heaven to Earth as the Generative Principle to the Creative Principle.
An examination of the~e analogies presupposes another

I:

concept which must be prior to the structural similarity concept.

If the relation between a Father and Mother, a King

and his Subject, or a Father to tis Son is in na~e only~ then
QQ relationship can be asserted and the consequence--for the

related terms--would be invalid.

(The only relationship that

could be asserted would be merely nomenal . . :hich 1.·:ould be the
absence of any effective relationship.)

That is to say that

if the Father and Mother were not functionin?; within each
realm in respect to their relational capacities, then

nothin~

further could be deduced and the other terms--Heaven to Earth-\·:ould have no explicit relation and the

analo~y

the cause of ambir.;uous and misleadinp- relations.
the

~elation

1.·:ould further
Clearly,

in the analogy must assume the ordered elements

of the first part before any "is to" can be deduced.

The

Drinciple of a structural .similarity presupposes an ordered
relational system, hence it should be termed a pr-inciple of

'

___
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the Integrated Unit System.

\~hen the terms in the analogy

are ordered sufficiently to function in related capacities,
then similar structural simila rities can be asserted in other
equally related units.

Once the units, or te~s in the

analogies, are suff iciently distinguished by their order,_
then a corresponding structural syste~ appears in the relation of these similarities to other eoually distin";uished
terms of any other order.
It would be profitable to return to the basic analory
for clarification,
A is to B as C is to D
or, as in our example:
Father

>:other

Heaven

Earth

The conditions for this analogy therefore are:

1.

A particular function must be assit.ned to father
and metter, or such other terms in the analor;y •

2.

.A corresponding structural relationship be.t,o;een
both father and mother should emerge as a unit.

J.

And sufficient evidence of this order, (1) and (2),
must be g iven l•rhich i s transferred ''as" or "as if"
to the latter terms, Heaven an~ Earth.

Even thoue;h these terms differ in respect to both ouantity
and qualit y , for as long as t h ey are actually ordered, tl1e.
relations i:ip can be sought in the latter terms.

~: h en

this

is established, an integrated system is in evidence.l6

16rhese t'li'!O principles necessary for th? analogy are
also the major principles of the Chinese· Class~c--The Book of

-- J_j
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The concept or principl€ of the repetition of the
integrated unit system is hierarchial and also justifies the

Chang es, or the I Ching .. In fact, ·the entire Book of Changes
can be seen as. an analo r:;~cal system in l·rhich tr.e relational
pa~te::ns arc g~ve~ a basJ.s and :orovided v.:iti1 a field. 'l'he
~r1nclple of the ~nte grated unit system and the nrincinle of
.structural .s imilarity are the key and paramount concepts
underlying the Book of Chang es, and also as-s umed for an
an.:;logy, or system of analog ies. Professor Gi-!-:inr;· Shien
l'.'r1 tes:
The principle of structural similarity is the key
principle of the Book of Chang es. If '\•Je do not understand this princi p le, we sha ll never understand tbe
es~en?e of the Book of Chang es. f_Gi !:Iing Shien, "Key
Pr~nc1ples of the Book of Chan~es: The Principle of
Structural Similarity and the Principle of the
Inter;rat ed System" ( Paoer read at the r·-Iew School of
Social Research, New- York, October 29, 1954).
(Kimeographed.l7
and , further, he adcis:
The key principle of the Boo~: 0f Chanc es is the
principle of structural similarity_,and repetition of
the integrated unit system. /Ibid.;
In order to see this ~ reces s i n a rn o~e detaile d manner, the
following is offered: · Beginning \·rith the first ti'!O terms,
Father

Hother

.'hen these terms em-er? e v.· ith suf:ficiE·ntl v ordered functional
activities·, th en. an integrated s yst e1J results. T!-: is ·.-:ould
al s o be tru e of terms as c.: if.fcrent as 1' fa ther
r.·:otherr: to
tt}:.e a.ven :
earth," hence a c ommon structural condition is
as s umed to underlie t h is emer r; ence. Naturally, tr_ere are
certain structural relations .V:rhich are as r. um·ed to be more profound or hierarchical than otters, an.d the Book of Chang es is
based upon these deeper relati o ns:
both the eight trig rams
und the sixty-four hexag r ams are imac;es of such functional
differentiations. Professor Shien writes :
!.

as

Acc-ording to the .i:loo~: o.f Chan[:es, the eig ht trir,r ams,
~Jell as the sixty-four hexae rams, are i:ma[:es of the

I

I
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!)roeressive concepts of the Good that characterizes the Pla--tonic positive dialectic.

The structural inteeral assunes

the integrated unit and the accepta~ce of units sufficiently
functionally developed to permit hi~her units of inter,rated
unities, as-:
Father to I-Iother - The family, tbe clan, th-e small
community, the t m:n, City, State,
Nation, and 1:Jorld.
8ertainly there is here a progressive unity and also an
increas€d complexity and

ma~nitude,

but since the

sw~e

prin-

ciples are operative, one c:m see the same principle and
therefore the same relations can be predicated.
intuitively perceives these interrelations,

hi~

The Saee
actions fol-

loi"I from this kno.,Jledge, and he thereby attains tranquility.

5.

Therefore it is the order of the changes that the
suPerior man devotes himself to end that te
attains tranquillity by.

and concludingthis section:
• • • Thus our actions are set in order, and the mind
u=~ or. the judcmentson the individual linesi \ore intuitively perceive the interrelatians in the world. 7

is also satisfied, for ,.,hen "'e meditc::te

.j

·r

Professor Gi-i·- :in,c->; Shi£n notes:

functional differentiations v-1hich are .shaped. by all tl;.ings;
moreover they are symbols of the structurc-~1 relationships
1-1hich exist be.tv-1een great things such as. hec:ven. and. ear~h,
but also tl--.e :--elationships vrhich exist \·.•::..thln r.:lcrocosmlc
systa~s. /Ybid.7
17H.ichard Wilhelm (trans.), The I Chinp; .2£ Book_ of
Chanr;es, render-ed into Enr.;lish by Cary F. Baynes (B o~llngen
Se!"ies XIX. Ne\·! York: Pantheon 3ooks, Inc., 1950), lol. I,
Chap. II, pp. 311-312.

' j
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As implied in the philosophy of the Book of ChanFes
because the structural similarit:· a'Ilon~ al l structural,
s~st~s, if we. can unde~~tand one st~uctural system
w~th~n a certa~n area o.r phenomena £either the small one,
such as the family, or rreat one, such a~ the world7,
then we can apply concLusions to all the structural
systems in that area.lE:
This concept provides a

princi~le

missinr, in the Platonic

movement of the Republic justifyinp the movement of the
analogy

fro~

the nature of the individual soul to the State·;

and in transferring qualities
other.

And in the

Chi~ese

bindin~

upon one ucon the

Classic of the Bo ok of Changes,

the "trigrams of Ch'ien and K'"un are applied to the unit of
the nation.

They are the symbol of the Kine; and his vassals;_

if applied to the family--husband and wife."
On the other hand, the hexagrams, Ch'ien and K'un, are
the fundamental

-princinles
,_

of the I

Chin~

....

-~=

and as principles

they are not the elements of a basic dualism.

In the same

-.,;ay as Yin Yang are complem-entary, so, too, are Ch' ien and
K 'un.

In the Great Commentary (Ta Chuan, or, as it is some-

times called, Hsi Tz'u Chuan) it is noted:
These two cardinal nrincinles of all existence are
then symboliz-ed in the- two funda111 ental hexae:rllms of the
Book o~ Changes, t he creative and the receptive. In
the last analysis, this cannot be called a dualism. -The
two principles are united by a relation based _on homoio
r;eneity; they do not cor,Jbat but complement eacL other • . ,.

In his concluding remarks .on the Key Principles of the Book

lBshien, 2£• cit., P~ 2.

19\·: ilhel.m, oc. cit., p. JOJ.

'
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of Changes, Professor Gi-I(ing Shien writes:
So we can see that every integral struct-ural system
is structurally similar to every other inter;ral structural system. The eight trigrams and ti1e sixty-four
hexagrams contain a principle ernbracinr; all thinr:s. In
its _fullnes_s, they can be a nplied t::> the nf:cnornena of
nature as a whole; in its partialness, th~· can be applied
to the phenomena of individual thinrs. Likcwis e, the
symbols, rules and relationships represented by tl:e tri~rams and hexagrams can be applied to the physical world,
the social world, and the animal world. The ap~lication
of the eight trigr-ams and the sixty-four hexaerc.r.ts vdll
lose any appearance of confusion or arbitr~riness (e.e.,
the trigrams Ch t·ien and l~ 'un simultaneously symbolizing
heaven and earth in nature, kin~ and ministers in the
nation, father and mother in the family) once the principle of structural similarity and repetition of the
integrated unit system is firmly grasped. It is throu~h
this principle that the Bobk of Chan~es tnkes the chan~ing
rules, laws, and symbols of the chan~inp: pr.enomena and
transforms them into an all-embracine principle which
nothing escapes.20
The concern for the relations and their relatedness to other

',

..
1

relations rather than to things and their properties or relations lies at the base of the system.

The concept of order

is not dependent upon perception but upon conception of
s L"TTilar relatio-ns bet-...reen vastly dissimilar thin:;s.
It is said in the 3ook of Chanr;es that "th-e Tao as
expressed there can be applied to what is for (the.
inoreanic or macrocosmic \-rcrld), and at. the ~ame tJ.m~
it can be applied t:J v.rhat is near. (the Imned1ate. so~1al
l·rorld or individual things). It 1s proper and fttt1nt;,
v1hen one speaks of snace between heaven and earth, it
embraces eve-rything.21
The Book of

I

I -

·I
I

Chanees therefore adds to the positive

dialectic a set of prir.ciples \·:hich can clarify much that

20shien, 2£· cit., p. 4.

2lshien,

12£·

cit.

__J-J

"2-20

would be left to doubt, and also expl-i citly fonnulates much
o-r the inner movement of the positive dialectic.

Primarily.,

the following principles have been noted:
Principle of Order
Principle of Struc-tural Similarity
Principle o-f the- Integrated Unit System
Hence these become the categories or postulates of an
ontology from the aspect of the positive dialectic.

It

assumes -a structural unity rather than a non-dual reality.

!-

However, the concept of order itself assumes a hierarchical_
class of principles but this is not explicitly formulated

I

within the Book of Changes.
The concept of Nothingness in Lao-Tzu's philosophy can
fill the gap in this problem.

Lao-Tzu provides the missing

element since his system assumes a hierarchical system from
order to nothingness.

The concept of Nothingness is one of

the central concepts of Lao-Tzu and the Taoist philosophers,
and it is, again,_ Professor Gi-1-ling Shien who has advanced
this concept, as well as demonstrating its interrelatedness
to order.
O.n the side of the

I·~adhyamikas-,

as, too, with the

Buddhists in general, there is a great reluctance to discuss
the concept of Sunyata 1 but not so with the concept of non-

being in Chinese thought.

The Taoists have thought it most

important to lend it more substanc-e than a mere negative

i'
.

I
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concept as in Buddhism.
Primarily, the concept of nothinenesE is based upon
the concept of spontaneity, with both spontaneity and nothingness being knmm by direct "intuition.
Investigatine;- the structure, or content, of t·: othinr;ness, Prof-ess-or Gi-Iviing Shien says:
• • • Then again, v:-c may find the sarne principle [Of
spontaneity? in our breathing. ~'Je are a\·:arc, if \"le stop
to notice, that there are inhalation and e}~alation in
alternation. It is a reflex action in which no conscious
effort is exp-e nded. The pushing out of air in exhalation
brings about a condition of vacuum in the lungs; \rrhen this
becomes great enough it starts the inward movement of the
air to fill the lungs. This inhalation continues until
the pressure of the inner expansion is rreat enou~h to
start the cycle again in the outward move."Tient of air.
That isy there is a continuous cycle of pressure from
positive to negative and back a~nin. As long as it is in
complete balance and all parts of the cycle have their
equivalents, there are symmetry and harmony and complete
return, in \'.rhich the inhalation moves directly into the
fallm.;ing exhalation over a smooth course, as it were.
This is a condition of comPlete spontaneity and, of course,
it is nothingness, beint: completely belO\'J tl':e threshold of
consciousness.22
The example of breathing supnlies an analogy to shov! the principles of proportion, symmetry, and harmony.

Tr.ese princinles

in their turn demonstrc.te the elements of spontaneity and presuppose (·the concept of) ;.: othingness.

Professor Shien clearly

makes this connection between spontaneity and nothineness when
he writes:

22Gi Ming Shien, "Nothingness in the Philosophy of
Lao-Tzu," Journal of Philosoohv East and \'lest, Vol. I, No. J,
p. 2.

2"22

We may gen~ra~ize to show the several parts of spon·taneity. It ~s lmportant to have proportion {analo~i7
symmetry~ and harmony.
Then, too, each force must be •
countered by an eauivalent force , and tl:e whole system
must return upon itse1f in such a manner that it will
continue in its cycle with self-suf:iciencv. In such
a system there will be the spontaneity which is tr.e
result of obtaining a complete null point, or nothinr,ness. 23

A class of principles in an hierarchical order suggest this amended form:
The
The
The
The
The

Principl-e
Principle
Principle
PrinciPle
Principle

of
of
of
of
of

Nothin?;ness
Spontaneity
Equivalence or Equilibrium
Proportion--Analogy and Symmetry
Order

A principle of order is assumed and this in turn rest·s

upon the notion of the Principle of Proportion, or analor,y,
and Symmetry.

This latter principle must accept the existence

of a Principle of Equivalence, or Equilibrium, or else it ,.;ill
not be symmetrical or proportioned ..

Again, this principle of

eouivalence, being at equipose, or a point of eouilibrium,
must in its turn assume a principle of spontaneity for ·its
existence.

Spontaneity and equivalence assume no outside

force or power acting upon it, directing it, or forcing an
external pattern upon it.

A system without this element of

spontaneity continually needs adjusting in order to function,
but with spontaneity, it must be
upon itself.

cyclical because it returns

In a cycle, it is self-sufficient.

23rbid., p. 3.

"In such a

I

22)

sys-tem, there will be the spontane.ity which is- the result of
obtaining a com pl et e null point or nothingness • n24

Thus, all

of these principles in turn rest upon the concept of nothingness:

Each in their turn depend upon

nothin~ness;

it is the

ultimate simplicity and the generati.nr; princifJle of all
things:
If we ask where the order, proportion and symmetry
come from, we shall notice a principle of ecuivalence.
From this we can find the presence of spont:ineity and
nothingness. Thus, we see the prime importance of
these two. When they are present~ the others follow
by necessary order of the universe or the Tao. They
represent a principle of inteeration by which every
part ha_rmonizes vlith every other part. This principle
is_ in every part a-nd at the same time transcends every
part because through its spontaneity and nothin~ness
there is generation and completion of' the univers e .
And this is the true meaning of the pr-incinle of
nothingness in the philosophy of Lao-Tzu.25
The concept of Nothingness has a twin aspect, for it can be
seen as the final expression of a structural unity since it
"represents a principle of integration by which every part
'

harmoniz-es \·lith every other part," and also as a non-dual
reference since it fftranscends" those very parts.
The tr:0nscendental reference from the metarhysical to

I

I.

·I

·j

the epi st e!!l ol or,ic al 1,·10uld 'ue equi va 1 ent to the adm is r ion
that the positive dialectic transforms itself by the denial
of even an nas if" assertion v.rhen it reaches towards the

_) ~)

-
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Principle of Nothingness.

It is not that it suddenly is

transformed into a neeative critique, but that it goes beyond
its

O'lftn

boundary, its own analogical form, to a concept \vhich

is no longer analogical or metaphoric, but can be clearly seen
to outstrip them both in the intuition o-r the non-dual insi .s ht
~~ich

transcends the

analo ~ ical,

tions and things in relation.

because it is beyond rela-

"The Tao tha t

c~n

be named is

not the eternal Tao.n26

!

-This is of course a different understanding of nothingness than that of Fung

Yu-la~

Philosophy, he ignores the

for in his History of

prohibit~on

Chine~e

I

against the Tao being

named when he says that the Tao has existence because it permeates everything and can be one thinr: and another.

And, he

further argues, it can, thus, be callert an "-all embracing
principlen27--but this cannot be the meanine of nothingness
because it is named.

It is clear that ·the true meaning of

nothingness is beyond existence 1r:hen Lao-Tzu says ·in the Tao
Te Ching that "Heaven and Earth and the ten thousand thinr,s
come from existence,_ but existence comes frm'l non-existence." 28

-, .

', ·

I·I

.I

Z6Lao-Tzu Tao Teh Ching., trans. P. Carus ( Chicap:o:
Open Court, 1945), Chap:-r, p. 73.
27Fung Yu-lan A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans.
Derk Bodde (reprinted:-Shanghai:North China Daily ~ews, 1949),
po. 177-179; and Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of ~h1nese
Philosophy, (Ne'Vt York: The r·-:acmillan Company, 1940, PP• 94-97 •
2BLao-Tzu, 2!?..• cit_., p. 102.
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III.

THE PROPOSITION AI\fD NEGATIVE DIALECTIC

To the negative dialectic the entire course of the
positive dialectic appears to be a system of
The negative dialectic,

bein~

ambi~uities.

a severe critic of the propo-

sitional form of judgement, sees its mm suecial task to be
the exposure of metaphoric and relational content in \·lhat is
apparently a literal

assertion~

Therefore, the transition

from the positive to the negative dialectic is a shift from

!-

the acceptance of the relational to its denial.
The mechanism of this denial needs

analy~is,

as does

the assertion that a consistent critic can say nothinp and
from silence nothine can be deducen.

The

nec~tive

dialectic

is a severe critic and therefore the mode and mechanism of
this critical technique will be examined.
equivalent to an analysis of the u·s -e of

I

This is of course

Ian~uap;e,

or more

..
I

correctly, the analysis of the use of the relational proposition compared with the ner,ative dialectic.
The proposition performs a twin object--it predicates
difference and

sa~eness

of some given referent.

But if the

proposition is limited to tne cone ept of sameness, it ,.,- ::mld
be a tautology and, therefore, it is the other more major
conce_p t of dif:'er •o: nce th~t needs analysis.

If all the nhilo-

sophical problems were to pass by in sine le file, they could
be .seen as attempts to make an assertion of some difference

,

i
I

.J ~)
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between things and concepts.
·The solution to th.e philosophical que.st.ions, sue:: as
the relation between the nhenomenal and noumenal, dvaita and
advaita, appearance and reality, maya and. 3rah"!lan,_ ignorance
and wisdom, cause and effect, jiva and

Drah~an,

etc.~

first assume that an underlying concept is valid.

must

It assumes

I
I .

the concept of difference can have more than an arbitrary or
praf,matic employment in propositions.

If, however, this con-

cept cannot be rationally defended., then all of these so-called
0hilosophical problems rest upon a spurious distinction.

It

is obvi.ous that. this is· the fundan.ental notion and if it fails,
then by the same analysis, so do all the derivative categori es and concepts ..
Nrsimhasramin, an Advaita-Vedantist followinr- the course
of Sankara, .-ras an extremely capable lohical disputer ,,,:ho
1

authored a "Critique of Difference" known as "The Bhedadhikara.''29

He examines the concept of difference and provides

additional evidence of the methodolop,ical
as

11

a~ployment

of reason

I
j

iI

disputationtt rather than as dialectic.
The first part of the work indicates a clear, consist-

ent em-ployment of reason in handling the proposition that the
Jiva and Isvara (the individual and the Lord) cannot be
2 9s. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and T. N. P • .l':Iahadevan,
A Critiaue of Difference (Bul ~ etins of the Department or
Indian Philosophy: No .• 2. University of !IJ:adras, 1936) •

J

.
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predicated as different, since difference is not real nor can
it rationally be defended.

(This is not to say that they

deny the seeming differences perceived, but only that apparent
difference can have no ultimate· validity.}

The argument devel-

ops in the recognition that the terr;ts, Jiva and I.svara, preclude difference, for the one is not perceived and the difference of the counter-correlate cannot be conceived.

The

Advaitan ackov-rledges the pragmatic , or empirical, "difference"
due to nescience, stating that it would advance nothinr, to
deny its inrerential character since it was merely nominal in
nature from its very beginning .JO

Inference cannot establish

any· evidence of absolute difference simply because of the
definational character of logical inference.

Inferential

evidence is "just that,n and is incapable of establishing anything but this tenuous tie by logic.

It is derived from logic

and postulates no more than what it assumes from the matrix of
logic.

It is at best a secondary means of cognitive evid-ence

whi ch must alvmys await further analysis to substantiate it .•.3 1
The Critioue next turns to the question of conditioning as a source for the establishment of difference.

Sut the

adjuncts \vhich are the conditioninr.; ar,ents cannot establ i sh
difference without the adjuncts.

If it is on~y kno~TI t hrough

them, then the concept of difference cannot be assumed ~dttout

JOibid., pp. 1.3 and 14 ••

-

3lrbid., p. 15, par. IV.

'

.

i
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them..

(The Critioue examines the conseouences of this conclu-

sion by testing its coherence, harmony, and interpretation
\-lith scriptural writin:::::s.32

But this has value only to

adherents of the tradition and therefore falls outside of
this work.

The next issue taken in the Bhedadhikara , namely,

the proble.'!l. of .presumption, also assumes a scriptural interpretation and by the same token \·!ill be i['"nored. )3.3
The more germane issue to this paper is Nrsimhasramin's
treatment of individuals:

If two apparently different indi-

viduals can be asserted to exist, then the concept of difference must have validity.

Tne previous point (of differenc.e

being unintelligible if dependent upon s.e.nse-contact) is
further pursued in this areument.

Among different individuals

there is no evidence for difference apart from adjuncts, such
as egoity,, body, and senses.

Hence the Vedantist 's conclusion

follows that the individual is only an adjunct-conditioned

part of the universal Self, Brahman.34

Differences and the

concept of difference heine thus not valid except in an
apparent way, the propositi.onal form ·which has a state.r:1ent of
difference as to major content suffers in its car.acity to
r.lirror reality.

'•ihen Bradley 1-"Trites:

The conclusion to \"lhich I am broue;ht is that a relational way of thought--anyone that moves by the machinery of terms and relations--must eive appearance, and not

-

32rbid., p. 16.

JJrbid.,_ p. 21.

34~., p. 22.

;
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truth • . It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical
comp:oml.s~~ most necessar-y, but in the end most indefens lbl e •.J :1
t r. ere are clear echoes back to Nrsimhasramin.
In Bradley' s philosophy, he c ont·inues t his analysis
along other lines in his criticism of things and their relations, qualities, space and time, causation, change, motion,
and the Self, \'lhich snows remarkably similar features to
that of the lvladhyamika and Advaita-Vedanta sch ools.

Bradley

further develops the problem of dif 7'erence and also provides
an elaboration o£ the mechanism of dialectic by his analysis
of the proposition as a form of judgement.
issue is the nature of the pro position

r,

I

The essential

itself~

~hether

this

hc. s contained within it, as a linguistic structure, the very
ele:n.ents antithetic to reason \'!hich, ironically enough, r ·eason
employs as its matter.

The basic Problem is the valid use of

the subject-verb-object combination.

It can be stated as:

X is in relation 1·Tith some Y
Bradley fore eful l y shO\·ls that:
• • • our conclusion briefly will be this~ delation
presupposes quality and qaality r-elation. Each can be
something neither together with, nor apart from, the
other; and the vicious ci:r;cle in vrhich they turn is not
the truth about reality .J o

35F. H. Bradley 1 Auoearance and Reality (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1930) J p. 33 •
J 6rb id., p. 21.

-

. I
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The point that he makes, and not without a sha d ed wit, is
that qualities are supposed to be isolated a~d, hence, r iven,
but if t ~lis be assumed t han an operat i nn of the ~n ind i s !Jresupposed. What is "different must be di~tinct, and, in c anseouence, related, n37 and this relation, .havine existence
only to the observ·er, can hardly be "9redicated of rea1i ty.
It is sugRested by Bradley th Rt this is the price for bein~

able to render finite the Y.Iorld.

The issue is v:hether rela-

tion is essential to 0ifferBnce, for upon one the other
depends.

His arp;ument is as subtle 0s it is simple.

It

assumes two qualities dif f erent from one another; hence, l'rhere
shall one relegate the difference?
• • • If it f a lls, in any degree or to any extent,
outside A or 3, we have relation at once. But, on the
other hand, how can difference and otherness faTl inside?
If we have in A any such otherness, then inside A w e must
distinr;uish its own quality and its other-ness. And if.
so, then the unresolved r roblem b reaks out inside each
0uality, and separates each into two ~ualities in relation. In brief, diversity wittout rel a ti on see~s a word
without rn eaning.38
Within the

d i ~ tinction

of substantive and adjective, he

employs the same analysis (as he does vdth al1_ the concepts
that he brin,ss before his critical eye), and they r:: eet the
same

conclusion.

Realizing that adjectives are said to

qualify a subject, a substantive, his argument can be dia-

37rbid., pp. 22-23.

38~., p. 24.
'

....-
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f';ra."!led for ereater clarity as,39
A lump of sugar
Adjectives
\'Thite
hard
sweet, etc.

Assmnntions
1.

2.

Properties are di s tinct.
i ~ not any one
of its ouali ties.

A substantive

It is obvious that the thing is not the unity of its adjectives, since it cannot be, if it is t a ken severally.

This is

the issue--it is the ancie.nt problem of the one and the many,
or in Bradley's terms, unity and multiplicity.

The properties

are obviously in s ome .relation ·r:ith t h e sub,::ect, "wh en \'.'hite,
hard, sweet, and the rest coexist in a
surely the secret of the thing.n40

cert ~ in

way, that is

The irony is reintroduced

\·:hen it is realized th8t th e adjectives are no\·/ suddenly sub-

,i ects.

Clearly the problem has a simple solution:

ouality A, it is simply in a relation with B.
counters:

r,IJhat does "is" mean here'i

~·;hat ever

Bradley

Certainly not "in rela-

tion with B," for that ·would hardly leave ro on en ou z h for B.

.I

Clearly t his is an exhibition of so :;histry when \·:ords not
intended literally are e nployed as such.
the relati on to be saved':
t~e line tha t

l

If s o, t h en h o~t! is

Tr~ e arg ument usually proceeds alonr:

the relati ~n is not ide ntical wi th the thinf but

is an attribute which adheres or belonrrs to the th i n~:;.

This,

of course, cannot escape detection, for if it adheres and

-

39Ibid., pp. 16-18.

40Ibid., p. 16.

; i
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belongs, or if the thin g has it, the ~uestion remains to be
c ~ nsidered:

In which way or sense can a thin~ have it--

a -dhere to it or have possessions 'i

As Bradley ac c urately

reflects, "Apart from metaphors not t a ken seriously, there
c.ppears really to be no ans\'ler. n 41

Tbe ancient dilemma

reasserts itself, for in predicatinG ''"ha_t
say what it is not, and, if not, then

i~

difi'erent you

nothin,r~

is said at all ..-

In spite o £' ·this,_ Bradley admits t -hat even thour.;: terms and
their relo.t i rms cannot exist to p, ether r.ar:noniously , there
must be

11

a v.rhole e:nbracin p: \·:hat is reL?,ted,

no differences and no rel2tion.n42

cr there i·;ould be

For everyday use, includ-

ing a pragmatic, terms and relations are

co~patible

only

because they are not analyze d --nor is there any s uch need.
But when these same dilemmas are transferred to the reaL'll of
metaphysics, there occurs a major difficulty.
Bradley C.ilploys his same method olog y throut;hout his
1.-z ork and he c oncludes his third chapter 1r:ith:
The reader 1trho has follo.,..red anC. ha~ ,r.;r e.s ped the principles of this chapte r , v.•i ll h a ve little need to ~ r end
hi~ ti me unon those whic h succeed it.
He will have seen
that ~~r e ; ~erience, wtere rel a tional, i ~ not true; ard
he \'i'ill have condemned, almost '·:ithout a he a ring, the
great mass of r.henoQena.43

'Taking his suc;gestion, v;e car: leave him for- other considerc:..t ions.

4lrbid.-, p ...

17.

43 Ibid., p. 29.

'
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It should be noted that a very c-urious fact r l:.ould
become quite obvious:

that literal st.-:: te~-.ents only seem

explicit when the metaphoric content is i~nored.

Critical

analysis consists nearly entirely in ex~osine the meta~horic
content th~t was ignored or v1 r.ich we.s not inter:ded to be a
subject for analysis because of its obviously non-litera1
reference.

On the other hand,_ it he.s al·ways been the asf.umn-

tion of the syste>.m builder and dogmatist that

:t~e

can present

Cis truths in the most precise and non-metaDhoric lanr,uaee-the critic merely points to the metaphor and asl:-s:
you mean? or, Is it
non-metaphoric terms?

',:hat do

possible to exrress this element in other
Looking back ·to 3radle:'l'-s assertions,

it is eaually clear that his entire criticism is

cothin~

than this and, as a matter of fact, hiE conclusion
been that he had found in

t~e

proposition an

more

~hould

analo~ical

have

form

that can never be taten a.:' literal because lani"_Suage is itself
hig.hly metaphorical and analoz, ical in content and strtAct•,;. re.
The basic asst.<nr;Jtion that this concer::tion attacks

i~

that language mirrors the structure of reality and therefore,
by invoking meaningful state~ents, you a~e also characterizing
reality.

Bertrand :tussell 1-vrites:

• • Our confidence in languaGe is due to the fact
that it shares the structure of th e physical ~orld, and
the:.-e-fore it can express that structure. '3 ut if there
is a ""-'or.ld. that is not in space-ti.'lle-, it nay !:ave a

234
structure \'.'hich we can never hope to
A more careful assertion

l \10Uld

~~nm•' .. 44

be--tl 1e extent to •::hich reality

can be understood within a space-time structure is a direct
function of the space-time structure of our lanr.uage, and it
is to that extent that we feel a confidence for la-nruar,e.
This is a far cry from predicating the linr;uistic s-tructure
to the physical world, or as \'Jittgenstein predicates to
Reality:
• • • The proposition constructs a world with the help
of log ical scaffoldin[, and therefore one can actually
see in the proposition all t h e lo,o; ical features possessed
by reality if it is true.45
Dogmatism, in any of

it~

diverse forms,

assert~

mu: L the .:: c:m e.

It is a tacit a greement tho t the proposition is not meant
metanhorica-l ly nor is it an e:>..."tension by an analor.ical leap.
It is the belief that it has an exact referent
characterizes Eome particular referent.

~hich

uniouely

It rests in the

belief that. literal ste:ltements are ir.. tr.enselves defensible.
Certainly this theory has convenient uses in everyday life,
but, as it ha~pens, this opinion becm~es the b ~ sis for the
literal rendering of feelin gs, and moreover, tte:: feelin .r::s
often seem to add an interpretation \dthin the literal sci-.eme

44nertrand Russell, Philosonhv (Ne1·; York: W. \·l. I":orton
&:.

c0 • '

193 6) , p .. 20 6-..

45Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Lo~ico-Philosonhicus
(New York:
Humanities Press, 1951), Sec. 4.cn.

'

I

.-J _)

235
of the linguistic structure.

This has become the source of

much of the wealth of the osychologist and nsychoanalyst.
On the other hand., it should be adr.litted that th..e
orocess in general is, on the surface, an aoparently justified one.

Bradley makes this clear when he justifi-es his

contention that every prooosition necessarily embodies a subject which is ultimate reality~6 A proposition asserts existence of a thing and isolates this ultimate reality by pr-edi.eating to it certain attributes,. yet by that process it
cannot be valid '\o!hen divorced or taken apart from the reality
which lies at its basis.

The proposition asserts a static

matrix within a certain space-time configuration, which by
the linguistic structure seems separate but cannot be so considered after the
lem

~ms

sli !~htest

scrutiny.

The heart of the prob-

seen by both r·.:ahayana and Advaita thinkers ":hen they

asserted the same truth in the principle that nothinr, is
intelligible when. taken apart from th·e '\>Thole or from unity.
Hence, the negative dialectic can be se.en as a proces·s in
v!hich the thinr-: asserted is shown as relative and therefore
not capable of providinr, a basis for do['}Jlatic· metaphysical
assertions.

An assertion taken literally needs a non-:Yleta-

phoric or non-relational character; without this form, it

46r-.

H. Bradley Log·i c (second. edit ion;. London: Oxford
University Press, 1922), pp. 49, 50, and 66.

.-·

)
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loses precisely the elements it sought for its certainty,
yet ironically enough it cannot separate itsel.f from the
relational.
In Vaihinger's classic work,47 his entire analysis of
theoreticalr practical, and religious fictions is based
entirely upon finding the hidden metaphor within a system
which would cause -embarrassment should its presence become
known.

The demand for literal or non-m-etaphoric understand-

ing involves the expansion of linguistic oatterns to uncover
their hidden. content.

This critical examination is very

similar to the negative dialectic in its pursuit of fictions
and ambiguities.
u·as

The neeative dialectic, not content with

if'T relations,. attacks directly the metar-horic content

and fi-nds that it cannot be predicated of reality.

But

Vaihinger does not ext end his concept of "as if" to tl:e
limit \'.·here he ., ,,ould have to admit Bradley's thesis of a
concept o£ non-determination or non-predication.
Therefore the final assertion of the non-dual traditions, or schools of thought, takes the non-relational form.
It might apoear as a tautology except that its meaning
reflects the entire teaching which precludes that identity.
The Advaita-Vedanta ·" That thou arttt or "Brahman and Atman are

47H. Vaihinger, Philosophy of nA§. If", trans. C• K•
Ogden (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner (.: Co., Ltd., 1932) •
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one" is not intend.ed either as a tautology or a relational
proposition.

It is an attempt to express an ontological fact

in which the totality is itself. non-relational and beyond
r-eason.48

The ass-ertion that it is beyond reason simply means

that an intuition of the non-dual gives a non-relation content that cannot be expressed in any dual, or relational,
proposition..

Hence from the aspect of the negative dialectic,

a metaphysical solution harmonizes the functions of reason by
recourse t .o a synthesis that is actually its inclusion in a
total picture.

The extension of reason beyond itself leads

to a non-relational form of the proposition.

Again, this

form is not meant to characterize either a specific thing
nor is it intended to be a tautology, but a proposition of
non-relations:

"That thou art."

The negation of difference

and yet the statement of the .real being both universal and
identical lies at the basis of the Advai ta ontology.
1~ad.hyamika,

The

on the other hand, does not offer any ontological

ass·e rtion, yet does advance the identity between Sunyata and
Tathagata.

The denial of all doctrines, or the advance~ent

of the "no-doctrine about reality" is not equivalent to the
philosophical nihilist, since that is clearly reject-ed as well
as all po.s iti ve assertions.

The ·intent of the l·Iadhyarnika is

4Bsurendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosoohy
(Cambridge: University Press, I, 1922; II, 1932), I, 439-440,
cf. II, 13-16.

2)8

clearly ·the re-jection of the conceptual tendency, but both
traditio.n s--the Nadhyamika and the Vedanta--do acknowledge a
reality which is non-dual and outside of all empirical
determinations.

Thus the non-relational form of the proposi-

tion provides a type of statement which precludes empirical
determinations and relational attributes.

)
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